other
Warning
- Location
scripts/social_client.py:39- Finding
Stable Host Fingerprint Is Unnecessarily Collected and Repeatedly Transmitted
- Content
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str: raw = f"{getpass.getuser()}@{socket.gethostname()}" return hashlib.sha256(raw.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:24] ``` ```python def ensure_user() -> dict[str, Any]: """Load or create user_id. Returns full user record from server.""" cached = load_user() fp = machine_fingerprint() resp = _post_json("/v1/register", {"machine_fingerprint": fp}) user_id = resp["user_id"] record = { "user_id": user_id, "machine_fingerprint": fp, "is_new": resp.get("is_new", False), } save_user(record) return {**record, **resp} ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill reads the current operating-system username and hostname and combines them into a persistent machine fingerprint. Although the resulting value is hashed, usernames and hostnames often have limited entropy and predictable formats. An operator with candidate values may therefore enumerate likely combinations and compare their truncated SHA-256 hashes. This collection exceeds the minimum local access required to query social-media data. Quota management could instead use a cryptographically random identifier generated locally without inspecting host identity information. The implementation also loads the cached registration record but never uses it. Consequently, every normal tool invocation calls `ensure_user()`, regenerates the fingerprint, and sends it to the external `/v1/register` endpoint even when registration has already occurred. The fingerprint permits calls from the same username-host combination to be correlated over time. Only the hash is transmitted by the audited code; there is no evidence that the raw username or hostname is sent directly. ### Attack Path 1. A user invokes `que ...[truncated 1256 chars]- Remediation
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