ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

iaiops-energy

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a clearly disclosed, read-only industrial telemetry MCP routing guide, with operational cautions but no artifact-backed hidden persistence or control behavior.

Install only if you intend to connect an MCP client to authorized energy telecontrol endpoints. Treat even read-only polling as operational traffic, keep IAIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD in a real secret manager, and review the external pip package separately if your environment requires runtime code provenance checks.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (1)

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

md
**Monitor-direction ONLY — deliberately.** No control/operate surface exists in
this edition: no DNP3 CROB or analog-output, no setpoints, no
select-before-operate, no IEC-104 command ASDUs (C_SC / C_DC / C_SE), no
IEC 61850 control model. This is not a gated write — the tools simply do not
exist, so an agent cannot be talked into operating a breaker.
未经授权勿对生产控制系统写入。

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.