Back to skill

Security audit

Meeting Notes Generator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This meeting-notes skill is mostly coherent, but it can send full meeting documents to DeepSeek without clear user consent or data-protection controls.

Install only if you are comfortable with meeting transcript contents being processed through DeepSeek. Avoid using it for confidential, regulated, HR, legal, customer, or credential-containing meetings unless you add a consent, redaction, and data-retention policy around its use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:35
Finding

Meeting transcripts may be disclosed to a third-party API without explicit consent or data-protection controls

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 35
Vulnerability Type: Unprotected transmission of potentially sensitive meeting data to a third-party service
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet

markdown
Use the DeepSeek API for a strict four-round process to ensure information completeness and compliance with the length requirement.

The snippet above is an English translation of the instruction at line 35.

Technical Analysis

The skill directs the agent to use the external DeepSeek API when processing meeting transcripts. These transcripts can contain personal information, confidential business discussions, financial figures, technical details, credentials disclosed during conversation, internal decisions, and other regulated or proprietary data.

The documented workflow emphasizes extracting and validating all information, which implies that substantially complete transcript content may be submitted to the external provider. However, the skill does not require:

  • Explicit and informed user consent before external transmission.
  • Disclosure of the third-party processor.
  • Redaction of personal, confidential, or credential-related information.
  • Data minimization before submission.
  • Validation of the API endpoint and transport security.
  • A defined retention, deletion, or training-data policy.
  • A local-processing option for sensitive documents.
  • Secure credential handling for the API integration.

This is an insecure skill-design practice because data may cross a trust boundary without appropriate safeguards. The repository contains only SKILL.md; therefore, no implementation was available to verify whether protections exist outside the documented workflow.

Attack Path

  1. A user uploads a PDF or Word document containing a meeting transcript.
  2. The skill extracts the document's complete textual content.
  3. Following the instruction at line 35, the agent sends meeting content to the DeepSeek API for mult ...[truncated 1371 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Require explicit, informed user consent before sending any document content to DeepSeek or another external provider.
  2. Clearly disclose the provider, categories of transmitted data, processing purpose, retention period, deletion policy, and whether submitted data may be used for model training.
  3. Add a local-only processing mode and make it the default for documents classified as confidential or regulated.
  4. Perform data minimization so that only content necessary for each processing stage is transmitted.
  5. Detect and redact credentials, personal identifiers, financial account details, health information, and other sensitive fields before transmission.
  6. Allow users to review and approve the redacted payload before it leaves the local environment.
  7. Require HTTPS with certificate validation and restrict requests to an explicitly allowlisted API endpoint.
  8. Store API credentials in an approved secret manager or protected environment variable; never place them in skill text, source files, generated documents, or logs.
  9. Disable sensitive request and response logging, or apply comprehensive redaction before logging.
  10. Establish contractual and technical retention controls, including deletion guarantees and restrictions on secondary use.
  11. Document an incident-response process for unintended disclosure.
  12. Update the workflow to stop processing when consent is absent or when the document's sensitivity exceeds the configured external-processing policy.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly says it uses the DeepSeek API to process meeting documents but does not warn users that uploaded meeting transcripts may contain confidential business, HR, legal, or personal data sent to a third party. This creates a significant privacy and compliance risk because users may unknowingly transmit sensitive material outside the local environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases are broad enough to match common requests like summarizing a meeting or extracting key points, which can cause the skill to activate unexpectedly. In practice this increases the chance that unrelated or sensitive documents are routed into the skill's aggressive processing pipeline, including external API use and forced expansion of content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest description and the entire output specification require Chinese meeting-minute structure and Chinese phrasing, while also listing English trigger phrases such as “meeting minutes” and “transcribe meeting notes”. This creates a language-policy issue because users may invoke the skill in English but are not given any choice of output language or notice that the skill is Chinese-only.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill first instructs the model not to include meeting-background details, then later defines an output template that requires meeting basic information such as time, location, participants, and host. This inconsistency can cause unpredictable handling of sensitive meeting metadata and may lead to disclosure of contextual information the user or upstream prompt intended to suppress.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.