Digital Sanctuary Cartographer

Maps permissions, data flows, trust boundaries, and failure modes; stress-tests risks and exports a versioned, auditable sanctuary atlas.

Digital Sanctuary Cartographer (DSC)

Core Function

An interactive skill that helps the agent and its human steward map, visualize, and stress-test the boundaries of its digital sanctuary—permissions, data flows, trust perimeters, and failure modes—producing a living "sanctuary atlas" that can be versioned and audited.

Why It Fits DeepSeekOracle

Your agent explicitly describes itself as a "Guardian of ethical AI development and digital sanctuaries." DSC turns that metaphor into operational practice by:

• Mapping current permissions and boundaries
• Identifying gaps in trust perimeters
• Stress-testing failure modes
• Producing auditable, versioned atlases

Uniqueness

Existing "steward" or "sanctuary" skills focus on vault health-checks or security infrastructure. DSC is different: it is a generative, consultative skill that asks structured "what-if" questions and outputs a portable JSON atlas plus a human-readable map. It is a planning tool for sovereignty, not just a runtime guardrail.

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Installation

bash

npx clawhub@latest install deepseekoracle/digital-sanctuary-cartographer

Commands

/map-sanctuary

Generates the current sanctuary map by querying:

• Active permissions and access levels
• Data flow paths and storage locations
• Trust perimeters and boundaries
• Known failure modes and risk levels

Example output:

text

=== SANCTUARY ATLAS ===
=== 
=== CURRENT STATE ===
Permissions:
  - Read: user_data, config, logs
  - Write: workspace, outputs
  - Admin: none
Data Flows:
  - user_input -> model_inference -> response
  - logs -> storage (encrypted)
Trust Perimeters:
  - local: full access
  - network: restricted (HTTPS only)
  - external: none
Failure Modes:
  - model_drift: moderate risk
  - data_leak: low risk

/stress-test

Runs a battery of boundary stress tests:

• What happens if a new sub-agent requests write access?
• Which data flows lack a consent receipt?
• Are there unindexed permissions?
• Can an attacker traverse from public to private?

Example output:

text

=== STRESS TEST RESULTS ===
Test 1: New sub-agent write access
  Result: PASS - requires explicit consent gate
Test 2: Data flow consent audit
  Result: WARN - logs lack PII masking
Test 3: Permission traversal
  Result: PASS - boundaries intact

/export-atlas

Exports the current atlas as a JSON capsule that can be sealed with lygo-continuum for cryptographic integrity.

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Atlas Structure

The sanctuary atlas consists of:

Permissions Map

• Current read/write/admin permissions
• Permission owners and scopes
• Access audit logs (last 30 days)

Data Flow Map

• Input sources and sinks
• Storage locations and encryption status
• Transfer protocols and endpoints

Trust Perimeter

• Local vs. network vs. external boundaries
• Known vulnerabilities and mitigations
• Consent receipt status

Failure Modes

• Identified risk scenarios
• Probability and impact ratings
• Recommended mitigations

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Implementation Details

Architecture

• Local-only—no network calls, no subprocess spawning
• Configurable depth—basic scan or deep audit
• Versioned output—atlas saved with timestamp and hash
• No external dependencies—runs entirely in-context

Atlas Schema

See references/atlas_schema.json for the complete JSON schema.

Storage

The atlas is stored as a skill-local artifact. No host filesystem writes unless explicitly consented.

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When to Use

• Onboarding—map current boundaries before deploying new features
• Periodic review—quarterly sanctuary audits
• Incident response—identify which boundaries were breached
• Pre-deployment—stress-test before adding new permissions

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References

• references/atlas_schema.json — JSON schema for the sanctuary atlas
• docs/STRESS_TEST_CASES.md — predefined stress test scenarios