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Security audit

vmware-aria

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan marks this VMware Aria skill suspicious, mainly because its setup instructions can overwrite an existing configuration without warning; it also reports an undeclared token-administration capability.

Consider avoiding installation until the setup instructions are reviewed or corrected to protect existing configuration. Before installing, also review the token-management capability and Docker image reference, and decide whether those behaviors fit your needs. The overall confidence is medium: Skillspector completed only a partial analysis because two local references were missing, while AIG completed with no findings.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (42)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Token issuance and revocation are access-control administration capabilities not described by the declared Aria Operations data and management functions. Starting the Aria MCP HTTPS server is reasonably treated as supporting infrastructure and is not itself a mismatch. The supplied chunk contains no implementation of the declared operational queries, but that absence alone is not the basis for this finding.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

md
ARIA_CONFIG","VMWARE_ARIA_<TARGET>_PASSWORD","VMWARE_ARIA_<TARGET>_USERNAME","VMWARE_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY"],"bins":["vmware-policy"]},"homepage":"https://github.com/vmware-skills/VMware-Aria","emoji":"📊","os":["macos","linux"]}}
compatibility: >
  vmware-policy auto-installed as Python dependency (provides @vmware_tool decorator and audit logging). All write operations audited to ~/.vmware/audit.db.
  Credentials: Each Aria Operations target requires a per-target password env var in ~/.vmware-aria/.env following the pattern VMWARE_ARIA_<TARGET_NAME_UPPER>_PASSWORD. Passwords are never logged or echoed.
  Read-heavy: 36 of 46 tools are read-only. Write operations limited to alert acknowledge/cancel, alert notes, alert definition management, report management, and resource maintenance start/end.
  No webhooks or guest operations. API calls use the configured Aria endpoint (HTTPS 443); MCP defaults to stdio, with opt-in authenticated HTTPS.
  Transitive dependencies: Only vmware-policy (audi

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

bash
uv tool install vmware-aria==2.4.8
vmware-aria init      # guided setup: writes config + .env (chmod 600, password grep-safe), then verifies
vmware-aria doctor

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 265)May include surrounding context.

vmware-aria api get /api/resources//properties [--param pageSize=20]

Diagnostics

vmware-aria doctor [--skip-auth]

text

### Key Metric Names (for `resource metrics` command)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/capabilities.md (reported line 116)May include surrounding context.

md
api/api/resources/stats/query` | list_rightsizing_recommendations (OnlineCapacityAnalytics recommendedSize keys), list_anomalies (`System Attributes\|total_alarms`) — one request for a resourceId array; get_aria_node_resources (window min / avg / max); get_resource_health (latest `SERVICE\|AVAILABILITY`, service-kind objects only) |
| `PUT /suite-api/api/resources/{id}/maintained` | start_resource_maintenance (window as the `duration` or `end` query parameter; neither = manual maintenance) |
| `DELETE /suite-api/api/resources/{id}/maintained` | end_resource_maintenance |
| `GET /suite-api/api/maintenanceschedules` | list_maintenance_schedules (paged; `resourceId` filter) |
| `POST /suite-api/api/alerts/query` | list_alerts (server-side status/criticality/resource filtering) |
| `GET /suite-api/api/alerts/{id}` | get_alert, investigate_alert (alert-side leg; no dedicated endpoint — the tool composes the two existing reads), get_alert_recommendations (the alert's definition id and critic

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/capabilities.md (reported line 131)May include surrounding context.

md
| `GET /suite-api/api/alertdefinitions` | list_alert_definitions |
| `POST /suite-api/api/alertdefinitions` | create_alert_definition |
| `PUT /suite-api/api/alertdefinitions/{id}/enable` (or `/disable`) | set_alert_definition_state |
| `DELETE /suite-api/api/alertdefinitions/{id}` | delete_alert_definition |
| `GET /suite-api/api/symptomdefinitions` | list_symptom_definitions (filter param is `resourceKind`); get_alert / investigate_alert symptom names and severities (`id` repeated, 50 per request) |
| `GET /suite-api/api/reportdefinitions` | list_report_definitions (`subject` is an array of resource-kind strings) |
| `POST /suite-api/api/reports` | generate_report (requires at least one resource UUID) |

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/capabilities.md (reported line 136)May include surrounding context.

