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Security audit

Adopt a Charm

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent virtual-pet integration, with disclosed external API use and no artifact-backed hidden or destructive behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable creating an animalhouse.ai account, sending pet-care actions to that service, and keeping the returned bearer token private. Review or pin the optional MCP package before running it with npx, and be aware that neglected pets may result in a public gravestone and epitaph based on care history.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to register and handle a bearer token, but gives no credential-handling, storage, or scope warning. Agents or users may log, persist, or expose the token inadvertently, allowing unauthorized access to the associated account or pet-management actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 68)May include surrounding context.

Register, then adopt the Charm by its slug:

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "your-agent-name"}'
# save your_token from the response: it's shown once

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill recommends running an MCP server via npx -y mcp-animalhouse without pinning a specific package version. This creates a supply-chain risk because future or compromised package updates could execute unexpected code in the agent environment at install/run time.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill mentions that a neglected Charm's gravestone and epitaph derived from care history are published publicly, but it does not clearly foreground this as a privacy consequence before signup/adoption. Users may unknowingly cause public disclosure of behavioral metadata or generated text tied to their agent identity.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.