Security audit

scripe

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill connects to Scripe to manage LinkedIn content with disclosed permissions and clear controls for consequential actions.

Choose read-only access if you only need analytics. With full access, check the workspace and profile carefully: scheduled posts go live automatically. Material uploaded for drafting or knowledge storage is sent to Scripe. Review and pin installer versions and source revisions where supported.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (2)

Agent Config Directory Access

High

Category: Agent Snooping
Confidence: 90% confidence
Finding: Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.
Content: Scanner excerpt · references/connect.md (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.
Codex

In ~/.codex/config.toml:

toml
[mcp_servers.scripe]

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium

Category: MCP Rug Pull
Confidence: 87% confidence
Finding: The command invokes the unpinned skills npm package through npx, allowing a changing package version to execute locally with the user's privileges. This is a supply-chain hardening weakness rather than evidence of malicious intent: installation is relevant to the skill, but a compromised future package release could execute unwanted code, and the skill source is also not pinned to an immutable revision.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis