T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/video_gen.js:140- Finding
Unrestricted Local File Upload Without Enforced Consent or Image Validation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/video_gen.js:140-149, 206-251, 273-283, 378-384
Vulnerability Type: Arbitrary local file disclosure through automatic remote upload
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
js function normalizeLocalFilePath(value) { if (typeof value !== 'string' || !value.trim()) return null; if (value.startsWith('file://')) { return new URL(value); } return path.resolve(value); } function inferMimeType(filePath) { return IMAGE_MIME_TYPES[path.extname(filePath).toLowerCase()] || 'application/octet-stream'; }js async function uploadFileToPublicUrl(inputPath, apiKey) { const resolvedPath = normalizeLocalFilePath(inputPath); if (!resolvedPath) { throw new Error(`Invalid local image path: ${inputPath}`); } const filePath = resolvedPath instanceof URL ? fileURLToPath(resolvedPath) : path.resolve(resolvedPath); let stat; try { stat = await fs.stat(filePath); } catch { throw new Error(`Local image file not found: ${inputPath}`); } if (!stat.isFile()) { throw new Error(`Local image path is not a file: ${inputPath}`); } const fileBuffer = await fs.readFile(filePath); const fileName = path.basename(filePath); const mimeType = inferMimeType(filePath); const form = new FormData(); form.append('batch_no', makeUploadBatchNo()); form.append('fixed', 'false'); form.append('file', new Blob([fileBuffer], { type: mimeType }), fileName); const controller = new AbortController(); const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), 60_000); let res; try { res = await fetch(MODELS_BASE_URL + UPLOAD_API_PATH, { method: 'POST', headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}`, }, body: form, signal: controller.signal, });js async function ensurePublicImageUrl(value, apiKey) { if (typeof value !== 'string' || !value.trim()) { throw new Error('Image source must be a non-empty string.'); } if (isPubl ...[truncated 3917 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
-
Disable local paths by default. Reject every image value that is not a valid public HTTPS URL during normal operation.
-
Require an explicit capability flag. Gate local uploads behind a clearly named option such as
--allow-local-upload. The flag should not be inferred from the presence of a path. -
Enforce informed consent. Before enabling the capability, show the exact resolved path, destination host, and warning that the service may return a public URL. For Agent-driven noninteractive use, require a separate trusted-layer authorization rather than treating JSON content as consent.
-
Restrict filesystem scope. Resolve canonical paths with
fs.realpath()and require files to reside within an operator-approved upload directory. Reject path traversal, symlink escapes, device files, and paths outside that directory. -
Enforce actual image types. Permit only required image formats and validate content using magic bytes or a trusted image decoder. Remove the
application/octet-streamfallback and reject files whose extension and detected content disagree. -
Apply resource limits. Check file size before reading, impose a conservative maximum upload size, and use streaming where supported to avoid loading an entire untrusted file into memory.
-
Separate commands and privileges. Consider moving local upload into a distinct command or helper that can run with narrower filesystem access. The primary generation commands should accept only HTTPS URLs.
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Improve dry-run warnings. Display the canonical local path, expected destination, detected type, and size without reading or uploading file content.
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Test the security boundary. Add automated tests confirming that sensitive paths, unsupported file types, symlink escapes, and local paths without the explicit authorization flag are rejected.
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