Back to skill

Security audit

上市策略引擎(免费版)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to be a go-to-market planning template, but it asks for shell and file-writing powers that its stated purpose does not need.

Install only if you are comfortable with a Chinese-language GTM planning skill that declares more local authority than it appears to need. Prefer a version that removes exec/write or clearly limits them, and only use callback_url with an endpoint you trust for potentially sensitive product and market information.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:16
Finding

Unnecessary Shell Execution and File-Write Capabilities

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 16-19
Vulnerability Type: Excessive tool permissions and violation of least privilege
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable configuration:

yaml
tools:
  - read
  - exec
  - write

Technical Analysis

The skill declares access to both exec and write, although its documented purpose is to analyze product information and generate a text-based go-to-market strategy. The documented workflow does not identify any operation that legitimately requires executing operating-system commands or modifying local files.

Granting capabilities beyond the skill's functional requirements violates the principle of least privilege. If the hosting agent exposes these declared tools without an additional authorization boundary, malicious user input, indirect prompt injection in analyzed content, or an agent reasoning error could cause the skill to invoke shell commands or write files unrelated to its stated purpose.

The configuration does not itself contain a malicious command, and no automatic exploitation behavior was identified. The risk arises from making high-impact tools available to a documentation-only workflow without a documented need or restrictive policy.

Attack Path

  1. A user invokes the skill with product or market information containing adversarial instructions, or untrusted content is introduced into its context.
  2. The agent processes that content while the unnecessary exec and write tools are available.
  3. The adversarial content attempts to persuade the agent to execute a command or create or overwrite a file.
  4. If the agent platform does not independently enforce sandboxing, path restrictions, command allowlisting, and user confirmation, the requested operation may run with the operating-system privileges of the agent process.
  5. The operation could affect files and resources accessible to that process.

Impact Assessment

Su ...[truncated 621 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove exec and write from the declared tool list because neither capability is required for generating a go-to-market strategy:
    yaml
    tools:
      - read
    
  2. If the platform can produce responses without a read capability, remove that permission as well and use only the minimum text-input and text-output facilities required by the host.
  3. If a future feature genuinely requires file creation, expose a narrowly scoped write operation restricted to a designated output directory, prohibit overwriting existing files by default, and require explicit user confirmation.
  4. Do not restore general shell access for routine document generation. If execution later becomes necessary, use an allowlist of fixed commands and arguments, reject shell metacharacters, run in an isolated sandbox, restrict network access, and require confirmation before execution.
  5. Add a documented tool-use policy stating that product descriptions, competitor material, and other supplied content are untrusted data and must never be treated as instructions to invoke tools.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The description says the skill is suitable for broad 'development scenarios' and emphasizes reusable workflows without tightly scoping when it should be invoked. Overly generic applicability can cause the agent to select this skill outside intended GTM tasks, increasing the chance of unnecessary tool access or unintended data handling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill declares exec capability even though the documented functionality is purely GTM strategy generation and does not describe any legitimate need to run local system commands. This unnecessarily expands the skill's privileges and creates avoidable risk that prompt content or future revisions could trigger command execution, potentially exposing local data or altering the environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill documents a callback_url parameter for asynchronous completion but provides no warning that outputs may be transmitted to an external endpoint. In practice, users may supply sensitive business plans, market data, or internal product details, which could then be exfiltrated to an untrusted destination without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The visible natural-language content, including display name, description, usage, and examples, is entirely in Chinese. This can violate language/locale choice expectations because the skill effectively forces one language without stating that it is Chinese-only or offering an opt-in or alternative locale.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.