Tmp.U6ndBhryVk

Query and act on Evite (evite.com) events, guest lists, RSVPs, and messages from a shell with curl and a cookie jar — instead of running the evite-mcp server. Does a headless EVITE_EMAIL/EVITE_PASSWORD login against evite.com's internal /services/, /ajax/, and /tsunami/ APIs, no browser or extension involved. Use when you want Evite data/actions without the MCP, in a script, or on a machine where the MCP isn't installed. Triggers on "check my Evite", "Evite guest list", "RSVP on Evite from the shell", "curl Evite", "evite-api skill".

Evite via curl (no MCP)

Evite has no public API — this hits the site's own internal /services/ (+ /ajax/, /tsunami/) layer using session cookies, exactly like evite-mcp does. This is a curl skill, not fpx: Evite's login is a plain CSRF-protected Django form POST, and reads/writes with the resulting cookies are not bot-walled (Cloudflare sits in front but doesn't trip on a plain curl/Node request carrying a valid session) — so the whole flow runs server-side with a cookie jar. No signed-in browser tab, no Transporter extension, no bridge.

Auth model: session cookies x-evite-session + evtsession, plus a CSRF cookie csrftoken sent back as the X-CSRFToken header on every write. The CSRF cookie rotates — re-read it from the jar immediately before each write, never cache it.

One-time login (per shell session, until the jar's session expires)

sh

export EVITE_EMAIL=[e-mail] EVITE_PASSWORD=yourpassword   # or: op read op://.../evite/password
JAR=/tmp/evite-jar.txt
touch "$JAR" && chmod 600 "$JAR"   # jar holds the live session cookie — restrict before writing
UA='Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/148.0.0.0 Safari/537.36'

# 1. Prime: GET the homepage to obtain the csrftoken (+ anonymous session) cookies.
curl -sS -c "$JAR" -b "$JAR" -A "$UA" 'https://www.evite.com/' -o /dev/null

# 2. Login: POST creds with the primed jar + X-CSRFToken + Origin/Referer (Django's
#    HTTPS CSRF check needs all three; a cold POST without them 403s).
CSRF=$(awk -F'\t' '$6=="csrftoken"{v=$7} END{print v}' "$JAR")
curl -sS -c "$JAR" -b "$JAR" -A "$UA" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H "X-CSRFToken: $CSRF" \
  -H 'Origin: https://www.evite.com' -H 'Referer: https://www.evite.com/' \
  -d "$(jq -n --arg e "$EVITE_EMAIL" --arg p "$EVITE_PASSWORD" '{email:$e,password:$p}')" \
  'https://www.evite.com/ajax_login'

A 200 means the jar now holds the authenticated cookies (x-evite-session, evtsession, a freshly-rotated csrftoken, x-evite-features) and a JSON body with full_name/user_id/token. 401 {"error":"Invalid Email Address / Password"} = bad creds; 403 {"error":"HTTP_403"} = the priming GET was skipped, or its csrftoken wasn't echoed back.

Reads: jar + Accept: application/json

sh

curl -sS -b "$JAR" -c "$JAR" -H 'Accept: application/json' \
  'https://www.evite.com/services/events/v1/?filterBy=all&type=invitation' | jq .

Always pass -b "$JAR" -c "$JAR" together (read AND rewrite the same file) — Evite occasionally re-sets cookies even on a GET, and a write's csrftoken rotation must land back in the jar for the next call.

Writes: jar + fresh X-CSRFToken + Content-Type: application/json

sh

CSRF=$(awk -F'\t' '$6=="csrftoken"{v=$7} END{print v}' "$JAR")
curl -sS -b "$JAR" -c "$JAR" -X PUT \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H "X-CSRFToken: $CSRF" \
  -d '{"rsvpResponse":"yes","numberOfAdults":2,"numberOfKids":0}' \
  "https://www.evite.com/services/event/v1/$EVENT_ID/guests/$GUEST_ID"

Re-read $CSRF from $JAR right before every write — a stale value 403s. If a write still 401/403s with the cookie unchanged in the jar (check awk -F'\t' '$6=="csrftoken"' "$JAR" before/after), the session itself expired: redo the one-time login.

Full endpoint list (every read + write, real paths/bodies, jq recipes) is in references/endpoints.md.

Notes / caveats

• Two write bodies are still unverified upstream (tracked as evite-mcp issue #3): send_message (POST /tsunami/v1/services/event/{id}/guest/{gid}/messages) and send_invitation (POST /services/event/v1/{id}/send/) — only the endpoints were captured live, not their exact request bodies. The MCP (and this skill) send {"message": "..."} / {} as the best-known shape; treat those two as slightly less certain than the rest.
• list_templates is HTML scraping (GET /invites/{category}/), not JSON — see the reference for the extraction pattern.
• Writes here really mutate Evite — RSVPs, cancellations, broadcast emails to real guests. There's no MCP-side confirm-gate in this skill: you are the confirm gate. Test broadcasts/sends only against a throwaway event with a blackholed @example.com guest.
• This project (evite-mcp) is developed and maintained by AI (Claude).