md
| `GET /suite-api/api/reportdefinitions` | list_report_definitions (`subject` is an array of resource-kind strings) |
| `POST /suite-api/api/reports` | generate_report (requires at least one resource UUID) |
| `GET /suite-api/api/reports` / `GET /suite-api/api/reports/{id}` | list_reports / get_report (timestamp field is `completionTime`; definition filter and limit applied client-side); delete_report (blast radius) |
| `DELETE /suite-api/api/reports/{id}` | delete_report |
| `GET /suite-api/api/deployment/node/status` | get_aria_health (a 503 is read as a status, not an error), is_alive, list_adapters (the appliance clock, `systemTime`, for collection ages) |
| `GET /suite-api/api/adapters` | list_adapters (unpaged) |
| `GET /suite-api/api/deployment/node/services/info` | get_aria_health, doctor (per-service health) |

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/cli-reference.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

vmware-aria doctor [OPTIONS]

Options: --skip-auth Skip authentication check (only tests config + network) --config -c Path to config file

text

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/cli-reference.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

md
3. Config parse succeeds (validates YAML and target structure)
4. Password env vars are set for each target
5. Network TCP connectivity to port 443 for each target
6. Aria Operations token acquisition (unless `--skip-auth`)
7. Aria version from `GET /versions/current`, e.g. `VMware Aria Operations 8.18.7 (8.x line, build 25423534)` (**WARN** `Not read: …` when it cannot be read — an unreadable version says nothing about whether the target works), and Aria platform health: PASS when HEALTHY, **WARN** when DEGRADED or UNKNOWN (the failed services are named), FAIL when DOWN. Only a failure to connect is an auth FAIL: an error after the token was acquired is a FAIL on the "Aria platform" row (`Checks did not complete: …`). The doctor disconnects from each target either way
8. MCP server module importable

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/detailed-guide-CN.md (reported line 110)May include surrounding context.

md
macOS 上的 v2.4.3 会遵守系统代理对 Aria 目标的绕过规则。如果旧版本能连通 TCP/443,
但获取认证 token 时 TLS 连接被关闭,请升级后重新运行 `vmware-aria doctor`。
`doctor --skip-auth` 只检查 TCP 连通性。

#### 离线 / 气隙环境安装(从源码)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/cli-reference.md (reported line 693)May include surrounding context.

--config -c PATH Config file path

text

Refused (exit 2) only when the resource is known not to be in maintenance — an adapter reports a state such as `STARTED` or `STOPPED`, so there is nothing to end. When the state is unknown (it cannot be read, or an adapter reports `UNKNOWN` / `NONE`) the call proceeds and `before` says unknown. `--dry-run` prints `DELETE /suite-api/api/resources/<resource-id>/maintained`.

**Output**: JSON with `before`, `after`, `confirmed` (true once the resource no longer reports maintenance, false when it still does, null when unknown) and `note`.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/detailed-guide-CN.md (reported line 95)May include surrounding context.

md
# 设置密码(绝不存入 config.yaml)
(
  umask 077
  set -C  # 拒绝覆盖已有文件;已有 .env 请直接用本地编辑器修改
  cat > ~/.vmware-aria/.env <<'EOF'
VMWARE_ARIA_PROD_PASSWORD=REPLACE_IN_LOCAL_EDITOR
EOF

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/detailed-guide-CN.md (reported line 96)May include surrounding context.

md
(
  umask 077
  set -C  # 拒绝覆盖已有文件;已有 .env 请直接用本地编辑器修改
  cat > ~/.vmware-aria/.env <<'EOF'
VMWARE_ARIA_PROD_PASSWORD=REPLACE_IN_LOCAL_EDITOR
EOF
)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/detailed-guide.md (reported line 101)May include surrounding context.

md
# Set password (never in config.yaml)
(
  umask 077
  set -C  # Refuse existing files; edit an existing .env locally instead
  cat > ~/.vmware-aria/.env <<'EOF'
VMWARE_ARIA_PROD_PASSWORD=REPLACE_IN_LOCAL_EDITOR
EOF

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/detailed-guide.md (reported line 102)May include surrounding context.

md
(
  umask 077
  set -C  # Refuse existing files; edit an existing .env locally instead
  cat > ~/.vmware-aria/.env <<'EOF'
VMWARE_ARIA_PROD_PASSWORD=REPLACE_IN_LOCAL_EDITOR
EOF
)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/detailed-guide.md (reported line 106)May include surrounding context.

md
VMWARE_ARIA_PROD_PASSWORD=REPLACE_IN_LOCAL_EDITOR
EOF
)
# Before continuing, edit .env locally; never type live secrets into shell commands.

