Identity AIops

Governed AI-ops for self-hosted identity providers — Keycloak + authentik.

identity-aiops gives AI agents (and the humans supervising them) a safe, audited way to operate the identity plane of self-built and small/mid-size infrastructure: who can sign in, what failed and why, which OAuth clients are misconfigured, and who still has no second factor. It is built for teams running their own Keycloak or authentik who want agent-driven identity operations with receipts — every tool call is audited, and writes carry risk-tier labels with dry-run previews and undo tokens.

Verification status: modelled on the public Keycloak admin REST API and authentik API v3 and exercised against mocked responses; there is no recorded end-to-end run against a live instance yet. identity-aiops doctor is the fastest live check — see docs/VERIFICATION.md.

What it does

29 MCP tools: 21 reads (including the 4 analyses) + 6 governed writes + 2 undo tools (undo_list, undo_apply). The same tools work on both platforms — a per-target platform field selects the API shape (auth flow + resource paths).

Supported platforms

Platform notes: require_password_reset, rotate_client_secret, client_sessions, client_session_stats, and user_lockout_status are Keycloak-shaped (authentik has no equivalent endpoint — the tools return a teaching error there). authentik contributes the global session list used by the stale-access audit's orphaned-session check.

Missing a platform (Authelia, Zitadel, Ory...), an endpoint, or an analysis you need? 缺功能提 issue/PR 欢迎留言 — open an issue or PR at https://github.com/AIops-tools/Identity-AIops, feature requests welcome.

What this tool does, and does not, decide

It delivers identity-provider operations — reads and writes — accurately and records every one of them. It does not decide whether a write is allowed to happen. That is the agent's judgement, or the permission of the account you connect it with: give the Keycloak service account (or authentik token) only the roles you want the agent to have — view-users / view-events / view-clients and no manage-* — and the writes fail at the server, the place that actually owns the permission.

So there is no read-only switch, no policy file, no approval gate to configure. The one thing the tool guarantees is that nothing is silent: every call, over MCP and over the CLI alike, lands an audit row in ~/.identity-aiops/audit.db, and reversible writes still capture their before-state (fetched, never guessed) and record a replayable inverse.

Each tool declares a risk_level, carried into the audit row as a descriptive tier — so a reviewer can see at a glance that a row was, say, a high-risk secret rotation. It is a label, not a gate.

Running a smaller / local model? See agent-guardrails.md — it lists the guardrails this tool now enforces for you (so you don't spend prompt budget restating them) and gives a ready-made system prompt for what's left.

Quick start

As a Claude Code plugin

One install gives an agent both the skill and the MCP server:

/plugin marketplace add AIops-tools/marketplace
/plugin install identity-aiops@aiops-tools

The MCP server is fetched with uv and pinned to the package version this plugin declares, so an audit row can be traced back to the code that wrote it. Credentials are still configured with identity-aiops init — see below.

As an OpenClaw plugin

The same bundle is published on ClawHub, where one install delivers the skill and its MCP server together:

openclaw plugins install clawhub:@zw008/identity-aiops
openclaw skills info identity-aiops          # expect: Visible to model: yes

Restart the OpenClaw gateway afterwards so it loads the plugin. The MCP server is fetched with uv, pinned to this exact release, so uvx has to be on PATH — without it the skill still installs but reports Visible to model: no. Credentials are configured exactly as below.

As a CLI or standalone MCP server

uv tool install identity-aiops        # or: pipx install identity-aiops

identity-aiops init      # wizard: target + realm + credential (encrypted)
identity-aiops doctor    # token acquisition + user-count probe per target
identity-aiops overview  # one-shot estate summary

For Keycloak, create a confidential client with Service accounts roles enabled and grant its service account the realm-management roles you want the agent to have (start with view-users, view-events, view-clients; add manage-users / manage-clients only if you want the governed writes). For authentik, create an API token for a (least-privileged) admin user.

CLI surface: users (list/show/sessions/credentials + disable/enable/ revoke-sessions/require-reset), clients (list/show + set-redirect-uris/ rotate-secret), events, overview, doctor, secret, init, mcp. Write commands take --dry-run and always double-confirm; execution is delegated to the governed MCP twins so CLI writes land in the audit log too.

MCP configuration

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "identity-aiops": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["--from", "identity-aiops", "identity-aiops-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "IDENTITY_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD": "<master password for secrets.enc>"
      }
    }
  }
}

env-block caveat: MCP clients launch the server with a minimal environment — variables from your shell profile are NOT inherited. Anything the server needs (IDENTITY_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD, an alternate IDENTITY_AIOPS_HOME, IDENTITY_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY to attribute writes on the audit trail) must be set in the env block above.

Governance

Every MCP tool runs through the vendored governance harness (identity_aiops/governance/, zero external dependencies):

• Audit — every call (including errors) lands in ~/.identity-aiops/audit.db with params, status, and risk level, plus any optional approver/rationale annotation. It records; it does not authorize.
• Budget — per-session call/time budgets and a runaway breaker (IDENTITY_MAX_TOOL_CALLS, IDENTITY_MAX_TOOL_SECONDS, IDENTITY_RUNAWAY_MAX) — a safety backstop, not an authorization gate.
• Risk tier — reads are low; containment/hygiene writes (disable_user, revoke_user_sessions, require_password_reset) are medium; access-granting or boundary-replacing writes (enable_user, update_client_redirect_uris, rotate_client_secret) are high. The tier is a descriptive label carried onto the audit row, not a gate — whether a write runs is the agent's judgement or the connecting account's permissions. IDENTITY_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY / IDENTITY_AUDIT_RATIONALE are optional annotations recorded when set, never required.
• Undo — reversible writes capture the REAL prior state (fetched before mutating, never guessed) and record a replayable inverse descriptor in ~/.identity-aiops/undo.db. Irreversible writes (revoke_user_sessions, rotate_client_secret) record priorState only — the secret is stored masked, never in clear.
• Sanitize — every string an IdP returns is folded through an injection-safe normaliser (bounded length, control characters stripped) before an agent sees it.
• Secrets — credentials live Fernet-encrypted (scrypt-derived key) in ~/.identity-aiops/secrets.enc, never plaintext on disk; a legacy IDENTITY_<TARGET>_SECRET env var is honoured as fallback and identity-aiops secret migrate moves it in. TLS verification defaults ON.

Configuration

~/.identity-aiops/config.yaml (created by init):

targets:
  - name: sso1
    platform: keycloak
    base_url: https://sso.example.com
    realm: master
    username: identity-aiops-agent   # the confidential client's client_id
    verify_ssl: true
  - name: ak1
    platform: authentik
    base_url: https://auth.example.com
    verify_ssl: true

Set IDENTITY_AIOPS_HOME to relocate all state (config, secrets, audit, undo). IDENTITY_AIOPS_CONFIG points the MCP server at an alternate config file.

Development

uv sync
uv run pytest -q
uv run ruff check .

MIT License. Part of the AIops-tools line — governed AI-ops tooling for self-hosted infrastructure.