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Security audit

Superfluid Protocol

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Superfluid knowledge-base skill is broadly coherent, but it includes under-controlled runtime package execution and high-impact financial approval guidance that users should review before installing.

Install only if you are comfortable using this as blockchain developer guidance. Pin and review any bunx/npx packages before running helper scripts, run them without wallet secrets or sensitive environment variables, verify contract addresses independently, prefer simulations and readable signing paths, and avoid unlimited token approvals unless you understand the standing allowance risk.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
references/guides/scripts.md:5
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Packages Are Downloaded and Executed at Runtime

Content
View full analysis
bun script.mjs` to resolve packages at runtime. All scripts are in `skills/superfluid/scripts/`. --- ## ABI JSON — `abi.mjs` Source: [`@sfpro/sdk`](https://sdk.superfluid.pro/docs) package. ``` bunx -p @sfpro/sdk bun abi.mjs Full JSON ABI bunx -p @sfpro/sdk bun abi.mjs Single fragment by name bunx -p @sfpro/sdk bun abi.mjs list All contracts with SDK import info ``` ``` The same pattern is used for other dependencies, including: ```bash bunx -p @superfluid-finance/tokenlist bun tokenlist.mjs ... bunx -p @superfluid-finance/metadata bun metadata.mjs ... bunx -p @sfpro/sdk -p js-sha3 bun selectors.mjs ... bunx @foundry-rs/cast ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill explicitly directs users or agents to use `bunx` to resolve packages from a public package registry at execution time. No exact package versions, lockfile, integrity hashes, or immutable package artifacts are specified. The scripts then import code from those downloaded packages, for example: ```javascript import { extendedSuperTokenList } from "@superfluid-finance/tokenlist"; import metadata from "@superfluid-finance/metadata"; import { keccak256 } from "js-sha3"; ``` Consequently, the code that runs is not limited to the content reviewed in this Skill. Package initialization code and transitive dependencies may execute with the permissions of the invoking user. The effec ...[truncated 1957 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (31)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

md
**Investigating (one-off):** Scripts (`tokenlist.mjs`, `metadata.mjs`, `balance.mjs`, `cast call`). ABI source: `scripts/abi.mjs`. Addresses: `scripts/metadata.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 339)May include surrounding context.

md
**Investigating (one-off):** Scripts (`tokenlist.mjs`, `metadata.mjs`, `balance.mjs`, `cast call`). ABI source: `scripts/abi.mjs`. Addresses: `scripts/metadata.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 347)May include surrounding context.

md
**Investigating (one-off):** Scripts (`tokenlist.mjs`, `metadata.mjs`, `balance.mjs`, `cast call`). ABI source: `scripts/abi.mjs`. Addresses: `scripts/metadata.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

md
**Investigating (one-off):** Scripts (`tokenlist.mjs`, `metadata.mjs`, `balance.mjs`, `cast call`). ABI source: `scripts/abi.mjs`. Addresses: `scripts/metadata.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 338)May include surrounding context.

md
**Investigating (one-off):** Scripts (`tokenlist.mjs`, `metadata.mjs`, `balance.mjs`, `cast call`). ABI source: `scripts/abi.mjs`. Addresses: `scripts/metadata.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 403)May include surrounding context.

md
**Investigating (one-off):** Scripts (`tokenlist.mjs`, `metadata.mjs`, `balance.mjs`, `cast call`). ABI source: `scripts/abi.mjs`. Addresses: `scripts/metadata.

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/deep-researches/semantic-money-yellowpaper.md (reported line 315)May include surrounding context.

md
- **ω preserves conservation** — the sum of all MUD deltas from any single ω
  invocation is zero. This is the per-operation zero-sum guarantee.
- **Agreement contracts are MUD** (they provide balance via π) but are **not**
  Semigroups — they replace state rather than merging. Only per-account MUD is
  a Semigroup.

### Lens Accessors

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The manifest explicitly recommends type(uint256).max approval for the strategy contract, which exposes users to unlimited ERC-20 spend if that strategy is buggy, later compromised, maliciously upgraded, or incorrectly approved by the manager owner. In this skill context, the risk is more significant because the document is operational guidance for real deployed contracts, so users may follow it verbatim and grant standing authority over their underlying tokens far beyond any single wrap operation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This manifest documents functions that can create, update, and delete token streams and grant or revoke operator permissions, but it does not prominently warn users that these actions can move funds continuously or delegate powerful control over their flows. In a wallet, agent, or UI context, a consumer of this YAML could present these methods as routine operations without sufficient risk framing, increasing the chance of unsafe approvals or unintended destructive actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unrestricted Tool Access

