Back to skill

Security audit

Poetize Blog Automation

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed POETIZE blog admin skill, but live-changing commands can run without an enforced confirmation gate.

Install only if you are comfortable granting this skill a high-privilege POETIZE admin API key. Use a revocable least-privilege key if available, avoid committing generated config or credentials, and manually confirm every publish, delete, comment, theme, SEO, resource, taxonomy, or payment change before allowing the agent to run it.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/poetize_cli.py:965
Finding

Documented confirmation gate is not enforced by state-changing CLI operations

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: scripts/poetize_cli.py:965-979
Vulnerability Type: Missing executable authorization and confirmation enforcement
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet

python
if mc == "delete-article":
    article_id = resolve_article_id(args)
    brief = resolve_brief(args)
    payload = apply_ops_strategy(
        brief,
        {"id": article_id},
        expected_task_type="delete_article",
    )
    response = call_recycle_bin_api(
        "POST",
        f"{args.base_url.rstrip('/')}/api/api/article/delete",
        args.api_key,
        payload,
    )
    if response.get("code") == 200:
        retention_days = (response.get("data") or {}).get("retentionDays")
        window = f"{retention_days} days" if retention_days else "the retention window"
        response["agent_guide"] = {
            "message": (
                "Article moved to the recycle bin. It is recoverable during "
                f"the retention window ({window}); permanent purge happens "
                "automatically only after that."
            ),
            "next_steps": [
                "Verify it is in trash: python poetize_cli.py manage list-trash",
                f"Restore it: python poetize_cli.py manage restore-article "
                f"--article-id {article_id}",
            ],
        }

Other directly reachable mutation examples include:

python
if mc == "delete-resource":
    body: dict[str, Any] = {}
    if getattr(args, "resource_id", None):
        body["id"] = args.resource_id
    if getattr(args, "path", None):
        body["path"] = args.path
    if not body:
        raise SystemExit("delete-resource requires --resource-id or --path")
    response = call_recycle_bin_api(
        "POST",
        f"{args.base_url.rstrip('/')}/api/api/resource/delete",
        args.api_key,
        body,
    )
python
if mc == "activate-theme":
    response = request_json(
        "POST",
        f"{args.base_url.rst
...[truncated 3662 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Add a centralized mutation gate before dispatching every state-changing command.
  2. Require an explicit confirmation artifact, such as --confirm, that is bound to:
    • The exact operation.
    • The concrete target identifier or path.
    • The destination blog origin.
  3. Reject mutation requests if the confirmation data does not match the resolved operation and target.
  4. Prefer a two-step workflow:
    • First generate a dry-run or preview containing the destination, target, and exact payload.
    • Then execute only after receiving a fresh confirmation token for that preview.
  5. Do not treat a strategy brief as user authorization unless it contains verifiable, operation-bound approval generated after the preview.
  6. Apply the check centrally so new mutation subcommands cannot accidentally omit it.
  7. Add automated tests asserting that every mutating command fails before any network request when confirmation is absent or mismatched.
  8. Preserve non-interactive automation by supporting a machine-readable approval token rather than relying exclusively on an interactive prompt.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (44)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

md
*Optional external LLM transmission (dry-run only).** `poetize-blog eval` (and `ai_dry_run_test.py`) reads the *full* SKILL.md and sends it, with a test intent,

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 138)May include surrounding context.

md
| `video` | No | — | Video URL |
   | `password` / `tips` | No | auto for drafts | Password and preview tip for private articles |
   | `payType` | No | free: `0`; paid: `> 0` | Omit for `free_default`; required for `paid_explicit` |
   | `payAmount` / `freePercent` | No | — | Price and free preview percentage (default 30) for paid articles; ignored when a `<!--paywall-->` marker is present in the body — see [Paywall cutoff marker](#paywall-cutoff-marker) |
   | `skipAiTranslation` | No | `false` | Skip AI translation |
   | `pendingTranslationLanguage` / `pendingTranslationTitle` / `pendingTranslationContent` | No | — | Pre-supplied translation |
   | `paymentPluginKey` / `paymentConfigFile` | No | — | Payment plugin key and sensitive config JSON path |

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

md
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

md
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 72)May include surrounding context.

md
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 73)May include surrounding context.

md
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · agents/openai.yaml (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

yaml
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

python
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

python
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 71)May include surrounding context.

python
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 72)May include surrounding context.

python
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 74)May include surrounding context.

python
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 131)May include surrounding context.

python
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 292)May include surrounding context.

python
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 293)May include surrounding context.

python
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 1920)May include surrounding context.

python
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 1921)May include surrounding context.

python
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 1990)May include surrounding context.

python
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 1991)May include surrounding context.

python
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 2103)May include surrounding context.

python
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 2176)May include surrounding context.

python
filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth (0600)
  environment:
    - POETIZE_BASE_URL
    - POETIZE_API_KEY

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The CLI trusts a repo-local fallback credentials file located relative to the script directory. In a shared or attacker-influenced skill/repository, a planted local credentials.json can silently redirect requests to an attacker-controlled base_url or substitute an API key, causing credential misuse or content exfiltration when non-auth commands auto-resolve credentials.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/poetize_cli.py (reported line 65)May include surrounding context.

python
except Exception:
    CREDENTIALS_PATH = None

LOCAL_CREDENTIALS_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "credentials.json"


def load_credentials() -> dict[str, str]:

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/render_openclaw_config.py (reported line 98)May include surrounding context.

python
if explicit_base_url:
        return normalize_base_url(explicit_base_url)

    env_values = parse_env_file(repo_root / ".env")
    if not env_values:
        env_values = parse_env_file(repo_root / ".env.example")

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly permits writing persisted authentication material to ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json and to user-provided credential files, which creates session persistence beyond the immediate task. While this appears operational rather than malicious, persisted high-privilege admin credentials increase exposure if the host, workspace, or shared account is later accessed by another process or user.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

md
label: "Install Python 3 (brew)"
permissions:
  filesystem:
    - skill folder read/write
    - user-provided markdown/config/credential files
    - ~/.config/poetize/credentials.json for persisted auth
  environment:

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The Writing Voice section mandates first-person plural using the Chinese phrase 我们 and bans specific Chinese expressions, which effectively requires a specific language/locale for generated article content. The file does not offer the user a language choice or frame this as an opt-in or region-justified constraint.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.