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Security audit

CHIS/CHISF

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is an installer shortcut that openly uses forced skill installation, but it normalizes bypassing suspicious-package warnings and recommends an unaudited local fallback installer.

Review this skill carefully before installing. Use normal installs where possible, run clawhub inspect first, pin an exact version, verify the publisher/source, and avoid chisf or --force for suspicious packages unless you have independently checked the package and are prepared for it to overwrite existing skills. Do not use the local fallback installer unless you know and trust that binary.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
scripts/chis-chisf.sh:21
Finding

Forced Installation Can Bypass ClawHub Package Safety Warnings

Content
View full analysis
--force --workdir /Users/zququ/.openclaw/workspace --dir skills --version ``` ```text Use this when: - package is flagged as suspicious - overwrite behavior is required ``` `SKILL.md:71-73`: ```bash clawhub install proactive-agent --force --workdir /Users/zququ/.openclaw/workspace --dir skills ``` `SKILL.md:84`: ```text If rate limit persists, use the local fallback installer: `/Users/zququ/.local/bin/clawhub-install-safe --force ` (or without `--force` when not needed) before switching to another approach. ``` ### Technical Analysis The `chisf` mode unconditionally adds `--force` to the `clawhub install` command. The documentation explicitly recommends this mode when a package has been flagged as suspicious. This changes a package safety warning from a blocking control into a condition for bypassing that control. The package slug and optional version are supplied at runtime. When no version is supplied, the latest available package is installed, meaning the effective third-party content can change after this wrapper has been reviewed. The target package contents are not included in this repository and therefore cannot be validated as part of this audit. The documentation also proposes an external fallback executable, `/Users/zququ/.local/bin/clawhub-install-safe`, including a `--force` option. That executable is not part of the audited project, so its validation, source selection, integrity checks, and installation behavior cannot be confirmed. The wrapper itself do ...[truncated 1859 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly documents a force-install path for packages that are flagged as suspicious or require overwrite, but it does not require any trust verification, backup, or warning about replacing existing local skill files. In a skill-install workflow, normalizing --force makes it easier to bypass safety signals and overwrite trusted content with potentially malicious or incompatible packages.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The fallback instruction recommends a local installer binary with --force as an alternative when service issues persist, again without any warning about trust, overwrite semantics, or verification of the local tool itself. This is more dangerous than the main flow because it shifts users to a local executable outside the documented clawhub path, increasing the chance of bypassing repository controls and installing untrusted or tampered content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.