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Security audit

佛学讲评助手

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed Buddhist audio/video lecture evaluation workflow, with manageable setup and language-normalization caveats.

Install in an isolated environment, pin and verify dependencies/models where possible, and avoid the third-party model mirror unless you trust it. Expect uploaded Traditional Chinese content to be converted to Simplified Chinese for processing and report generation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:45
Finding

Unpinned Dependencies and Unverified Third-Party Model Mirror

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 45–46
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through unpinned packages and third-party artifact retrieval
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

bash
pip install -i https://pypi.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/simple faster-whisper soundfile
export HF_ENDPOINT=https://hf-mirror.com        # CN environment model mirror

Technical Analysis

The documented installation command obtains faster-whisper, soundfile, and their transitive dependencies without fixed versions or integrity hashes. Package installation can execute package build or installation logic with the invoking user's privileges. Because resolution is not reproducible, future releases or compromised dependencies may introduce code that was not present during this audit.

The configuration also redirects Hugging Face model retrieval to a third-party mirror without requiring checksum or signature verification. A compromised mirror, distribution channel, or upstream account could provide altered model artifacts. Depending on the model loader and artifact format, this could cause output manipulation and, where unsafe deserialization is involved, potentially code execution. The reviewed documentation does not establish that unsafe deserialization occurs, so that outcome is conditional rather than confirmed.

The risk is limited by the fact that these are transparent setup instructions rather than hidden execution logic. Nevertheless, users following them enter an inadequately controlled software and model supply chain.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises a package publisher, transitive dependency, configured package index, or model mirror.
  2. The attacker distributes a malicious package release, dependency, or modified model artifact.
  3. A user follows the documented commands without version or hash verification.
  4. pip resolves and installs the attacker-controlled package content, or the transcription framework downlo ...[truncated 1126 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin every direct dependency to an audited exact version, for example through a locked requirements file.
  2. Lock transitive dependencies and require cryptographic hashes with pip --require-hashes.
  3. Prefer the official PyPI index and official Hugging Face endpoint. If mirrors are operationally necessary, document their trust model and use only controlled or organization-approved mirrors.
  4. Publish verified SHA-256 checksums or signatures for all model files and validate them before loading.
  5. Use safe model formats such as safetensors where supported, and prohibit loaders that deserialize executable Python objects.
  6. Install dependencies in an isolated virtual environment or container under an unprivileged account.
  7. Generate and review a software bill of materials, and continuously scan locked dependencies for known vulnerabilities.
  8. Include the referenced runtime scripts in the distributed project so their download, subprocess, deserialization, temporary-file, and input-validation behavior can be audited.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The document states that all Traditional Chinese content is uniformly converted to Simplified Chinese before all computation and comparison. This imposes a specific language/script policy on user content without offering a choice or opt-in, which matches the locale/language policy violation criterion.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The quality guardrail requires all text to be converted to Simplified Chinese immediately on read, with no Traditional Chinese retained. This is a blanket script constraint without a documented user choice or clear region-specific justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.