Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
ClawScan rates the skill benign with medium confidence: the reported findings are treated as expected for its stated purpose, though Skillspector’s review is partial because some references could not be resolved.
Before installing, consider whether you are comfortable sending selected media to Miragea and review that service’s privacy and retention terms. The tool scope is undeclared, and Skillspector’s scan was partial because some references could not be resolved, so the evidence is incomplete.
The skill describes processing local video and audio, but does not warn that their contents are transmitted to a third-party service. Line 13 identifies Miragea as the provider, but naming the provider alone does not clearly disclose the privacy implications of submitting potentially sensitive recordings.
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.
self.timeout = timeout
self.opener = urllib.request.build_opener(NoRedirect())
def request(self, method, path, payload=None, content_type=None, key=None, timeout=None):
headers = {'Authorization': 'Bearer ' + self.key, 'Accept': 'application/json'}
if content_type:
headers['Content-Type'] = content_type
Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, ValueError) as exc:
raise ClientError({'error': {'code': 'request_failed', 'message': 'API request failed; submission outcome may be unknown. Reuse the same idempotency key for the same payload.'}}) from None
def task(self, task_id, timeout=None):
return self.request('GET', '/tasks/' + urllib.parse.quote(task_id, safe=''), timeout=timeout)
def capabilities(self):
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
cmd += [flag, str(p[k])]
for t in p.get("tags", []):
cmd += ["--tag=" + t]
r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
if r.returncode != 0 or not os.path.exists(out_path):
sys.stderr.write(r.stdout + r.stderr)
raise ScriptError("generate failed for: %s... Re-run the same command to resume; the same idempotency key "
Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.
raise ValueError('--reference-text requires --reference-audio-url.')
payload = {'text': args.text if args.text is not None else args.text_file.read_text(encoding='utf-8')}
for field in ('actor_id', 'reference_audio_url', 'reference_text', 'model', 'format', 'speed', 'tags', 'language'):
value = getattr(args, field)
if value is not None:
payload[field] = value
result = client.request('POST', '/audio/generations', json.dumps(payload).encode(), 'application/json', submission_key)