proxmox-mcp

An MCP server that lets an AI client read and operate a Proxmox VE cluster, VMs, containers, and nodes, over plain API-token auth.

Why: your homelab lives in Proxmox, and you want an agent to inventory it, boot a guest, or trace a task without you clicking through the web UI. How it differs: a strict three-tier write gate is built into every tool, so reads are open but anything that changes state needs an explicit confirm flag, and anything destructive needs two more gates on top. Status: WIP. The tool surface and the safety model are stable, but the package is still pre-1.0. The latest release is 0.12.0.

Website & docs → lidless.dev/proxmox-mcp

What it does

proxmox-mcp is an open-source Model Context Protocol server for Proxmox VE, the open-source virtualization platform. It gives an AI client (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, OpenClaw, Codex CLI, or any MCP host) a structured, gated interface to a Proxmox cluster: inventory VMs and LXC containers, inspect node and storage status, read RRD metrics, trace tasks, manage snapshots and backups, run gated reads and shell commands inside guests, and provision, clone, or destroy resources, all over Proxmox API-token auth.

It is built for homelab and virtualization operators who want to point an agent at their cluster without handing it a root shell. The differentiator is the write-safety model: 96 tools split across four tiers, where reads need nothing, safe writes need confirm: true, and destructive operations need confirm: true + destructive: true + a process-level PROXMOX_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE=1 env flag. A hallucinated or careless tool call fails closed, before any HTTP traffic reaches Proxmox.

Proof

A real MCP client config. Drop this into Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json) and the 96 tools appear in the client. Reads work immediately; the destructive env gate stays off until you opt in.

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "proxmox": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@solomonneas/proxmox-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "PROXMOX_URL": "https://192.0.2.10:8006",
        "PROXMOX_TOKEN_ID": "pve-admin@pam!api-token-1",
        "PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET": "REPLACE_WITH_TOKEN_SECRET",
        "PROXMOX_TLS_INSECURE": "false"
      }
    }
  }
}

Tool list (96 tools, verified against source)

Tier markers below are authoritative: each tool's gate is enforced in code (src/gates.ts + per-tool schema), and WriteGateError fires before any HTTP call when a gate is unmet.

Generated from docs/assets/workflows/proxmox-safety.json with lidless workflow.

Reads (43): open; no flags required. Gated guest reads (4): guest file/path/directory/service inspection tools require confirm: true because they expose in-guest state through host-backed SSH. Safe writes (41): require confirm: true. The schema documents the gate on every tool. WriteGateError fires before any HTTP call. Destructive (8): require confirm: true + destructive: true + env PROXMOX_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE=1. All three gates must be satisfied; if any one is missing the tool throws WriteGateError before resolving the resource.

Eight tools are destructive and can delete, hard-stop, or power off resources: proxmox_destroy_resource, proxmox_cleanup_smoke_resources, proxmox_rollback_snapshot, proxmox_delete_snapshot, proxmox_force_stop_resource, proxmox_delete_volume, proxmox_node_power, and proxmox_delete_storage. They are gated behind the PROXMOX_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE=1 process env flag and stay inert until you set it. See SECURITY.md and the Safety section.

Quickstart

Install globally or run on demand with npx:

npm install -g @solomonneas/proxmox-mcp
# or, no install:
npx -y @solomonneas/proxmox-mcp

Set the three required credential env vars (scrub real hosts and IPs out of any shared config):

export PROXMOX_URL=https://192.0.2.10:8006
export PROXMOX_TOKEN_ID=pve-admin@pam!api-token-1
export PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET=REPLACE_WITH_TOKEN_SECRET

# Optional: skip TLS cert validation for homelab self-signed certs.
# Accepts true/1/yes (case-insensitive). Defaults to false.
export PROXMOX_TLS_INSECURE=false

Wire it into your MCP client (full per-client config in Setup):

# Claude Code
claude mcp add proxmox -s user -- npx -y @solomonneas/proxmox-mcp

Then ask your agent to list your cluster's containers. Reads work with nothing but the three credential vars; write and destructive tiers stay gated until you opt in.

