Security audit
Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk
This skill is a disclosed MinIO operations tool with sensitive but purpose-aligned admin capabilities and explicit safeguards.
Install only if you intend to let an agent operate a MinIO deployment. Start with MINIO_READ_ONLY=1 until you trust the setup, use least-privilege MinIO keys where possible, protect MINIO_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD in MCP client configuration, and keep the documented approval and audit settings enabled for write operations.
Connection: the S3 API endpoint (host:port, default 9000; SigV4 via the official SDK), plus the unauthenticated health endpoints (/minio/health/live|ready|cluster) and the cluster metrics endpoint (/minio/v2/metrics/cluster — public mode or the default bearer-token mode; the token is derived from the stored credentials, no extra secret). The access key lives in config.yaml; the secret key is stored ENCRYPTED in ~/.minio-aiops/secrets.enc (Fernet/AES-128 + scrypt-derived key) — never plaintext on disk. Run 'minio-aiops init' to onboard, or 'minio-aiops secret set <target>' to add one. The store is unlocked by a master password from MINIO_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD (non-interactive/MCP/CI) or an interactive prompt (CLI on a TTY). A legacy plaintext env var MINIO_<TARGET_NAME_UPPER>_SECRET_KEY is still honoured as a fallback with a deprecation warning (migrate with 'minio-aiops secret migrate'). Secrets are held only in memory, never logged or echoed. State-changing operations require double confirmation at the CLI layer and support --dry-run. All write tools pass through the @governed_tool decorator (pre-check + budget guard + audit + risk-tier gate). bucket_delete is high-risk, dry-run + double-confirm, and refused unless the bucket is verifiably empty (including versions and delete markers); remove_incomplete_uploads only aborts uploads older than a safety window. Reversible writes (set/delete bucket policy, set_versioning, set/delete lifecycle, set_bucket_quota) capture the prior state and record an inverse undo descriptor. Webhooks: none — no outbound network calls beyond the configured MinIO endpoint. SSL: secure (https) and verify_ssl default to true; disable verification only for self-signed lab certificates. Transitive dependencies: the official minio SDK, httpx, and the MCP SDK. No post-install scripts or background services. Verification status: validated against mocked SDK/HTTP responses; no recorded end-to-end run against a live MinIO server yet. Eras ...[truncated 25 chars]
## 4. Secrets - Secret keys live **encrypted** in `~/.minio-aiops/secrets.enc` (Fernet + scrypt master password; file chmod 600). Never in config.yaml. - Non-interactive use (MCP server, CI): export `MINIO_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD`. MCP clients start the server **without a TTY and without your shell profile** — put the variable in the client's `env`
metadata: {"openclaw":{"requires":{"env":["MINIO_AIOPS_CONFIG"],"bins":["minio-aiops"],"config":["~/.minio-aiops/config.yaml","~/.minio-aiops/secrets.enc"]},"optional":{"env":["MINIO_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD"]},"primaryEnv":"MINIO_AIOPS_CONFIG","homepage":"https://github.com/AIops-tools/MinIO-AIops","emoji":"🪣","os":["macos","linux"]}}
compatibility: >
Standalone, self-governed MinIO operations. The governance harness (audit, policy, token/runaway budget, undo, risk-tiers) is bundled in the package — no external skill-family dependency. Works against any reasonably current MinIO server (single-node or distributed/erasure-coded); admin features (quota, server info) need admin-capable keys.
All write operations are audited to a local SQLite DB under ~/.minio-aiops/ (relocatable via MINIO_AIOPS_HOME).
Connection: the S3 API endpoint (host:port, default 9000; SigV4 via the official SDK), plus the unauthenticated health endpoints (/minio/health/live|ready|cluster) and the cluster metrics endpoint (/minio/v2/metrics/cluster — public mode or the default bearer-token mode; the token is derived from the stored credentials, no extra secret). The access key lives in config.yaml; the secret key is stored ENCRYPTED in ~/.minio-aiops/secrets.enc (Fernet/AES-128 + scrypt-derived key) — never plaintext on disk. Run 'minio-aiops init' to onboard, or 'minio-aiops secret set <target>' to add one. The store is unlocked by a master password from MINIO_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD (non-interactive/MCP/CI) or an interactive prompt (CLI on a TTY). A legacy plaintext env var MINIO_<TARGET_NAME_UPPER>_SECRET_KEY is still honoured as a fallback with a deprecation warning (migrate with 'minio-aiops secret migrate'). Secrets are held only in memory, never logged or echoed.
State-changing operations require double confirmation at the CLI layer and support --dry-run. All write tools pass through the @governed_tool decorator (pre-check + budget guard + audit + risk-tier gate). bucket_delete is high
...[truncated 25 chars]Standalone, self-governed MinIO operations. The governance harness (audit, policy, token/runaway budget, undo, risk-tiers) is bundled in the package — no external skill-family dependency. Works against any reasonably current MinIO server (single-node or distributed/erasure-coded); admin features (quota, server info) need admin-capable keys. All write operations are audited to a local SQLite DB under ~/.minio-aiops/ (relocatable via MINIO_AIOPS_HOME). Connection: the S3 API endpoint (host:port, default 9000; SigV4 via the official SDK), plus the unauthenticated health endpoints (/minio/health/live|ready|cluster) and the cluster metrics endpoint (/minio/v2/metrics/cluster — public mode or the default bearer-token mode; the token is derived from the stored credentials, no extra secret). The access key lives in config.yaml; the secret key is stored ENCRYPTED in ~/.minio-aiops/secrets.enc (Fernet/AES-128 + scrypt-derived key) — never plaintext on disk. Run 'minio-aiops init' to onboard, or 'minio-aiops secret set <target>' to add one. The store is unlocked by a master password from MINIO_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD (non-interactive/MCP/CI) or an interactive prompt (CLI on a TTY). A legacy plaintext env var MINIO_<TARGET_NAME_UPPER>_SECRET_KEY is still honoured as a fallback with a deprecation warning (migrate with 'minio-aiops secret migrate'). Secrets are held only in memory, never logged or echoed. State-changing operations require double confirmation at the CLI layer and support --dry-run. All write tools pass through the @governed_tool decorator (pre-check + budget guard + audit + risk-tier gate). bucket_delete is high-risk, dry-run + double-confirm, and refused unless the bucket is verifiably empty (including versions and delete markers); remove_incomplete_uploads only aborts uploads older than a safety window. Reversible writes (set/delete bucket policy, set_versioning, set/delete lifecycle, set_bucket_quota) capture the prior state and record an inverse undo descr ...[truncated 25 chars]
## Common Workflows Each recipe starts from an RCA read and ends in a governed, reversible write. Every write step accepts `--dry-run`; irreversible ones also double-confirm. ### 1. "Backups are failing — the cluster says it's out of space"
64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.
Detected: suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions