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Security audit

OT Security Posture Scorecard

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent OT security assessment tool, but it sends sensitive industrial-security details and an API key to a third-party service with limited consent/privacy disclosure, and its bundled test script disables TLS verification.

Review carefully before installing. Use only sanitized, non-sensitive OT/ICS details unless your organization has approved sharing them with ToolWeb.in, confirm the vendor's retention and privacy terms, and avoid running scripts/test-api.sh unless TLS verification is fixed by removing the -k option. Store TOOLWEB_API_KEY as a secret and rotate it if it was used over an untrusted network with the test script.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/test-api.sh:22
Finding

TLS Certificate Verification Disabled in API Test Script

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: scripts/test-api.sh, lines 22–38
Vulnerability Type: Improper TLS certificate validation
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

bash
RESPONSE=$(curl -sk -w "\n%{http_code}" -X POST "$API_URL" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-API-Key: $TOOLWEB_API_KEY" \
  -d '{
    "org_name": "Test Manufacturing Corp",
    "sector": "Manufacturing",
    "ot_size": "Medium",
    "integration_level": "Partial",
    "ot_technologies": ["SCADA", "PLC", "HMI"],
    "it_tools": ["Firewall", "SIEM"],
    "csf_scores": {
      "identify": 3,
      "protect": 2,
      "detect": 2,
      "respond": 1,
      "recover": 1
    },
    "threat_concern": "Ransomware targeting OT networks",
    "compliance": "IEC 62443"
  }')

Technical Analysis

The curl command uses the -k option, which is equivalent to --insecure. This disables validation of the server's TLS certificate and hostname. Consequently, the HTTPS connection provides encryption without reliable server authentication.

The request transmits the TOOLWEB_API_KEY in the X-API-Key header and sends OT security-assessment information in the body. Because any presented certificate is accepted, an attacker capable of intercepting or redirecting network traffic can impersonate portal.toolweb.in, terminate the TLS connection, and inspect or modify the request and response.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker obtains a network interception position or influences DNS, proxy, gateway, or routing behavior.
  2. The attacker redirects the connection intended for portal.toolweb.in:8443 to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
  3. The attacker presents an arbitrary or self-signed TLS certificate.
  4. The script accepts that certificate because curl -k disables certificate and hostname verification.
  5. The attacker captures the X-API-Key header and submitted assessment data.
  6. The attacker ma ...[truncated 892 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the -k option and retain normal certificate and hostname validation:

    bash
    RESPONSE=$(curl -sS -w "\n%{http_code}" -X POST "$API_URL" \
      -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
      -H "X-API-Key: $TOOLWEB_API_KEY" \
      -d '{
        "org_name": "Test Manufacturing Corp",
        "sector": "Manufacturing",
        "ot_size": "Medium",
        "integration_level": "Partial",
        "ot_technologies": ["SCADA", "PLC", "HMI"],
        "it_tools": ["Firewall", "SIEM"],
        "csf_scores": {
          "identify": 3,
          "protect": 2,
          "detect": 2,
          "respond": 1,
          "recover": 1
        },
        "threat_concern": "Ransomware targeting OT networks",
        "compliance": "IEC 62443"
      }')
    
  2. Configure the server with a certificate whose trust chain and hostname are valid for portal.toolweb.in.

  3. If a private certificate authority is required, install its CA certificate securely and use --cacert rather than disabling validation globally.

  4. Fail closed on TLS errors; do not automatically retry with insecure certificate handling.

  5. Consider public-key pinning with --pinnedpubkey where operationally appropriate, while maintaining a documented certificate-rotation process.

  6. Rotate the API key if the vulnerable script has been executed over an untrusted network.

  7. Store the API key through protected secret injection, restrict configuration-file permissions, and grant the key only the minimum API permissions and quota required.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (8)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill states it will gather OT environment details and send them to an external Security API, but provides no warning about data sharing, retention, jurisdiction, or sensitivity of OT/SCADA information. Because OT assessments often involve critical infrastructure details, users may disclose highly sensitive operational data to a third party without informed consent or minimization controls.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This markdown file states that clawhub publish will upload all text-based files, including SKILL.md, README.md, and shell scripts, but does not warn users to review those files for sensitive data before publishing. Because publishing transmits local content to an external service, the absence of a user-facing warning about potential data exposure is a meaningful safety gap.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The README advertises a very broad natural-language trigger for a safety-sensitive OT/ICS assessment workflow without defining scope limits, required confirmations, or exclusions. In an agent setting, this can cause the skill to activate on loosely related messages and collect or act on sensitive industrial-context information more readily than the user may intend.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

clawhub install ot-security-posture-scorecard

Or manually

mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/skills/ot-security-posture-scorecard cp SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/ot-security-posture-scorecard/

text

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes shell/curl to contact an external service but does not declare any explicit tool scope such as allowed-tools or permissions. This weakens execution governance because the runtime may permit shell access more broadly than users expect, making review and enforcement of least privilege harder.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill is explicitly designed to transmit user-supplied assessment data and an API credential to an external endpoint via curl. External transmission is expected for this functionality, but in this context it still creates a real security risk because sensitive OT posture information leaves the local trust boundary and could be exposed through provider compromise, interception, logging, or misuse.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

md
env:
        - TOOLWEB_API_KEY
      bins:
        - curl
    primaryEnv: TOOLWEB_API_KEY
    os:
      - linux

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The workflow instructs the agent to collect highly sensitive OT/ICS security details—such as architecture maturity, known gaps, technologies, and threat concerns—and send them to a third-party API, but it does not clearly warn the user about this external transmission before collection. In an OT context, these details can materially aid targeting of critical infrastructure or expose regulated operational-security information if shared without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The script sends assessment data and an API key to an external service using curl with the -k option, which disables TLS certificate verification. This makes the HTTPS connection vulnerable to man-in-the-middle interception, allowing an attacker on the network path to capture or modify the OT security assessment data and the authentication header.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/test-api.sh (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
echo ""

RESPONSE=$(curl -sk -w "\n%{http_code}" -X POST "$API_URL" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-API-Key: $TOOLWEB_API_KEY" \
  -d '{

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.