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Security audit

Agent Relay Orchestrator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to be an agent-orchestration helper, but it asks users to run mutable external code that controls Claude sessions, stores context, and uses external integrations without enough disclosure.

Review before installing. Run the orchestrator only from a pinned, audited commit or release, use a dedicated low-privilege environment, provide a least-privilege Notion token, keep the HTTP API bound to localhost with access controls, and avoid sending secrets or proprietary code unless you understand what is persisted and what is synced to Notion or Telegram.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:16
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies and Repository Code Are Installed and Executed

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 50)May include surrounding context.

git clone https://github.com/TheAgentAcademy/agent-relay-orchestrator.git cd agent-relay-orchestrator npm install cp .env.example .env

Edit .env with your Notion credentials

npm start

text

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 51)May include surrounding context.

git clone https://github.com/TheAgentAcademy/agent-relay-orchestrator.git cd agent-relay-orchestrator npm install cp .env.example .env

Edit .env with your Notion credentials

npm start

text

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The metadata and setup require Notion credentials and describe visibility through an external service, but the skill does not warn that user prompts, worker outputs, or metadata may be transmitted to Notion or other third-party integrations. In this context, the omission is security-relevant because users may assume orchestration is local-only while sensitive agent data is actually shared externally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill documents local HTTP endpoints that expose worker state, events, sessions, and metadata, and also describes persistence and auto-resume, but it does not warn users that sensitive prompts, outputs, and operational metadata may be retrievable through those endpoints or retained across restarts. In an agent orchestration context, these records can contain proprietary code, secrets, or system instructions, so omission of this warning meaningfully increases the risk of unintended disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

Health Check

bash
curl http://localhost:3890/health

Returns service status, active workers, and ticker state.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest and top-level documentation consistently position the skill around Claude Code orchestration with Notion visibility, but the documented API section exposes a "Toggle Telegram Ticker" capability instead. This is not merely omitted detail: it names and documents a different integration target than the stated Notion visibility purpose, creating an active intent/documentation contradiction.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.