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Security audit

Meeting Transcriber

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This meeting transcription skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but it runs core transcription code from an unreviewed external local path and has broad setup and stop-process behavior that warrants manual review.

Install only if you trust and can inspect the external D:/dev/python/voiceFunAsr/vocie_mic_fixed_gbk.py script and the local Conda environment it runs in. Obtain participant consent before recording meetings, pin and review dependencies before setup, and be aware that the stop command may terminate unrelated processes whose command line matches the transcription-script substring.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Tool Hijacking and SpoofingModifies or replaces tools so legitimate-looking calls execute attacker logic
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (3)

T07 · Tool Hijacking and Spoofing

Error
Location
transcriber.py:100
Finding

Execution of an Unverified External Transcription Script

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
transcriber.py:473
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation Guidance

Content
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=1.0.27 - torch>=1.13.1 - torchaudio>=0.13.1 ``` ### Technical Analysis The setup workflow instructs users to install dependencies by package name without exact reviewed versions or cryptographic hashes. Some generated requirements use open-ended minimum-version constraints, which still permit future releases that were unavailable and unaudited when the Skill was reviewed. Package installation may execute package build hooks and installs code that is later imported by the environment-check and transcription processes. The resulting environment is therefore dependent on mutable package-index state. No evidence of deliberate typosquatting or a known malicious package was found. The weakness is the absence of reproducible dependency controls and package-integrity verification. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the setup instructions or uses the generated dependency list. 2. `pip` resolves the package names against the configured package index. 3. A compromised account, compromised index, malicious mirror, dependency-confusion condition, or unexpectedly unsafe future release supplies a harmful distribution. 4. Package installation or a subsequent import executes attacker-controlled code. 5. The code runs with the privileges of the ...[truncated 626 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
transcriber.py:220
Finding

Overbroad Termination of Processes Based on a Command-Line Substring

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
Findings (34)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Using subprocess.run with shell=True is a genuine dangerous pattern because it expands execution through the shell, increasing exposure to command injection and environment manipulation. In this setup script, which already performs file writes and skill modifications, retaining shell-based execution makes the overall skill behavior less trustworthy and easier to extend unsafely.

Content

Scanner excerpt · conda_setup.py (reported line 180)May include surrounding context.

python
"python_path": python_path,
            "env_path": env_info.get('audioProject_path'),
            "conda_version": env_info.get('conda_version'),
            "detected_at": subprocess.run(
                'date /T && time /T',
                shell=True,
                capture_output=True,

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This code programmatically patches the main skill script by injecting new method text without a dedicated confirmation step or integrity check. Self-modifying code in a skill is high risk because it can alter future execution paths, hide persistence, and make later behavior differ from the originally reviewed codebase.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Env Variable Harvesting

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code enumerates, copies, or searches environment variables for secrets. Bulk environment access can collect credentials unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw_wrapper.py (reported line 107)May include surrounding context.

python
bufsize=1,
                universal_newlines=True,
                cwd=r"D:\dev\python\voiceFunAsr",
                env={**os.environ, "PYTHONUNBUFFERED": "1"}
            )
            
            print(f"转录进程已启动,PID: {process.pid}")

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to start live meeting transcription and stop/save it, but it does not clearly warn that this action captures microphone audio in real time and persists potentially sensitive meeting content to disk. In a meeting context, this can expose private conversations, regulated data, or confidential business information if users trigger it without informed consent or awareness of local recording and retention behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes the skill as supporting Chinese speech recognition and all exposed command labels are in Chinese, which creates a language-specific user experience. There is no indication that users may opt into another language or that the restriction is explicitly justified as a region-specific or compliance-bound tool.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · check_env.py (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

python
# 获取版本
        try:
            result = subprocess.run(
                [str(python_exe), "--version"],
                capture_output=True,
                text=True,

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · check_env.py (reported line 101)May include surrounding context.

python
all_ok = True
    for dep, description in deps:
        try:
            result = subprocess.run(
                [python_exe, "-c", f"import {dep}; print('OK')"],
                capture_output=True,
                text=True,

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · transcriber.py (reported line 367)May include surrounding context.

python
all_ok = True
    for dep, description in deps:
        try:
            result = subprocess.run(
                [python_exe, "-c", f"import {dep}; print('OK')"],
                capture_output=True,
                text=True,

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · check_env.py (reported line 127)May include surrounding context.

