security-scan

/security-scan — 6-Layer Security Pipeline ## What Runs a defense-in-depth static scan across 6 layers. A project with zero CVEs can still have hardcoded secrets, SQL injection, and missing auth — each layer catches a different vulnerability class. Findings map to the OWASP…

Install

openclaw skills install skills-sh:codewithmukesh/dotnet-claude-kit/security-scan

/security-scan — 6-Layer Security Pipeline

What

Runs a defense-in-depth static scan across 6 layers. A project with zero CVEs can still have hardcoded secrets, SQL injection, and missing auth — each layer catches a different vulnerability class. Findings map to the OWASP Top 10:2025 taxonomy and are rated Critical/High/Medium/Low by exploitability, impact, and exposure — a Critical SQL injection on a public endpoint outranks a Low info-disclosure on an admin page.

Detection patterns, OWASP mappings, remediation code, and the report template live in references/scan-layers.md — read it before executing.

Honesty rule: this is static analysis, not a penetration test. It catches known patterns but misses business-logic flaws, complex authorization bypasses, and runtime-only vulnerabilities. Every report states this.

When

  • Pre-release security gate — full scan, non-negotiable before production
  • "Security scan", "security audit", "find secrets", "CVE check", "OWASP"
  • After a dependency update (Layer 1), auth changes (Layer 4), config changes (Layer 2), or logging changes (Layer 6)
  • Pre-pentest preparation — fix static issues before paying for a pentest
  • Incident response and quarterly reviews

How

Step 1: Choose Layers

ScenarioLayers
Pre-release gate / pentest prep / incident / quarterlyAll 6
After dependency update1
New endpoint added3, 4, 5
Auth system changes4
Config file changes2
Logging changes6
Public API exposure3, 4, 5
Internal-only service1, 2, 3

Step 2: Execute the Layers

Read references/scan-layers.md for the detection patterns per layer. Delegate deep auth and secrets review to the security-auditor agent, pairing the authentication and configuration skills.

#LayerOWASP 2025Method
1Package vulnerabilitiesA03 Supply Chaindotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive
2Secrets detectionPattern scan over .cs/.json/.yml/.xml/.config
3OWASP code patternsA05 Injection, A08 Integrity, A04 Crypto, A01 Access ControlSource scan: raw SQL, Html.Raw, BinaryFormatter, MD5/SHA1, IDOR
4Auth configurationA07 Authentication, A01 Access Controlget_endpoint_map — every route's auth posture in one call; flag unmarked endpoints; then JWT validation settings
5CORS policyA02 MisconfigurationWildcard origins, credentials combos, method/header breadth
6Data protectionA04 Crypto, A09 Logging & AlertingPII in logs, over-broad responses, plaintext sensitive storage

Step 3: Rate with Context

Severity must match actual risk — over-classification causes alert fatigue and buries the real Critical:

  • Test-fixture "secrets" and appsettings.Development.json values are expected — skip or mark INFO, don't flag as HIGH
  • A missing XML comment is never a security finding
  • Reserve Critical for exploitable-now issues: injection on public endpoints, exposed production secrets, auth bypass

Step 4: Report

Every finding: [SEVERITY] file:line — title, OWASP category, what's wrong, impact if exploited, and remediation code (before/after). Produce the summary table + per-layer status table from the reference template, prefixed with the static-analysis disclaimer.

Example

text
User: /security-scan before we ship

Claude: Running all 6 layers...

| Layer | Status | Findings |
|-------|--------|----------|
| 1. Packages | PASS | 0 CVEs (142 packages incl. transitive) |
| 2. Secrets | PASS | 0 real secrets (2 dev-only values skipped) |
| 3. OWASP Patterns | FAIL | 1 SQL injection |
| 4. Auth Config | WARN | 2 endpoints missing explicit auth attributes |
| 5. CORS | PASS | Explicit origins from configuration |
| 6. Data Protection | WARN | Customer email logged at Information level |

[HIGH] SearchOrders.cs:34 — SQL Injection (A05:2025)
  FromSqlRaw($"...LIKE '%{search}%'") → attacker controls the query.
  Fix: db.Orders.Where(o => EF.Functions.Like(o.Name, $"%{search}%"))

[MEDIUM] OrderEndpoints.cs:18,31 — no [Authorize]/[AllowAnonymous]; behavior
  depends on ambient global policy. Make intent explicit per endpoint.

[LOW] OrderPlacedHandler.cs:22 — PII in logs (A09:2025). Log CustomerId, not email.

Note: static analysis only — this does not replace a penetration test.

Related

  • references/scan-layers.md — detection patterns, OWASP 2025 mappings, report template
  • /verify — Phase 5 runs a lightweight version of this scan per change set
  • /health-check — Dimension 7 (Security Posture) is the spot-check version
  • authentication / configuration — remediation patterns for Layers 4 and 2