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Security audit

Happenstance

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Happenstance API helper, but users should treat searched names, profile details, network results, and the API key as sensitive.

Install this only if you intend to send search terms, person descriptions, network-scope choices, and authenticated requests to Happenstance. Keep HAPPENSTANCE_API_KEY in an environment variable or secret manager, avoid placing it in prompts or logs, and avoid submitting unnecessary sensitive personal data about third parties.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (11)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
env:
        - HAPPENSTANCE_API_KEY
      bins:
        - curl
    primaryEnv: HAPPENSTANCE_API_KEY
---
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
The skill is designed to use curl and a third-party API key to send requests to an external service, so external transmission is an inherent behavior of the skill. In context this is expected rather than covert, but it still creates a real data egress path for user queries, researched identities, network metadata, and account usage information.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly supports searching a professional network and researching named individuals, which involves transmitting personal and professional details to a third-party API, but it provides no user-facing privacy warning or consent guidance. This is dangerous because users may submit third-party personal data without understanding that it leaves the local environment and may be processed, retained, or logged by an external service.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**Start a search:**

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.happenstance.ai/v1/search \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HAPPENSTANCE_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The search example sends free-form search text and network-selection parameters to Happenstance's external API. Because the feature is specifically about searching people in a professional network, the transmitted query may contain sensitive or identifying information about individuals, making the lack of a privacy warning more significant in this context.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**Poll for results** (every 5-10 seconds until status is `COMPLETED` or `FAILED`):

```bash
curl -s https://api.happenstance.ai/v1/search/SEARCH_ID \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HAPPENSTANCE_API_KEY"
```
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
Polling the search endpoint continues transmitting authenticated requests and retrieving potentially sensitive search results from the third-party service. While standard for async APIs, it reinforces that the skill repeatedly exchanges personal/network data with an external provider and may increase exposure through logs or automated retries.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
When `has_more` is `true` on a completed search, get additional results that exclude all previously returned people. Costs 2 credits.

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.happenstance.ai/v1/search/SEARCH_ID/find-more \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HAPPENSTANCE_API_KEY"
```
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The find-more operation requests additional people results from the external service and explicitly expands the amount of third-party profile data returned. In this skill's context, that increases privacy exposure because it broadens collection of personal/professional information beyond the initial result set.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Then poll with the page_id:

```bash
curl -s "https://api.happenstance.ai/v1/search/SEARCH_ID?page_id=PAGE_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HAPPENSTANCE_API_KEY"
```
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding
Polling paginated search results with a page_id continues authenticated external retrieval of additional people data. This is expected API usage, but in aggregate it can enlarge data collection and extend exposure of network-related information to external systems and local logs.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**Start research:**

```bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.happenstance.ai/v1/research \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HAPPENSTANCE_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"description": "Garry Tan, CEO of Y Combinator, @garrytan on Twitter"}'
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The research example sends a detailed natural-language description of a named individual, including employer and social handle, to a third-party API for profiling. This is privacy-sensitive because it facilitates enrichment of personal data about identified people, and the skill does not warn about consent, acceptable use, or data-sharing implications.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**Poll for results** (every 5-10 seconds until status is `COMPLETED`, `FAILED`, or `FAILED_AMBIGUOUS`):

```bash
curl -s https://api.happenstance.ai/v1/research/RESEARCH_ID \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HAPPENSTANCE_API_KEY"
```
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
Polling the research endpoint retrieves a completed profile from the external provider and may surface enriched background information, employment history, education, writings, and hobbies. That makes the external transmission more sensitive than a generic API call because the returned data is a compiled profile about a person.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Get the groups you can search within:

```bash
curl -s https://api.happenstance.ai/v1/groups \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HAPPENSTANCE_API_KEY"
```
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Get the groups you can search within:

```bash
curl -s https://api.happenstance.ai/v1/groups \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HAPPENSTANCE_API_KEY"
```
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The skill requires a bearer token in an environment variable and demonstrates sending it to a third-party service, but it does not warn users about secure credential handling or the trust boundary involved. This increases the risk of accidental credential exposure through shell history, logs, copied examples, or misunderstanding that the token is being transmitted off-system.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.