Iaiops Energy

Vendor-neutral, governed, READ-ONLY energy/substation telecontrol data tap — the energy edition (变电/电力) of Industrial-AIOps. Monitor-direction telemetry over IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC-104: RTU link status, general interrogation, single monitored-point reads by IOA — 遥测/遥信), DNP3 / IEEE 1815 (outstation link status, Class 0/1/2/3 integrity poll), and IEC 61850 MMS (IED logical-device directory, model browse, data-attribute reads) — plus the base cross-protocol brain (dataflow diagnosis, alarm bad-actors, data-quality scorecards, OEE, asset inventory, compliance self-assessment) mounted on the same server. Use when the task names IEC 60870-5-104 / IEC-104 / 104规约, DNP3 / IEEE 1815 / outstation, IEC 61850 / MMS / IED / GOOSE (GOOSE and Sampled Values are NOT supported — MMS reads only), a substation / 变电站 / RTU / SCADA gateway / telecontrol front-end, energy / power / utility SCADA telemetry, or 遥测遥信 / 电力监控. Routes to the iaiops-energy MCP server. Monitor-only by design: no control/operate (CROB, setpoints, select-before-operate, IEC-104 command ASDUs) is exposed. Do NOT use for factory/building/process protocols (OPC-UA, Modbus, S7, BACnet, MQTT …) — those live in the base iaiops server — nor for IT/network gear, Kubernetes, hypervisors, or backups.

iaiops-energy — substation / utility telecontrol data tap (变电 / 电力)

The energy edition of Industrial-AIOps as one governed MCP server: read-only connectors for the three utility telecontrol protocols — IEC 60870-5-104, DNP3 / IEEE 1815, IEC 61850 MMS — built on the base iaiops core, plus the base cross-protocol brain mounted onto the same server. Every tool runs through the iaiops governance harness (audit / budget / risk-tier); startup refuses to serve any tool missing the _is_governed_tool marker.

Monitor-direction ONLY — deliberately. No control/operate surface exists in this edition: no DNP3 CROB or analog-output, no setpoints, no select-before-operate, no IEC-104 command ASDUs (C_SC / C_DC / C_SE), no IEC 61850 control model. This is not a gated write — the tools simply do not exist, so an agent cannot be talked into operating a breaker. 未经授权勿对生产控制系统写入。

When to route here

Task mentions: IEC 60870-5-104 / IEC-104 / 104规约 / general interrogation / 总召 / IOA, DNP3 / IEEE 1815 / outstation / integrity poll / Class 0/1/2/3, IEC 61850 / MMS / IED / logical device / logical node / data attribute / functional constraint, substation / 变电站 / RTU / telecontrol / SCADA gateway, energy / power / utility telemetry, 遥测 / 遥信 / 电力监控.

Explicitly out of scope: IEC 61850 GOOSE and Sampled Values (layer-2 pub/sub — not supported; MMS client reads only), protection-relay settings changes, any control/operate action.

Factory / building / process protocols route elsewhere: OPC-UA, Modbus, Siemens S7, Mitsubishi MC, MTConnect, MQTT/Sparkplug B, EtherNet/IP, EtherCAT, SECS/GEM, PROFINET, HART-IP, BACnet → use the base iaiops server (pip install iaiops, then iaiops-mcp), not this one.

Install & run

bash

pip install 'iaiops-energy[energy]'      # all three protocols
pip install 'iaiops-energy[iec104]'      # or per-protocol extras:
pip install 'iaiops-energy[dnp3]'        #   [iec104] / [dnp3] / [iec61850]
iaiops-energy-mcp                        # brain + energy tools over stdio

iaiops-energy pulls in the base iaiops package (shared core) automatically. Protocol client libs are lazy optional extras — a missing lib degrades to a teaching error naming the exact pip install, not a crash. Targets live in ~/.iaiops/config.yaml (override path via IAIOPS_CONFIG): protocol: iec104|dnp3|iec61850, host, port, plus common_address / unit_id as the protocol needs. Credentials go to the encrypted secret store, unlocked via IAIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD — never into config or chat.

MCP client config (stdio):

json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "iaiops-energy": {
      "command": "iaiops-energy-mcp",
      "env": {
        "IAIOPS_CONFIG": "/etc/iaiops/config.yaml",
        "IAIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD": "<from your secret manager>"
      }
    }
  }
}

Every tool takes an optional endpoint selecting a named target from that config; omitted, the sole/default target of the protocol is used.

