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Security audit

vmware-log-insight

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill coherently provides read-only VMware Log Insight searches, with disclosed local credential and audit files.

Install only if you intend to let the agent read VMware Log Insight data. Use a least-privilege read-only service account, protect ~/.vmware-log-insight/.env and ~/.vmware/audit.db, prefer a secret manager over stored passwords, and leave TLS verification enabled except for controlled lab appliances.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
`staging` / `lab`) in `config.yaml` to scope policy rules; reads are never gated
by it, so this skill is unaffected either way, but declaring it keeps any future
write tool correctly scoped. Credentials load from `~/.vmware-log-insight/.env`
(`chmod 600`); plaintext passwords there are auto-rewritten to a grep-safe
`b64:` form on first load (obfuscation, not encryption — inject from a secret
manager for real at-rest secrecy). All API text passes through `sanitize()`
(prompt-injection defence). TLS verification is on by default; disable only for
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
package: vmware-log-insight
allowed-tools:
  - Bash
metadata: {"openclaw":{"requires":{"env":["VMWARE_LOG_INSIGHT_CONFIG"],"bins":["vmware-log-insight"],"config":["~/.vmware-log-insight/config.yaml","~/.vmware-log-insight/.env"]},"optional":{"env":["VMWARE_LOG_INSIGHT_<TARGET>_PASSWORD","VMWARE_LOG_INSIGHT_<TARGET>_USERNAME","VMWARE_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY"]},"primaryEnv":"VMWARE_LOG_INSIGHT_CONFIG"}}
---

# VMware Log Insight
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
1. **Source Code** — https://github.com/vmware-skills/VMware-Log-Insight (MIT).
2. **Config file contents** — `config.yaml` holds only host/port/username/provider;
   no passwords or tokens. Secrets live only in `.env` (`chmod 600`).
3. **Webhook data scope** — none. This skill makes no outbound calls except to the
   configured Log Insight appliance.
4. **TLS verification** — on by default (`verify_ssl: true`); disable only for
Confidence
24% confidence
Finding
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
| Metadata | `log_fields`, `log_version` | 2 | Read |
| Alerts | `alert_list`, `alert_get`, `alert_history` | 3 | Read |

**7 tools, all read-only.** No ingest, no alert creation/edit/delete — zero write surface.

## Quick Install
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
## Audit & Safety

Read-only by construction (no write tools). MCP tools run through
`@vmware_tool(risk_level="low")`, which records each call to the shared audit DB
(`~/.vmware/audit.db`). Targets may declare `environment:` (`production` /
`staging` / `lab`) in `config.yaml` to scope policy rules; reads are never gated
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
Every tool this skill ships is read-only, and reads are never gated — so the
label changes nothing for Log Insight today. Set it anyway to keep the family's
config files consistent, so a future write tool is correctly scoped. Run
`vmware-audit policy` to see the rules in force.

## Credentials
Confidence
18% confidence
Finding
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

VirusTotal

56/56 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.