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill grants unrestricted tool access without appropriate constraints. An agent with unfettered tool access can perform arbitrary actions including file modification, network requests, and code execution.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/contracts/FluidEPProgramManager.abi.yaml (reported line 107)May include surrounding context.

yaml
stopFunding:
  # Stops funding by deleting the treasury flow and subsidy flow.
  # Compensates for unused funds by transferring remaining amounts back.
  # Anyone can call this — no access restriction.
  notes:
    - "Gotcha: Can only be called within the EARLY_PROGRAM_END window before the end date."
  mutability: nonpayable

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The file states that FaceTec-based face verification is used and that periodic re-verification is required, which is privacy-sensitive handling of biometric data. While it notes anonymous facial-hash storage, it does not clearly warn users about the sensitivity of biometric collection or its implications in a user-facing cautionary way.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The description says GoodID uses Amazon Rekognition for age and gender prediction and uses IP/phone for location, which can materially affect user privacy. Although it says opt-in is required, it does not include a clear warning about the sensitivity of these data sources or the consequences of participating.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae4

Medium
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Suspicious Unicode normalization or mixed-script content

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The document makes a materially misleading security claim by stating the contracts are 'non-custodial' and 'do not hold funds themselves' while elsewhere acknowledging that TOREX accumulates user in-tokens before execution. Even if the custody is temporary and automated, users and integrators may incorrectly downgrade smart-contract, insolvency, or operational risk, which can lead to unsafe reliance on the system.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/guides/clear-macro.md (reported line 377)May include surrounding context.

md
// ... build encodedPayload, types, and sign as in self-submit steps 4–6

// 4. Submit to relay
const relayRes = await fetch(
  'https://clearmacro-provider.superfluid.dev/v1/relay-executions',
  {
    method: 'POST',

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The Solidity example explicitly reverts unless lang == bytes32("en"), which enforces a single language and demonstrates a locale restriction. The surrounding documentation presents lang as a localization mechanism, but this example offers no user opt-in or justification for limiting support to English only.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The primary execution example shows how to call BlindMacroForwarder directly, but the nearby flow does not prominently warn that the wallet will present opaque calldata that users cannot meaningfully verify. In a security-sensitive blockchain context, normalizing direct execution of a legacy blind-signing flow increases the chance that integrators and end users approve malicious or unintended macro behavior, especially because macros are permissionless and can compose arbitrary batch operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unbounded Resource Access

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/guides/super-apps.md (reported line 107)May include surrounding context.

md
`Host.allowCompositeApp(targetApp)`.

`MAX_APP_CALLBACK_LEVEL` is **1**, meaning at most two Super Apps in a chain
(SECOND → FINAL). This prevents unbounded callback recursion.

If a SECOND-level app calls a non-whitelisted Super App, the transaction
reverts with `APP_RULE` code 30 (`COMPOSITE_APP_IS_NOT_WHITELISTED`).

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/subgraphs/sup-subgraph-guide.md (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

md
Base Mainnet and Base Sepolia **only**. These are Goldsky-hosted endpoints (not the standard `subgraph-endpoints.superfluid.dev` pattern):

- Base Mainnet (8453): `https://api.goldsky.com/api/public/project_clsnd6xsoma5j012qepvucfpp/subgraphs/sup/v2/gn`
- Base Sepolia (84532): `https://api.goldsky.com/api/public/project_clsnd6xsoma5j012qepvucfpp/subgraphs/sup_test/latest/gn`

---

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/subgraphs/sup-subgraph-guide.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md
Base Mainnet and Base Sepolia **only**. These are Goldsky-hosted endpoints (not the standard `subgraph-endpoints.superfluid.dev` pattern):

- Base Mainnet (8453): `https://api.goldsky.com/api/public/project_clsnd6xsoma5j012qepvucfpp/subgraphs/sup/v2/gn`
- Base Sepolia (84532): `https://api.goldsky.com/api/public/project_clsnd6xsoma5j012qepvucfpp/subgraphs/sup_test/latest/gn`

---

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
77% confidence
Finding

This YAML file describes the contract and its behavior but does not define any explicit trigger phrases, invocation conditions, or exclusion criteria for when a related skill should activate. For manifest-style files, that absence can make downstream activation logic ambiguous if this metadata is used to determine when the skill applies.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

This YAML file describes a skill-facing contract artifact but does not define any explicit trigger phrases, invocation boundaries, or exclusion conditions for when an agent should use it. For manifest-scoped files, the absence of activation specificity can lead to overly broad or unintended use if the surrounding system treats this metadata as skill-discovery input.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.