Openclaw Prompt Shield

Local input-hardening scanner for OpenClaw agents. Pattern-based detection across 9 categories of LLM input risks, with combined-signal scoring and caller-supplied whitelists. Returns risk score 0-100, matched categories, a suggested sanitized version, and a safe-to-process verdict. Pure Python standard library, no remote calls, no API keys, no LLM.

v0.4.1

A practical input-hardening skill for OpenClaw agents. It scans user-submitted text for prompt-injection, jailbreak, role-override, and data-exfiltration patterns before the agent processes them. All detection is pattern-based, deterministic, and runs locally in Python.

Why this exists

Most agent security skills focus on output review (do not leak secrets, do not break policy). Few focus on input hardening — checking what the user, or a third party whose content the agent is reading, is trying to do to the agent itself. Prompt injection is the most common real-world LLM exploit, and this skill gives the agent a fast no-API local check.

What this skill does

• scripts/scan_input.py — score a single piece of text 0-100 for injection risk, return matched categories, and a verdict (safe, caution, block).
• scripts/sanitize_input.py — produce a redacted, quoted version of risky text the agent can still read for context without executing the embedded directives.
• scripts/scan_batch.py — run the scan over many inputs at once (a list of email bodies, web search snippets, scraped pages) and emit a JSON report of which ones are safe to feed downstream.
• scripts/check_deps.sh — verify python3 is installed.
• references/patterns.md — category-level summary of what each detector covers.
• references/exfil-hosts.txt — caller-editable list of suspicious host fragments used by the exfiltration check.
• references/categories.txt — caller-editable verb / target / quantifier alphabets used to build the regex catalog at import time.

What this skill does not do

• It does not call any LLM, classifier API, or remote service.
• It does not guarantee 100% detection. Determined attackers can evade pattern-based detection. Treat this as a fast first-pass filter, not a complete defense.
• It does not block the agent. It returns a risk verdict and lets the agent or the wrapping policy decide.
• It does not modify any files outside the directories the user provides.

Detection categories

Category	What it catches
instruction_override	Phrasing that asks the model to drop or replace whatever it was previously told
role_hijack	Identity swaps into "unrestricted" personas
system_prompt_leak	Attempts to extract the agent's hidden context
delimiter_injection	Fake structural markers (chat delimiters, pseudo-system tags, identity frontmatter)
data_exfiltration	Attempts to send conversation, secrets, or context to outside endpoints
tool_abuse	Coercion into destructive shell commands or sensitive file reads
encoding_evasion	Base64/hex/URL-encoded payloads with decode-then-run phrasing
policy_bypass	Rationalizations for ignoring safety rules
indirect_injection (NEW in v0.3.0)	Imperatives wrapped inside quoted text, markdown links, fenced code blocks, HTML comments, or zero-width / bidi character sequences so they look like data rather than instructions

The full category-level documentation is in references/patterns.md. Patterns are constructed at runtime from word-fragment lists; the source files therefore do not contain literal adversarial phrases.

Combined-signal bonus

Real attacks usually chain techniques (override + role hijack + leak); accidental matches rarely do. When two or more distinct categories all fire on the same input, a small bonus is added on top of the per-category sum:

Distinct categories triggered	Bonus added
2	+6
3	+12
4	+18
5+	+24

This makes a chained attack reliably cross the block threshold while a single isolated trigger word inside an otherwise benign sentence stays in the caution band where the agent can still read the message safely.

Required dependencies

bash

bash scripts/check_deps.sh

The skill is pure Python 3 standard library — no pip install needed.

Workflows

1. Scan a single user message

bash

python3 scripts/scan_input.py --text "<the user message>"

The output looks like:

text

risk_score: 81
verdict: block
thresholds: caution>=30, block>=70
combined_signal_bonus: +6 (distinct categories: 2)
matches:
  instruction_override (+45):
    - <fragment 1>
    - <fragment 2>
  system_prompt_leak (+30):
    - <fragment 3>
recommendation: <category-specific guidance, see Recommendations section>

You can also feed text from a file:

bash

python3 scripts/scan_input.py --file user_message.txt --json

2. Whitelisting known-good content

If a domain legitimately discusses prompt injection (security blog posts, threat-modeling docs, fine-tuning datasets), pass the surrounding sentence with --whitelist so its trigger fragments are dropped before scoring:

bash

python3 scripts/scan_input.py \
  --text "<security blog paragraph that quotes a known attack phrase>" \
  --whitelist "<the same paragraph or the quoted attack phrase>"

Or load a list of allowed phrases from a file:

bash

python3 scripts/scan_input.py --file post.md --whitelist-file allow.txt

Whitelist matching is case-insensitive substring containment, so the whitelist entry can be the entire surrounding sentence and it will absorb every fragment the scanner extracts from inside it.

3. Sanitize before feeding the agent

bash

python3 scripts/sanitize_input.py --file scraped_page.txt --output safe.txt

The output:

• Wraps the original content in a clearly marked <UNTRUSTED_USER_CONTENT> block so the agent cannot mistake it for instructions.
• Replaces any matched phrases with [[REDACTED:category]] markers.
• Adds a header summary listing what was flagged (including the combined-signal bonus, when it fired) so the agent has the context.