Note: the latest published version is 0.12.0. npx/npm install pins the published release; this repository may track ahead between releases.

Configuration

Set the following env vars. All three credential vars are required.

PROXMOX_URL=https://192.0.2.10:8006
PROXMOX_TOKEN_ID=pve-admin@pam!api-token-1
PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET=REPLACE_WITH_TOKEN_SECRET

# Optional: skip TLS cert validation (homelab self-signed certs).
# Accepts true/1/yes (case-insensitive). Defaults to false.
PROXMOX_TLS_INSECURE=false

# Optional (experimental): load tools on demand instead of listing all 96.
# Accepts true/1/yes (case-insensitive). Defaults to false. See "Deferred tool loading".
PROXMOX_DEFERRED_TOOLS=false

PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET is the UUID Proxmox shows exactly once when you create the API token; it cannot be read back afterwards. Every example here uses a literal REPLACE_WITH_TOKEN_SECRET placeholder rather than a UUID-shaped dummy, so copying a snippet into your own repo will not trip a secret scanner.

Trailing slashes on PROXMOX_URL are stripped. The token secret is registered with the redactor on startup and masked from all log + error output.

Deferred tool loading (experimental)

96 tool schemas cost roughly 17k tokens of context in every request, whether or not the agent needs a single one of them. Set PROXMOX_DEFERRED_TOOLS=1 and the server instead starts with one tool, proxmox_search_tools. The agent describes its task, gets back matching tool descriptors, and those tools are added to that connection's tool list; the server emits notifications/tools/list_changed, the client re-reads the list, and the agent calls the tool it wants with its own real schema. Measured on a live connection, the visible tools/list payload drops from 68,495 bytes to 1,400, a 98% reduction.

Requirements and caveats:

• Your client must honor notifications/tools/list_changed, and not all of them do. Measured against a real connection:

  Client	Deferred mode	Notes
  Claude Code 2.1.219	works	re-fetches tools/list 2ms after the notification, then calls the new tool
  Cursor (cursor-agent 2026.07.23)	does not work	receives the notification, never re-lists; the agent is then told the tool does not exist
  Codex CLI 0.145.0	untested	could not dispatch MCP tool calls headlessly in our harness, so list_changed support is unknown

  A client that ignores the notification will see the search succeed, be told which tools were loaded, and then be unable to call any of them. Leave the flag unset there. Default (flag unset) is the full static tool list exactly as before, which is why static profiles remain the supported path.

• On clients that apply their own tool deferral, a newly listed tool may be visible but not immediately callable until the client fetches its schema, which costs one extra turn.

• Hiding a tool is not a safety mechanism. Destructive tools are searchable, and the gate chain is unchanged: a tool reached through search still requires confirm: true, destructive: true, and PROXMOX_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE=1 exactly as it would otherwise. Search results carry each tool's tier and the gate arguments it will demand. The gates in src/gates.ts are the boundary; visibility is a token optimization.

• Calling a tool by name that search has not surfaced still works. Refusing it would create a second, weaker enforcement surface without adding safety.

In-container exec env vars

The proxmox_exec, proxmox_read_file, and proxmox_write_file tools SSH to the Proxmox host (for LXC, via pct exec) or directly to the VM (for QEMU). All are optional; defaults derive from PROXMOX_URL.

Per-VM overrides (read at execute time, no MCP restart needed):

• PROXMOX_VM_<vmid>_SSH_HOST - pin a VM's IP (bypasses guest agent)
• PROXMOX_VM_<vmid>_SSH_USER - per-VM user override
• PROXMOX_VM_<vmid>_SSH_KEY - per-VM key override

For QEMU VMs without a per-VM env override, install qemu-guest-agent in the VM and enable it with qm set <vmid> --agent 1 so the IP can be discovered automatically.

Set PROXMOX_EXEC_BACKEND=guest-agent to run QEMU guest commands entirely through the qemu-guest-agent API instead of SSH. This needs no in-guest SSH key and no network path from the MCP host to the VM (traffic goes through the Proxmox API), but the API token needs the VM.GuestAgent.* privileges (Unrestricted for exec, FileRead/FileWrite for file ops). LXC guests always use pct exec over host SSH regardless of this setting.

