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Security audit

Clawlet Daily

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a simple daily-report generator, but it can expose agent memory through broad triggers and insufficient scoping.

Install only if you are comfortable with the agent reading and summarizing matching memory files into a report. Use it in a trusted, single-user context, and consider narrowing the trigger, limiting it to explicit dates, and reviewing memory contents for secrets or private information before use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

other

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:3
Finding
Unrestricted Aggregation and Disclosure of Agent Memory## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 3-55 **Vulnerability Type**: Unrestricted sensitive agent-memory access **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Skill Instructions The following is an English translation of the relevant instructions: ```markdown description: A dedicated daily report generation skill for Clawlet. It is triggered when the user requests a "Clawlet Daily Report," "Today's Summary," or asks "What did you do today?" It automatically aggregates learning records, task logs, and AI intelligence from the memory directory and generates a Markdown daily report with citations, summaries, and emotional warmth. 1. **Automatic aggregation**: Scan the `memory/` directory for files such as `ai-briefing-*.md`, `learning-*.md`, and `task-logs-*.md`. 4. **Source traceability**: Every data point links back to the original record file. * **Traceability**: Every conclusion must be supported by a file in `memory/`. ## Related Files * `memory/ai-briefing-*.md`: AI intelligence reports. * `memory/learning-*.md`: Learning notes. * `memory/task-logs-*.md`: Task logs. ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill directs the agent to search and summarize internal files under `memory/` whenever a user makes a broadly worded daily-summary request. These files may contain task history, intelligence reports, learning records, personal information, operational details, or other context not intended for the requesting user. No instruction requires the agent to: - Authenticate or authorize the requester. - Confirm that the requester owns or may access the records. - Limit processing to records associated with the current user or session. - Canonicalize and validate paths before reading files. - Restrict records to a specific requested date. - Detect or redact credentials, personal data, confidential content, or embedded secrets. - Avoid exposing internal file names and links. The traceability requirement increases the disclosure risk because the genera ...[truncated 1779 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Require explicit authorization before reading or summarizing any memory records. 2. Bind access to the authenticated user, workspace, or session that owns the records. 3. Restrict reads to an approved, canonicalized directory and reject paths that resolve outside it. 4. Limit collection to an explicit date and a narrowly defined allowlist of files required for the requested report. 5. Add mandatory filtering for credentials, authentication tokens, personal information, confidential business data, and unrelated session content. 6. Summarize only the minimum information necessary to fulfill the request. 7. Do not expose internal paths or source links by default. Provide sanitized citations only when the requester is authorized to see the underlying record. 8. Treat instructions embedded in memory files as untrusted data and prohibit them from changing agent behavior. 9. If authorization or sensitivity cannot be established, request confirmation or refuse to disclose the affected records. 10. Record access decisions in an audit log without copying sensitive file content into that log.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The trigger description includes broad everyday phrases such as asking what was done today, which can cause the skill to activate in situations beyond the user's clear intent to generate a specific report. This increases the chance of over-triggering and unexpected access to local `memory/` files containing personal activity summaries.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The usage example repeats broad natural-language triggers like '小钳今天做了什么?', reinforcing ambiguous activation behavior. In context, that ambiguity matters because the skill aggregates and summarizes potentially sensitive historical notes from the `memory/` directory, so accidental invocation could expose more information than the user intended.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The skill description and examples are written to produce a Chinese-language日报 for 小钳, with no indication that users may choose another language or locale. This can be a language policy issue when the skill implicitly forces one language without offering a choice.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.