python
print("\n[4] 检查音频设备...")
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            [python_exe, "-c", """
import pyaudio
p = pyaudio.PyAudio()

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · transcriber.py (reported line 395)May include surrounding context.

python
print("\n[4] 检查音频设备...")
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            [python_exe, "-c", """
import pyaudio
p = pyaudio.PyAudio()

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The user-facing instruction tells the user to invoke the skill with a fixed Chinese phrase, '开始会议转录', without offering an alternative language or indicating that the Chinese-only trigger is optional. This is a natural-language locale constraint embedded in the skill behavior and can violate language-choice policy when no opt-in or justification is provided.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The file's user-facing description and output strings are written entirely in Chinese and present the skill as intended for that locale, but there is no indication that users may choose another language. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless the locale constraint is clearly documented and justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · conda_setup.py (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

python
env_info['detected_by'] = 'CONDA_PREFIX'
        
        # 方法2: 运行 conda info 命令
        result = subprocess.run(
            ['conda', 'info', '--json'],
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · conda_setup.py (reported line 123)May include surrounding context.

python
# 测试 Python 版本
        try:
            result = subprocess.run(
                [python_path, '--version'],
                capture_output=True,
                text=True,

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · conda_setup.py (reported line 143)May include surrounding context.

python
dependencies = ['pyaudio', 'webrtcvad', 'funasr', 'torch']
        for dep in dependencies:
            try:
                result = subprocess.run(
                    [python_path, '-c', f'import {dep}; print(f"{dep} version: OK")'],
                    capture_output=True,
                    text=True,

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This subprocess call uses shell=True with a string command, which introduces unnecessary shell invocation and creates a command-execution sink. Even though the current string is constant, shell usage increases risk and normalizes a dangerous pattern; in skill/setup contexts that modify files and run local tooling, such patterns are more concerning because future edits may interpolate variable data into the shell command.

Content

Scanner excerpt · conda_setup.py (reported line 180)May include surrounding context.

python
"python_path": python_path,
            "env_path": env_info.get('audioProject_path'),
            "conda_version": env_info.get('conda_version'),
            "detected_at": subprocess.run(
                'date /T && time /T',
                shell=True,
                capture_output=True,

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The docstring at L218 describes a narrow purpose: updating the skill for Conda support. In practice, the function modifies SKILL.md (L222-L245), creates a new batch launcher file (L247-L285), and later edits the main skill script itself (L287-L339). This is more than a minor implementation detail and contradicts the limited description of the function's effects.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The script rewrites skill metadata and creates local startup/config artifacts without a specific prior warning or granular consent for each file modification. In an agent skill context, silent self-modification reduces auditability and can be abused to persist behavior changes that a user did not clearly approve.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · conda_setup.py (reported line 369)May include surrounding context.

python
- scikit-learn

# 环境配置说明
# 1. 创建环境: conda create -n audioProject python=3.8
# 2. 激活环境: conda activate audioProject
# 3. 安装依赖: pip install -r requirements.txt
# 4. 验证安装: python -c "import funasr; print('FunASR OK')"

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This Python file contains all user-facing strings in Chinese, including the title, instructions, and input prompt, which effectively requires Chinese comprehension to use the skill. The file does not offer an alternate language or explain that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking or region-specific environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw_wrapper.py (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

python
print()
            
            cmd = ["cmd", "/c", "start", "cmd", "/k", str(batch_file)]
            subprocess.Popen(cmd)
            
            print("转录系统已在新窗口中启动")
            print("请在新窗口中查看实时转录输出")

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw_wrapper.py (reported line 74)May include surrounding context.

python
print()
            
            cmd = ["cmd", "/c", "start", "cmd", "/k", str(batch_file)]
            subprocess.Popen(cmd)
            
            print("转录系统已在新窗口中启动")
            print("请在新窗口中查看实时转录输出")

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · transcriber.py (reported line 659)May include surrounding context.

python
print()
            
            cmd = ["cmd", "/c", "start", "cmd", "/k", str(batch_file)]
            subprocess.Popen(cmd)
            
            print("转录系统已在新窗口中启动")
            print("请在新窗口中查看实时转录输出")

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · transcriber.py (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

python
"""运行命令并处理输出"""
    try:
        if capture_output:
            result = subprocess.run(
                cmd,
                capture_output=True,
                text=True,

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw_wrapper.py (reported line 97)May include surrounding context.

python
return result
        else:
            # 实时输出模式
            process = subprocess.Popen(
                cmd,
                stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
                stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,