Waiting for long-running tasks

Provisioning and disk operations (proxmox_create_container, proxmox_create_vm, proxmox_clone_resource, proxmox_run_backup, proxmox_restore_backup, proxmox_migrate_resource, proxmox_resize_disk, proxmox_download_url, proxmox_destroy_resource) return a task UPID immediately. Pass wait: true (with optional wait_timeout seconds, default 120) to block until the task finishes; the result then includes a task object with done, exitstatus, and ok (true only for an OK exit). Without wait, use proxmox_wait_task to poll the UPID yourself.

CLI

The same package ships a read-only control CLI, proxmoxctl (alias proxops), for shells, cron, and CI. It shares the ProxmoxClient core with the MCP server and reads the same env config (PROXMOX_URL, PROXMOX_TOKEN_ID, PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET, PROXMOX_TLS_INSECURE). It exposes only read/inventory/audit operations; every lifecycle, snapshot, backup, and exec action stays in the MCP/plugin surface behind the safety gates.

npx @solomonneas/proxmox-mcp@latest status
# or, installed globally:
proxmoxctl status                       # PVE version + per-node status (exit 1 if a node is offline)
proxmoxctl vms list
proxmoxctl containers list
proxmoxctl vm config 100
proxmoxctl storage list --node pve
proxmoxctl storage content local --node pve --content backup
proxmoxctl disks list --node pve        # physical disks + SMART health
proxmoxctl services list --node pve     # host systemd services
proxmoxctl firewall rules --scope cluster
proxmoxctl backups list --vmid 100
proxmoxctl snapshots list 100
proxmoxctl audit-permissions
proxmoxctl recent-tasks --limit 20
proxmoxctl task status UPID:pve:...
proxmoxctl vms list --json              # raw JSON for piping

Run proxmoxctl help for the full command list. --json emits raw JSON instead of the concise summary. Exit codes: 0 success, 1 runtime error (backend unreachable / call failed, and status when a node is offline), 2 usage error (unknown command/flag or bad value).

Starting the MCP server

proxmoxctl mcp (or the back-compat proxmox-mcp bin) starts the stdio MCP server. If a launcher referenced the file path dist/mcp-server.js directly, it keeps working; new launchers can point at dist/mcp-bin.js (or dist/cli.js mcp). Launchers that use the proxmox-mcp bin name need no change.

Shared HTTP mode

Run one persistent process for multiple MCP clients:

node dist/cli.js mcp --http
# Or: proxmoxctl mcp --http

Set the usual PROXMOX_URL, PROXMOX_TOKEN_ID, and PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET on the server, plus an independent PROXMOX_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN. Generate a random HTTP token, for example with openssl rand -hex 32. Startup refuses a missing or blank token, or one equal to the Proxmox token ID, token secret, complete API authorization value, or URL credentials. Tokens are compared using SHA-256 and constant-time comparison. Keep the token private: every client with it shares the server's Proxmox privileges and process-level destructive-operation flag.

The resolved address is printed to stderr on startup. /mcp supports Streamable HTTP POST, GET, and DELETE with bearer authentication on every request. GET /healthz requires no token and returns only {"status":"ok"}. Requests must use the bound host or a loopback alias in Host. A supplied Origin must be an HTTP or HTTPS loopback origin. Request bodies are limited to 1 MiB. The listener accepts at most 128 sessions, reaps sessions idle for 30 minutes (on a minute timer), and closes transports and the listener on SIGTERM or SIGINT. Active tool requests are excluded from idle expiry. An idle SSE channel does not keep a session alive. Clients must initialize again after expiry or a restart.

Each initialized MCP session gets its own server and deferred-tool visible set. Confirmation gates have no pending approvals: confirm, destructive, and the environment gate are checked on every tool invocation. One session's confirmation cannot authorize another call. The secret-redaction registry is process-wide and only adds masking, never authorization. Session IDs route connection state and are not separate user identities. All clients using the shared bearer token are in the same trust boundary. HTTP mode preserves the existing stdio defaults.

