uas-ops-checker

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 18, 2026 · 10:39 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This is a local drone compliance helper with no evident malware behavior, but its regulatory output should be checked against official sources.

Use this as a local reference aid only. It appears safe to run from a security perspective, but do not treat its classifications as legal proof; verify against current official Chinese UAS rules, especially when only one weight value is available or the operation involves controlled airspace, commercial use, or other special conditions.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Behavioral AST: exec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (5)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Confidence: 91% confidence
• Finding: The line states that the documentation is in Chinese only ("中文文档见 `SKILL.md`") and does not indicate any alternative language option or user choice. Under the policy, imposing a specific language without opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless clearly justified as region-specific.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The visible display name, description, headings, usage notes, warnings, and FAQ are all presented in Chinese. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in or a documented justification is a natural-language policy violation.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: The tool presents itself as rule-based compliance support tied to specific Chinese legal and regulatory sources, but the implemented branching logic appears simplified and may not faithfully encode the cited standards. In a compliance decision-support context, this can misclassify aircraft or obligations, causing unsafe or unlawful operational decisions by users who over-trust the output.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The module docstrings, CLI descriptions, argument help text, errors, notes, and disclaimer strings are all hard-coded in Chinese throughout the file. This creates a language/locale restriction without any opt-in, fallback, or explanation that the skill is intentionally limited to Chinese-speaking users or a China-specific deployment context.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low

• Category: Dangerous Code Execution

Content

out_list.append({"tool": META["slug"], "input": d, "errors": [str(e)], "rc": 2, "aigc_mark": AIGC})
        print(json.dumps(out_list, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
        sys.exit(0 if allok else 2)
    args = {k: getattr(ns, k) for k in argnames}
    try:
        res, rc = _run(args)
    except GateError as e:

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.