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Security audit

Kubernetes Security

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Kubernetes security helper needs review because its audit can miss dangerous administrator access while presenting itself as comprehensive.

Use this as a starting checklist, not proof that a cluster is secure. Before relying on it, correct the binding queries and remove the blanket exclusion of system-prefixed subjects. Select the intended cluster and namespaces, use read-only access for audits, and authorize secret access or configuration changes separately.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (4)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/audit-rbac.py (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

python
Audit RBAC configuration for security issues.

    Args:
        context: Optional kubeconfig context

    Returns:
        Dictionary with audit findings

The audit claims to check cluster-admin bindings but retrieves ClusterRoles instead.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

ClusterRoles define permissions, but ClusterRoleBindings identify which subjects receive those permissions; retrieving ClusterRoles cannot establish who has cluster-admin access. In a security-auditing skill, this mismatch can cause excessive privileges to go undetected and create false assurance, although the query itself does not grant access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The documented role-binding audit retrieves role definitions instead of bindings.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The role-binding examples retrieve roles and clusterroles rather than rolebindings and clusterrolebindings, so an audit following these instructions cannot determine which users, groups, or service accounts receive the permissions. This is particularly consequential in a security-auditing skill that prioritizes cluster-admin bindings: excessive privileges could remain undetected while the audit appears complete.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Activation keywords are overly broad and not explicitly restricted to Kubernetes requests.

Low
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The activation rules include generic terms such as "security", "permissions", "policy", and "who can", which also occur in ordinary requests unrelated to Kubernetes. Although the skill's title and description establish its domain, these explicit matching rules do not require Kubernetes context or exclude unrelated uses.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.