Keep the default loopback binding for local clients. A non-loopback listener requires a trusted TLS proxy or tunnel and appropriate network access controls. This transport does not provide TLS, OAuth, browser CORS access, or per-client Proxmox accounts. Preserve the allowed Host header through a proxy. A wildcard bind does not allow arbitrary Host headers. Use a specific bind address or host name for remote clients.

Claude Code

Add this entry under mcpServers in ~/.claude.json. Replace the token placeholder with the HTTP token. Restrict access to the config file.

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "proxmox": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "http://localhost:3100/mcp",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "Bearer <HTTP_TOKEN>"
      }
    }
  }
}

The type and header syntax follow the Claude Code MCP configuration.

Codex

Add to ~/.codex/config.toml, and export PROXMOX_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN in the environment that launches Codex. Its value must match the server's token, without the Bearer prefix. The client needs no upstream Proxmox credentials.

[mcp_servers.proxmox]
url = "http://localhost:3100/mcp"
bearer_token_env_var = "PROXMOX_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN"

These fields follow the Codex Streamable HTTP configuration.

systemd user service

An example unit is at docs/systemd/proxmox-mcp-http.service. Adjust its generic installation paths, build the project there, and place the server environment in %h/.config/proxmox-mcp/http.env with mode 0600:

PROXMOX_URL=https://proxmox.example.com:8006
PROXMOX_TOKEN_ID=operator@pve!mcp
PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET=REPLACE_WITH_UPSTREAM_SECRET
PROXMOX_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN=REPLACE_WITH_INDEPENDENT_RANDOM_TOKEN
PROXMOX_MCP_HTTP_PORT=3100

The unit reads this file with EnvironmentFile. Add SSH settings there if the chosen tools require them. Leave PROXMOX_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE unset unless the service should permit destructive calls. Installing or starting the example is an operator action, separate from building the server.

Setup

Claude Desktop

~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (macOS) or %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json (Windows):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "proxmox": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@solomonneas/proxmox-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "PROXMOX_URL": "https://192.0.2.10:8006",
        "PROXMOX_TOKEN_ID": "pve-admin@pam!api-token-1",
        "PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET": "REPLACE_WITH_TOKEN_SECRET",
        "PROXMOX_TLS_INSECURE": "false"
      }
    }
  }
}

Claude Code

claude mcp add proxmox -s user -- npx -y @solomonneas/proxmox-mcp

Then export env vars in your shell (~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc) or pass --env flags.

OpenClaw

Plugin loads automatically once installed. Config goes in your ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json plugins.entries.proxmox (or use the bundled openclaw.plugin.json):

{
  "plugins": {
    "entries": {
      "proxmox": {
        "package": "@solomonneas/proxmox-mcp",
        "activation": { "onStartup": true }
      }
    }
  }
}

Env vars from ~/.openclaw/workspace/.env are inherited by the plugin.

Codex CLI

~/.codex/config.toml:

[mcp_servers.proxmox]
command = "npx"
args = ["-y", "@solomonneas/proxmox-mcp"]

[mcp_servers.proxmox.env]
PROXMOX_URL = "https://192.0.2.10:8006"
PROXMOX_TOKEN_ID = "pve-admin@pam!api-token-1"
PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET = "REPLACE_WITH_TOKEN_SECRET"
PROXMOX_TLS_INSECURE = "false"

Safety

This MCP uses a three-tier write-gating model. The tier is enforced in code, not just documented.