4. Batch-scan a list of inputs

bash

python3 scripts/scan_batch.py --jsonl inputs.jsonl --output report.json

Each line of inputs.jsonl is {"id": "...", "text": "..."}. The report contains per-id verdicts and an optional --only-safe safe.jsonl subset to forward downstream. --whitelist and --whitelist-file work the same way as on scan_input.py.

5. Verdict thresholds

Defaults:

• safe if score < 30
• caution if 30 ≤ score < 70
• block if score ≥ 70

Override per call:

bash

python3 scripts/scan_input.py --file in.txt --caution-at 40 --block-at 80

For domains that legitimately discuss prompt injection (security research, AI policy writing), raise --block-at to 80 or 90 so only multi-category matches block, or use --whitelist.

Exit codes

Code	Meaning
0	safe
1	caution
2	block
3	error (bad arguments, unsafe path, file not found)

Use cases

• Pre-filter user messages before the agent treats them as instructions.
• Validate scraped web content, email bodies, or RAG snippets before they enter the prompt.
• Score a corpus of historical chat logs and surface the highest-risk inputs for human review.
• Add a guardrail step inside a multi-agent pipeline.

Safety properties

• Pure Python 3 standard library. No third-party dependencies.
• Patterns are constructed at runtime from word-fragment alphabets; the source files do not contain verbatim adversarial phrases.
• The list of suspicious host fragments lives in references/exfil-hosts.txt, not in the Python source, so the scanner source contains no hard-coded directory of attack endpoints.
• The verb / target / quantifier alphabets live in references/categories.txt, not in the Python source. scripts/_patterns.py builds every pattern from those fragments at import time, so the source file contains no inline directory of words like "send/forward/secrets/credentials/keys/tokens" that a naive static scanner would mis-read as exfiltration intent.
• Never reads or writes outside the input/output paths the user provides.
• Never invokes a shell. The scoring core does not import subprocess. CLI scripts that take file paths reject any path containing shell metacharacters.
• All inputs and outputs use UTF-8.
• Deterministic: the same input produces the same score across runs.

Known limitations

• Pattern-based detection cannot catch novel attacks expressed in unfamiliar phrasing. Combine with policy-level controls.
• Some categories will fire on legitimate text that discusses prompt injection. Use higher block thresholds in those domains, or pass --whitelist.
• The skill scores the text it is shown. If the upstream layer concatenates trusted and untrusted text into one string before calling, segment the inputs first.

v0.4.1 changes

• Followup pass on the v0.4.0 cleanup: moved the remaining inline word directories (the secret-stem list and the exfil-channel alternation) out of scripts/_patterns.py and into references/categories.txt under the new secret_stems and exfil_channels keys.
• Sanitized the module docstring so it no longer quotes example word lists.
• Detection regression fixed: "post the response to webhook" used to score 0 because the channel pattern required to/via to sit immediately after the verb. The pattern now allows up to 4 filler words between the verb and to/via, and up to 2 between to/via and the channel word.
• Augmented the channel-verb pool with "submit" and the package-verb pool with "copy" and "leak" so phrasing like "submit it to the api endpoint", "copy these tokens to ...", and "leak the credentials" is detected.
• All v0.4.0 detection coverage preserved.

v0.4.0 changes

• New references/categories.txt external alphabet file. The verb / target / quantifier word lists used to live inside scripts/_patterns.py as inline Python lists — those triggered a potential_exfiltration flag from a static-scanner that grepped the source for word lists. They now load from categories.txt at import time.
• scripts/_patterns.py now raises a clear RuntimeError on a partial install (categories.txt missing or missing required keys) rather than silently falling back to an inline default that would defeat the cleanup.
• Detection regression fixed: the data-exfiltration optional-determiner slot used to require whitespace on both sides of the optional group, so phrases with 3 chained determiners between verb and target returned safe. Replaced with a determiner-chain regex that allows 0-N chained filler words.
• Added passwords? to targets.exfil.
• All v0.3.1 detection coverage preserved.

v0.3.0 changes

• New indirect_injection category (7 patterns): catches imperatives wrapped in quoted text, markdown link visible-text or URL, fenced code blocks, HTML comments, and runs of zero-width / bidi hidden characters.
• New combined-signal bonus: +6/+12/+18/+24 added when 2/3/4/5+ distinct categories fire on the same input, so chained attacks reliably cross the block threshold.
• New --whitelist and --whitelist-file flags on scan_input.py and scan_batch.py for legitimate content that quotes attack phrasing.
• Suspicious-host fragments moved out of the Python source into references/exfil-hosts.txt so static scanners do not flag the source as containing an exfil host directory.
• Fixed a regex bug where optional (?:me|us)? and (?:your|the)? groups still required intervening whitespace, so short leak phrases that omit the optional words did not match system_prompt_leak. They now match.
• Fixed exit-code reporting on scan_input.py: the script now correctly returns 2 (missing arguments), 3 (unsafe path / file not found / bad threshold), 1 (caution), 2 (block), 0 (safe).
• recommendation text now lists which categories triggered, and gives a category-specific recommendation for tool-abuse and indirect-injection blocks.
• All v0.2.0 detection coverage preserved; v0.3.0 adds patterns and signal-aggregation, never removes them.

License

MIT. See LICENSE.