T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
- GUIDE.md:57
- Finding
- Plaintext Storage of a Sensitive HealthOS API Token## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `GUIDE.md`, lines 57–60 **Vulnerability Type**: Plaintext credential storage guidance **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code Snippet ```markdown For a *new* user account: 1. Generate a token: **app → Settings → Health data → API** (or the developer page), or `POST /api/v1/tokens` with the four read scopes. 2. Set it in Quark: add `HEALTHOS_API_TOKEN` to `env.vars` in `/root/.openclaw/openclaw.json` (or the equivalent agent env). ``` ### Technical Analysis The setup guide instructs users to place `HEALTHOS_API_TOKEN` in a general JSON configuration file. A bearer token is equivalent to a password for the permissions assigned to it. Storing it as plaintext in a regular configuration file exposes it to any user, process, backup system, diagnostic collector, or support bundle that can read or copy that file. The project does not require restrictive permissions for this configuration file, recommend a dedicated secret store, or provide token rotation and revocation guidance. Although the client itself does not print the token and only sends it to the fixed HealthOS API origin, those runtime safeguards do not protect the credential while it is stored on disk. ### Attack Path 1. A local process, compromised agent component, administrator, backup operator, or other party obtains read access to `/root/.openclaw/openclaw.json` or a copied backup. 2. The party extracts the plaintext value assigned to `HEALTHOS_API_TOKEN`. 3. The token is supplied as a bearer credential to `https://api.healthosx.com/api`. 4. The party invokes API endpoints authorized by the token, such as health summaries, metrics, sleep records, workouts, catalog information, coverage information, or raw archive endpoints. 5. Access remains possible until the token expires or is explicitly revoked. This exploitation path depends on an attacker first obtaining access to the configuration file; the findin ...[truncated 847 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Store the API token in the platform's dedicated secret-management facility rather than in the general OpenClaw JSON configuration. 2. Inject the token into `HEALTHOS_API_TOKEN` only at runtime, ensuring it is not written to command histories, prompts, logs, diagnostic output, or source-controlled files. 3. If file-backed storage is unavoidable: - Place the token in a dedicated secrets file rather than the general configuration. - Restrict ownership to the service account that runs the agent. - Apply owner-only permissions, such as mode `0600`. - Exclude the file from source control, backups, support bundles, and diagnostic collectors unless those systems provide equivalent encryption and access controls. 4. Continue granting only the minimum required read scopes and avoid broader or separately scoped health-data permissions. 5. Document procedures for immediate token revocation and rotation after suspected disclosure. 6. Prefer short-lived credentials where the HealthOS API supports them, and periodically rotate long-lived personal tokens. 7. Update the setup guide to explain that bearer tokens are sensitive credentials and must not be placed in ordinary plaintext configuration without appropriate protection.