• Tier 1 (reads): open. No confirm flag needed. Status, listings, config inspection, QEMU smoke-source validation, permission audit, usage, recent tasks, backup inventory, template inventory, storage inventory, snapshot inventory, guest network lookup, task wait, next-VMID lookup, task status/log, pool resource audit, storage content listing, node service/disk/update inventory, and firewall rule/option inspection, storage-config and backup-job listing, and access/role/ACL/pool/token inspection, and cluster/HA/SDN/replication observability live here.
• Tier 2 (gated guest reads + safe writes): require an explicit confirm: true arg. Guest file/path/directory/service inspection, start, stop, reboot, snapshot create, run backup, create container, create VM, clone, VM/container config edit, disk resize, backup restore (to a new VMID), node migration, suspend/resume/reset, convert-to-template, ISO/template download, task cancel, firewall rule add/delete and enable-toggle, disk move, storage creation, backup-job create/delete, ACL grant/revoke, API-token create/delete, pool create/update/delete, HA resource add/remove, replication job create/delete, in-container exec, in-container write_file, and guest service start/stop/restart live here. A tool call without the confirm flag throws WriteGateError before any HTTP traffic. Restoring a backup over an existing VMID escalates to the Tier-3 gate because it wipes the target's disks.
• Tier 3 (destructive): require confirm: true + destructive: true + the env flag PROXMOX_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE=1 on the MCP process. Permanent resource deletion, smoke pool cleanup, snapshot rollback/deletion, non-graceful force-stop, storage-volume deletion, storage-definition removal, and node reboot/shutdown live here.

Destructive operations env gate

Tier 3 destructive tools (proxmox_destroy_resource, proxmox_cleanup_smoke_resources, proxmox_rollback_snapshot, proxmox_delete_snapshot, proxmox_force_stop_resource, proxmox_delete_volume, proxmox_node_power, proxmox_delete_storage) require an additional safety gate beyond the per-tool confirm: true + destructive: true args: the env var PROXMOX_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE=1 must be set on the MCP process. Without it, the tools throw WriteGateError before any HTTP call is made. proxmox_cleanup_smoke_resources defaults to dry_run: true, which previews targets without the destructive env gate.

This is intentional: destructive ops are rare. The env flag is a coarse "I am actively doing smoke-test cycles" toggle. Leave it unset day to day; flip it only when actively destroying resources is part of the workflow.

API token scope recommendation: start with a read-only token (PVE Datastore.Audit + VM.Audit + Sys.Audit) and verify the read tools work end to end. Grade up to write privileges (VM.PowerMgmt, VM.Snapshot, VM.Backup) only after you have confirmed the redactor is masking your secret in your transcripts and that the model is honoring the confirm gate. Tokens are tied to a PVE user and can be revoked instantly from Datacenter > Permissions > API Tokens.

The PROXMOX_TLS_INSECURE=true toggle exists for homelab self-signed certs. Leave it false in any environment with a real CA-signed cert.

Full security policy, reporting, and in-scope/out-of-scope detail in SECURITY.md.

Live smoke testing

Read-only live smoke:

PROXMOX_ENABLE_LIVE_SMOKE=1 npm run smoke:live

Full scratch CT lifecycle smoke requires a token that can create, start, stop, inspect, and destroy resources in the mcp-smoke pool:

PROXMOX_ENABLE_LIVE_SMOKE=1 \
PROXMOX_SMOKE_CREATE=1 \
PROXMOX_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE=1 \
npm run smoke:live

Optional scratch CT backup and snapshot rollback smoke:

PROXMOX_ENABLE_LIVE_SMOKE=1 \
PROXMOX_SMOKE_CREATE=1 \
PROXMOX_SMOKE_BACKUP=1 \
PROXMOX_SMOKE_BACKUP_STORAGE=local \
PROXMOX_SMOKE_SNAPSHOT_ROLLBACK=1 \
PROXMOX_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE=1 \
npm run smoke:live

Create a scoped smoke-test role/user/token on the Proxmox host:

PROXMOX_CREATE_SMOKE_TOKEN=1 bash scripts/create-smoke-token.sh

The script creates or updates role McpSmokeRole, pool mcp-smoke, user mcp-smoke@pve, token mcp-smoke@pve!live-smoke, and ACLs for the smoke pool plus local and local-lvm storage. Proxmox prints the token secret once; store it in your private environment and do not commit it.

Proxmox also checks /vms/<vmid> before creating a new CT/VM. For one-off smoke tests, grant the exact next VMID before running the lifecycle smoke:

PROXMOX_CREATE_SMOKE_TOKEN=1 PROXMOX_SMOKE_VMID_GRANT=102 bash scripts/create-smoke-token.sh

npm run smoke:live now attempts that exact VMID grant automatically before creating a scratch CT or QEMU clone when PROXMOX_SSH_HOST, PROXMOX_SSH_USER, and PROXMOX_SSH_KEY are available. Set PROXMOX_SMOKE_SKIP_AUTO_GRANT=1 to disable it.

