Security audit
Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk
This skill is a clearly scoped Redis and RabbitMQ operations helper that discloses its broker access, local state, secrets handling, and destructive write safeguards.
Install only if you intend to let the agent inspect and, when enabled, change Redis or RabbitMQ state. Prefer QUEUE_READ_ONLY=1 until you trust the setup, restrict broker credentials to the minimum needed permissions, avoid storing the master password in plaintext client configs when your MCP client offers safer secret injection, and treat purge/delete operations as destructive even with audit and undo records.
metadata: {"openclaw":{"requires":{"env":["QUEUE_AIOPS_CONFIG"],"bins":["queue-aiops"],"config":["~/.queue-aiops/config.yaml","~/.queue-aiops/secrets.enc"]},"optional":{"env":["QUEUE_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD"]},"primaryEnv":"QUEUE_AIOPS_CONFIG","homepage":"https://github.com/AIops-tools/Queue-AIops","emoji":"📬","os":["macos","linux"]}}
compatibility: >
Standalone, self-governed broker operations across redis (RESP wire protocol via the redis Python client; password optional — auth-less lab instances are supported — TLS optional) and rabbitmq (management HTTP API /api/..., HTTP Basic auth with a monitoring/management-tagged user). Each target in the config names its own platform, and a name-keyed platform registry selects the protocol shape, so one config can span a mixed estate. The governance harness (audit, policy, token/runaway budget, undo, risk-tiers) is bundled in the package — no external skill-family dependency.
All write operations are audited to a local SQLite DB under ~/.queue-aiops/ (relocatable via QUEUE_AIOPS_HOME).
Credentials: the redis password (optional) or the rabbitmq management password is stored ENCRYPTED in ~/.queue-aiops/secrets.enc (Fernet/AES-128 + scrypt-derived key) — never plaintext on disk. Run 'queue-aiops init' to onboard (it asks for the platform), or 'queue-aiops secret set <target>' to add one. The store is unlocked by a master password from QUEUE_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD (non-interactive/MCP/CI) or an interactive prompt (CLI on a TTY). A legacy plaintext env var QUEUE_<TARGET_NAME_UPPER>_SECRET is still honoured as a fallback with a deprecation warning (migrate with 'queue-aiops secret migrate'). The secret is presented as AUTH at connect time (redis) or HTTP Basic auth (rabbitmq) and held only in memory; secrets are never logged or echoed.
State-changing operations pass through the @governed_tool decorator (pre-check + budget guard + audit + risk-tier gate). purge_queue and delete_queue are risk=high with dry_run + an approver
...[truncated 25 chars]3. `queue-aiops rabbitmq policies` → check no policy still targets its name pattern, so you are not leaving a dangling rule behind. 4. `queue-aiops rabbitmq delete-queue <name> --vhost / --dry-run` → preview. 5. Re-run without `--dry-run` (double-confirm, risk=high, approver required) — the write captures the queue's definition first, so the undo descriptor **re-declares exactly that queue** (durability and auto-delete flags included). 6. `queue-aiops rabbitmq queues` → confirm it is gone and nothing else changed.
### rabbitmq Enable the management plugin and create (or reuse) a user with at least the `monitoring` tag (reads) — the `management`/`policymaker` tag is needed for policy writes, and queue purge/delete needs configure permission on the vhost:
64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.
Detected: suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions