T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:370- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a translation API skill whose file upload, API key use, status polling, and download behavior match its stated purpose, with some privacy and implementation cautions.
Install only if you are comfortable sending selected documents or text, plus an API key, to the external translation service shown in the skill. Use a dedicated or low-privilege API key, review each file before upload, avoid sensitive regulated content unless the service terms allow it, and run the example code in an isolated environment with safer temporary-file handling if adapting it.
SKILL.md:370Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
SKILL.md:225Predictable Temporary File Enables File Overwrite and Cross-Run Data Disclosure
The skill supports uploading local files to an external service, sending API-authenticated requests, and writing downloaded archives to disk, but it does not clearly warn users about these behaviors. In an agent environment with read and exec tools, missing disclosure materially increases the risk of sensitive data exfiltration or unsafe handling of downloaded content.
The feature comparison explicitly states 'Webhook: 不支持' for the free version at L088. However, the skill later presents automated API-driven completion handling patterns and describes callback-style automation as part of the broader capability set, creating an intent-level contradiction in the documentation for what the free edition supports.
This skill explicitly instructs the agent/user to send local file contents and text to an external domain using authenticated API requests. External transmission is expected for a translation service, but in a general-purpose agent context it is still security-relevant because users may not realize their data is leaving the local environment.
# 获取支持的语言列表
curl https://api-verify.example.com/languages
# ...
# 创建翻译项目
curl -X POST https://api-verify.example.com/project \
The trigger condition is broad enough that routine requests involving translation or localization could invoke the skill unintentionally. In this skill's context, accidental activation is more dangerous because the tool can upload local files, transmit text to a remote API, and download outputs to disk, leading to unintended data transfer.
The automation example shows repeated authenticated requests to an external service and subsequent download behavior, which creates a real data-transfer surface. While this is core functionality rather than overtly malicious behavior, it remains dangerous in an agent setting because it normalizes unattended external communication and file handling.
-F "title=auto_$FILE" | jq -r '.data.project_id')
# ...
# 确认项目
curl -s -X POST https://api-verify.example.com/project/confirm \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
-d "project_id=$PROJECT"
# ...
The '不适用场景' section says the tool is not appropriate for '文学创作翻译', implying an excluded use case. Yet the provided client and examples at L172-L264 and elsewhere accept arbitrary text/files and target languages with no checks or restrictions reflecting that documented limitation, so the documented intent is not reflected in behavior.