Tools by protocol (all [READ][risk=low])

IEC 60870-5-104 (c104; RTU / substation telemetry — 遥测遥信)

• iec104_connection_info — connect and report link status + discovered stations (common addresses) — the IEC-104 doctor step
• iec104_interrogate — general interrogation (总召): all monitored points of one station by ASDU common address, with type / quality / timestamp
• iec104_read_point — read ONE monitored point by information-object address (IOA)

DNP3 / IEEE 1815 (pydnp3; outstation monitoring)

• dnp3_link_status — bring the DNP3 master online and report link / outstation status — the DNP3 doctor step
• dnp3_integrity_poll — Class 0/1/2/3 integrity poll: the outstation's database grouped by measurement type (binary / analog / counter …)

IEC 61850 MMS (pyiec61850; substation IED reads — linux-only wheel)

• iec61850_device_directory — list the IED's logical devices (optionally their logical-node children) — the IEC 61850 doctor step
• iec61850_browse — browse immediate model children under a reference (LD / LN / DO)
• iec61850_read — read one data attribute by object reference + functional constraint (e.g. LD0/MMXU1.TotW.mag.f, FC MX)

Substation intelligence (pure analysis — no live I/O)

• substation_event_analysis — Sequence-of-Events (SOE) protection-trip / selectivity analysis: feed injected relay pickups/trips + breaker open/close + lockouts ({ref, timestamp, type}) and it decides what tripped and whether protection coordinated — selective trip vs non-selective backup operation vs breaker failure, cite-first, monitor-only（变电事件序列/保护选择性分析：判定 跳闸与保护配合是否正确——选择性跳闸/后备越级动作/断路器失灵；纯分析、只读， 不做任何 live I/O）

Cross-protocol brain (mounted from the base iaiops package)

The base brain tools register onto this server too — diagnostics (diagnose_dataflow, alarm_bad_actors, tag_health, historian_health, data_quality_scorecard, downtime root-cause), analytics (OEE / downtime, monitor_changes), asset inventory + unified asset model / alias governance, and compliance self-assessment (防护指南 / 等保 2.0 / IEC 62443) — plus protocols_supported for the capability map. Same governance harness; see the base iaiops skill for the full brain reference.

Supported versions (honest matrix)

Protocol	Lib pin (this release)	Spec / transport	Verification status	CI
IEC 60870-5-104	c104>=2.0,<3	IEC 60870-5-104 over TCP/2404	verified (monitor path) — real client↔server round-trip vs an in-process c104 server (tests/test_iec104_live.py, passes in a Linux container): general interrogation returns seeded points, bad IOA → no fabricated value, no control ASDU issued; skips on macOS (no c104 wheel). Live RTU 待核实	✅ runs every push
DNP3 / IEEE 1815	pydnp3>=0.1,<1	IEEE 1815, TCP; monitor direction only	verified (monitor path) — real master↔outstation round-trip vs a live opendnp3 outstation in Docker/Linux; physical RTU 待核实	⏭ skips on hosted CI ¹
IEC 61850 MMS	pyiec61850>=1.5.2a1,<2 (linux-only wheel)	MMS over ISO-on-TCP/102; no GOOSE/SV	verified (monitor path) — real client↔server round-trip vs an in-process libiec61850 MMS server in Docker/Linux; physical IED 待核实	⏭ skips on hosted CI ¹

¹ CI-coverage caveat (honest). Only IEC-104's monitor path is CI-gated — the CI job hard-installs the iec104 extra, so test_iec104_live.py runs its loopback round-trip on every push. DNP3 and IEC-61850 are loopback-verified only via manual / Docker runs: their native libs (opendnp3 via pydnp3, libiec61850 via pyiec61850) don't build on hosted GitHub runners, so CI installs them best-effort and test_dnp3_live.py / test_iec61850_live.py SKIP there. A regression in the DNP3 or IEC-61850 monitor path is thus not caught by CI — re-verify those with a manual/Docker run; the green CI badge does not cover them.

pydnp3 ships no wheel (native opendnp3 build → run in a Linux container); pyiec61850 is a linux-only SWIG wheel — both protocols no-op with a teaching error elsewhere. Anything not yet proven against real gear stays marked 待核实 — do not claim otherwise.

Doctor-first workflow

1. protocols_supported — see what this server exposes and what's configured.
2. Prove the link with the protocol's cheap status tool before any deep read: iec104_connection_info / dnp3_link_status / iec61850_device_directory.
3. Only then interrogate: iec104_interrogate / dnp3_integrity_poll / iec61850_browse → targeted reads (iec104_read_point / iec61850_read).
4. Feed results to the brain (e.g. diagnose_dataflow for "no data", data_quality_scorecard for fleet trust, alarm_bad_actors for floods).

Safety

Read-only edition: zero write/control tools, so there is nothing to gate — the strongest guarantee available. All tools are risk=low, audited, and budget-tracked; errors return the canonical {error, hint} shape. Never point this at production telecontrol gear without authorization; interrogations and integrity polls do generate real traffic on the operational link. No tool returns secrets.