Optional QEMU clone smoke:

PROXMOX_ENABLE_LIVE_SMOKE=1 \
PROXMOX_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE=1 \
PROXMOX_SMOKE_QEMU_SOURCE_VMID=9000 \
npm run smoke:live

This validates the source, full-clones it to a scratch VMID, starts it, waits for guest-agent network data, stops it, and destroys it. Use PROXMOX_SMOKE_QEMU_TARGET_VMID or PROXMOX_SMOKE_QEMU_NAME to override the generated target.

The QEMU source should be a small stopped VM or template with agent: enabled=1, DHCP networking, no PCI/USB passthrough, no raw args, and a modest disk size. Check it first:

# tool: proxmox_validate_qemu_smoke_source { "vmid": 9000 }

Audit smoke-token permissions:

# tool: proxmox_audit_permissions {
#   "userid": "mcp-smoke@pve!live-smoke",
#   "source_vmid": 103,
#   "target_vmid": 102
# }

Optional systemd service smoke:

PROXMOX_ENABLE_LIVE_SMOKE=1 \
PROXMOX_SMOKE_SYSTEMD_VMID=100 \
PROXMOX_SMOKE_SERVICE=basic.target \
npm run smoke:live

To run a live service action as well as status, add PROXMOX_SMOKE_SERVICE_ACTION=start|stop|restart and PROXMOX_SMOKE_SERVICE_ACTION_CONFIRM=1.

Audit or clean leftover smoke resources:

# Read-only pool audit
# tool: proxmox_list_pool_resources { "pool": "mcp-smoke" }

# Dry-run cleanup, only resources named mcp-smoke-* in the pool are targeted
# tool: proxmox_cleanup_smoke_resources {}

# Actual cleanup waits for delete tasks and skips running guests unless force:true
# tool: proxmox_cleanup_smoke_resources { "dry_run": false, "confirm": true, "destructive": true }

Why not the alternatives?

• The Proxmox web UI is the canonical control plane and you should keep it. proxmox-mcp is not a replacement; it is the agent-facing read/operate surface so an AI client can inventory, trace, and operate the cluster in the same loop it is already running, without you driving a browser.
• Hand-rolling Proxmox API calls in your agent works, but the agent has to manage token auth, the redactor, retry, task polling, and (critically) safety on its own. proxmox-mcp ships the token redactor, structured MCP error payloads, and the three-tier write gate so a careless or hallucinated call fails closed instead of deleting a guest.
• A general "run any HTTP request" MCP tool gives a model unbounded access to the Proxmox API with no guardrails. proxmox-mcp is the opposite: a fixed, named tool surface where every state change is gated and every destructive op needs an explicit process-level env flag.
• Terraform / Ansible / pct + qm are the right tools for declarative, reviewed, repeatable infrastructure. proxmox-mcp is for interactive, agent-driven inspection and operation, not for codifying your cluster.

What proxmox-mcp is not

• It is not a tool for blind automation of destructive operations. The destructive tier exists for deliberate, supervised work (smoke-test cycles, intentional teardown), not for unattended agents. The PROXMOX_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE=1 flag is a coarse "I am actively doing this right now" toggle; leave it unset day to day.
• It is not a Proxmox cluster manager or orchestrator. It does not schedule cluster work. HTTP mode keeps MCP session state in memory. It translates MCP tool calls into Proxmox API calls and SSH commands, and that is all.
• It is not a substitute for least-privilege tokens. The write gate is a guardrail against a misbehaving model, not a substitute for a properly scoped Proxmox API token. Start read-only and grade up. See SECURITY.md.
• It is not stable yet. It is WIP, pre-1.0, and the tool surface can change between minor versions.

Contributing

Bug reports and patches are welcome. See CONTRIBUTING.md for what lands easily, local dev, and the safety rules every change must keep. By participating you agree to the Code of Conduct.

Changelog

See CHANGELOG.md for the release history.

License

MIT. See LICENSE.

Part of Lidless Labs · the eye does not close

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