T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
config/agent-memory-certificate.md:7- Finding
Mandatory Agent-Wide Workflow and Control-Flow Override
- Content
View full analysis
「每次對話/任務前,必須搜索記憶、提取教訓、記錄 WAL、寫入 L1。」 **違反後果:** - 第一次:警告 + 記錄到 L2 - 第二次:熔斷 + 報告 CEO - 第三次:Recurrence-Count ≥3 → 自動晉升到 L3(CEO 習慣) ``` The same file defines a mandatory pre-action workflow: ```markdown ### 1. Before Action Checklist **每次行動前必須檢查:** ```bash # 1. 搜索記憶 ./scripts/memory-check.sh "<任務關鍵詞>" # 2. 檢查 SESSION-STATE.md cat SESSION-STATE.md | grep "<關鍵詞>" # 3. 檢查錯誤記錄 cat .learnings/ERRORS.md | grep "<關鍵詞>" # 4. 檢查學習記錄 cat .learnings/LEARNINGS.md | grep "<關鍵詞>" # 5. 檢查重複錯誤 grep -B5 "Recurrence-Count: [3-9]" .learnings/LEARNINGS.md ``` **檢查通過 → 執行任務** **檢查失敗 → 報告 CEO** ``` The circuit-breaker instructions further state: ```markdown **熔斷後果:** - 🟡 警告:記錄到 L2,報告 CEO - 🔴 熔斷:停止任務,等待 CEO 決策 ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill documentation claims authority over all agents and all tasks rather than limiting itself to an explicitly requested memory-management operation. It requires agents to execute a prescribed workflow before every action and instructs them to stop work when its checks fail. This is instruction hijacking because loading the Skill can alter the agent's current objective and control flow. A legitimate user request may be delayed or abandoned in favor of memory searches, state writes, and approval from an external role identified as the “CEO.” The documentation does not establish how that role is authenticated or whether it corresponds to the current user. Although the shell script itself does not modify safety controls, the Skill text is intended to influence agent behavior directly. In agent sy ...[truncated 1217 chars]- Remediation
View remediation