# Verify setup
vmware-aria doctor

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/setup-guide.md (reported line 78)May include surrounding context.

3. Set password

Option A — .env file (recommended):

bash
(
  umask 077

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/setup-guide.md (reported line 82)May include surrounding context.

bash
(
  umask 077
  set -C  # Refuse existing files; edit an existing .env locally instead
  cat > ~/.vmware-aria/.env <<'EOF'
VMWARE_ARIA_PROD_PASSWORD=REPLACE_IN_LOCAL_EDITOR
EOF

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/setup-guide.md (reported line 83)May include surrounding context.

md
(
  umask 077
  set -C  # Refuse existing files; edit an existing .env locally instead
  cat > ~/.vmware-aria/.env <<'EOF'
VMWARE_ARIA_PROD_PASSWORD=REPLACE_IN_LOCAL_EDITOR
EOF
)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/setup-guide.md (reported line 87)May include surrounding context.

VMWARE_ARIA_PROD_PASSWORD=REPLACE_IN_LOCAL_EDITOR EOF )

Before continuing, edit .env locally; never type live secrets into shell commands.

text

This writes placeholders only. Enter passwords or tokens using a local editor after creation; do not paste live credentials into terminal commands, chat or commits. If the file exists, the command refuses to overwrite it; edit the existing file after checking its permissions are `600`.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/detailed-guide.md (reported line 116)May include surrounding context.

md
On macOS, v2.4.3 honors the system proxy bypass list for Aria targets. If an
older installation reaches TCP/443 but token acquisition ends with a TLS close,
upgrade and rerun `vmware-aria doctor`. `doctor --skip-auth` checks TCP only.

#### Offline / Air-Gapped Install (from source)

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
- Bash
metadata: {"openclaw":{"requires":{"anyBins":["vmware-aria","uvx"]},"optional":{"env":["VMWARE_ARIA_CONFIG","VMWARE_ARIA_<TARGET>_PASSWORD","VMWARE_ARIA_<TARGET>_USERNAME","VMWARE_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY"],"bins":["vmware-policy"]},"homepage":"https://github.com/vmware-skills/VMware-Aria","emoji":"📊","os":["macos","linux"]}}
compatibility: >
  vmware-policy auto-installed as Python dependency (provides @vmware_tool decorator and audit logging). All write operations audited to ~/.vmware/audit.db.
  Credentials: Each Aria Operations target requires a per-target password env var in ~/.vmware-aria/.env following the pattern VMWARE_ARIA_<TARGET_NAME_UPPER>_PASSWORD. Passwords are never logged or echoed.
  Read-heavy: 36 of 46 tools are read-only. Write operations limited to alert acknowledge/cancel, alert notes, alert definition management, report management, and resource maintenance start/end.
  No webhooks or guest operations. API calls use the configured Aria endpoint (HTTPS 443); MCP

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 200)May include surrounding context.

md
| Raw API | `search_api_operations` | Read | Search the shipped 8.6 / 9.1 operation index; marks GET operations |
| | `get_api_path` | Read | GET one indexed path (`{id}` filled in, query in `params`); sanitized, capped at 30,000 chars (`truncated`) |

**Read/write split**: 36 read-only, 10 write. All write operations are audit-logged to `~/.vmware/audit.db` (via vmware-policy).

### List results are envelopes — read `truncated` before you summarise

Unsafe Defaults

Medium
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 265)May include surrounding context.

vmware-aria api get /api/resources//properties [--param pageSize=20]

Diagnostics

vmware-aria doctor [--skip-auth]

text

### Key Metric Names (for `resource metrics` command)

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/capabilities.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
| **L5** | Auto-remediation from learned pattern | Pattern library only; requires `risk:low` + `reversible:true` + `repeatable:true` | *(roadmap — candidates: auto-acknowledge known-noisy alerts, auto-cancel resolved-by-event alerts)* |

**Notes**:
- L1/L2 tools are always safe for agents to call without confirmation.
- L3 alert-state writes pass through the `@vmware_tool` decorator: connection check → policy check → audit log. Cancel is irreversible by Aria API design and treated as a destructive operation.
- For VM/host operations see [vmware-aiops](https://github.com/vmware-skills/VMware-AIops); Aria recommendations are advisory, not actuating.