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Security audit

lingxiao-amazon-ads-check

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent for Amazon ads analysis, but it asks users to connect a mutable third-party MCP server and submit full advertising reports without enough privacy, scoping, or upload-control detail.

Review this before installing if your Amazon ads reports contain confidential spend, sales, campaign, keyword, or product data. Use a project-scoped MCP configuration where possible, allow only the named tools if your client supports it, inspect the exact CSV before upload, remove unnecessary columns, and do not submit reports unless you accept processing by the third-party Lingxiao service.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:15
Finding

Complete Advertising Reports Are Transmitted to an External Service Without Documented Privacy Controls

Content
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## 准备报表 后台导出的搜索词报告是 xlsx,**先另存为 CSV** 再读进来——xlsx 是二进制,粘不进字段。 ``` ads_waste_check({ reportText: "", filename: "SearchTerm_US.csv" }) ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs the user or agent to submit the complete contents of an Amazon advertising search-term report to the externally operated MCP endpoint at `https://www.lingxiaochuhai.com/mcp`. These reports may contain commercially sensitive information, including search terms, campaign or advertising-group structure, advertising spend, clicks, attributed orders, sales performance, and related business metrics. Although the document states that no store authorization is required, anonymous access does not make the report transmission private. The stated per-IP request quota also indicates that the service processes client network metadata. The Skill does not document: - Which report columns are required or can be removed. - How long uploaded reports and request metadata are retained. - Whether uploaded data is used for analytics, profiling, or model training. - Who can access the submitted data. - Whether users can request deletion. - Whether report content is encrypted or protected after receipt. - Whether explicit user confirmation is required immediately before transmission. This is a data-minimization and disclosure-control weakness rather than evidence that the external operator is malicious. ### Attack Path 1. A use ...[truncated 1324 chars]
Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:12
Finding

Unpinned Remote MCP Service Creates an Unbounded Third-Party Trust Boundary

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The description includes many broad trigger conditions such as 'when the user wants to launch Amazon ads,' 'do ad optimization,' 'negative keywords,' and 'analyze search term reports,' which can match a wide range of normal advertising conversations. This can cause the skill to be invoked when the user did not intend to use an external MCP-backed workflow, increasing the chance of unnecessary data handling or workflow interference.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The skill content is entirely in Chinese and strongly implies Chinese-language operation without stating that it should respect the user's current language. In multilingual environments, this can override user expectations, reduce transparency around tool use, and make safety-relevant guidance or consent cues less understandable to non-Chinese-speaking users.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.