T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:15- Finding
Unpinned Package and Container Installation Instructions
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md, lines 15–24
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned executable third-party dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash brew install openclaw openclaw setup # Windows (WSL) wsl --install npm install -g openclaw openclaw setup # Docker docker pull openclaw/coreTechnical Analysis
The quick-start instructions install executable packages and a container image without specifying reviewed versions, immutable image digests, checksums, signatures, trusted publisher identities, or explicit official repositories.
Consequently, the installed artifact is selected from mutable package-manager or container-registry state at installation time. If a publisher account, registry entry, release pipeline, or similarly trusted supply-chain component is compromised, users following these instructions could receive code different from the version originally reviewed. The documentation also does not establish that the Homebrew formula, npm package, and container image share verified provenance.
The global npm installation is particularly sensitive because package installation hooks and subsequently invoked commands execute with the privileges granted to the package manager. The Docker image can execute within its container and access any files, credentials, sockets, networks, or devices explicitly exposed to that container.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises a relevant package publisher, registry account, release pipeline, or mutable package version.
- The attacker publishes a malicious package or replaces a mutable container tag with a malicious image.
- A user follows the documented
brew install,npm install -g, ordocker pullinstruction. - The package manager or container runtime resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled artifact because no reviewed version or digest is pinned.
- Malicious installation hooks or application co ...[truncated 1012 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every package to a specifically reviewed version rather than resolving the latest available release.
- Pin container images by immutable digest, for example
repository@sha256:..., instead of relying solely on a mutable tag. - Identify the expected official publisher, package repository, and container registry explicitly.
- Publish and require verification of release signatures or cryptographic checksums before installation.
- Prefer isolated or project-local package installation over global npm installation where supported.
- Run setup and application processes under a dedicated, non-administrative account.
- Document a restrictive container configuration: avoid privileged mode, mount only required paths as read-only where possible, do not expose the container-runtime socket, and supply only necessary credentials.
- Add a controlled update procedure requiring review and integrity verification before changing pinned versions or digests.
