T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
references/broadcasts-reference.md:294- Finding
Broadcast deletion lacks server-side authentication and ownership validation
- Content
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No script provided. Documented for completeness. DELETE https://api.insightssystem.com/api:6_ZYypAc/broadcast/:broadcast_id Authorization: Bearer Origin: https://console.notifyer-systems.com **Path parameter:** `broadcast_id` (integer — the `id` field, not `broadcast_identifier`) **Xano function stack:** 1. `/cors_origin_console` 2. Get Record From `broadcast_schedule` 3. **Delete Bulk Records In `user's_recipient_phone_numbers`** (cascade delete of all recipients) 4. Delete Record In `broadcast_schedule` **No `/get_user` call** — authentication relies solely on CORS origin check. **Response:** Empty body (HTTP 200). ``` The corresponding script directly invokes the vulnerable endpoint without first verifying that the requested broadcast belongs to the authenticated workspace: ```js const result = await requestJson(config, { method: "DELETE", path: `/api:6_ZYypAc/broadcast/${id}`, body: { broadcast_id: Number(id) }, }); ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented backend function stack does not resolve the bearer token to a user and does not compare the broadcast's owner or workspace with the caller. It relies solely on the `Origin` header through `/cors_origin_console`. CORS is a browser security control, not an authentication or authorization mechanism. Non-browser clients can freely supply: ```http Origin: https://console.notifyer-systems.com ``` The shared API client automatically supplies that header. Although the script requires `NOTIFYER_API_TOKEN` locally, the documented backend function does not call `/get_user`, so the au ...[truncated 1258 chars]- Remediation
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