T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
references/customer_prep.md:9- Finding
Untrusted CRM Notes Are Promoted to Agent Directives
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a coherent Odoo sales-order automation skill, but it gives an agent broad bearer-token-backed write access and weakly scoped instructions that users should review before use.
Use this only with a tightly scoped Odoo MCP token, an HTTPS endpoint you control, and a server-side permission set limited to the intended sales tools. Treat customer notes as business data to summarize and confirm, not as authority to override the user or approve writes. Review any proposed lessons before making them persistent, and require explicit confirmation before order edits, grid applies, submit, confirm, or force_confirm.
references/customer_prep.md:9Untrusted CRM Notes Are Promoted to Agent Directives
references/lessons_learned.md:3Runtime Observations Can Be Written into Persistent Agent Policy
scripts/odoo_mcp.py:47Bearer Token Can Be Sent to an Unvalidated or Plaintext Endpoint
SKILL.md:40Dynamic Remote Tool Definitions Are Trusted Without a Client-Side Allowlist
SKILL.md:27Unbounded MCP Dependency Allows Unreviewed Future Releases
The skill is presented as a narrowly scoped Odoo sales assistant, but its documented behavior includes generic tool discovery and arbitrary MCP tool invocation by name. That makes it effectively a general authenticated transport to the MCP server, which can enable privilege creep, misuse of unrelated administrative tools, and bypass of user expectations about what the skill is allowed to do.
The skill exposes environment-backed MCP access but does not declare a restrictive tool scope such as explicit permissions or an allowed-tools list. Because it is designed to discover tools dynamically and operate with a bearer token, the absence of scope boundaries increases the chance that the skill can invoke unintended server capabilities beyond sales-order entry if the MCP server exposes them.
This documentation presents the raw sales_grid_apply path and example before giving a strong, immediate warning that omitted cells are deleted, creating a realistic risk of accidental destructive updates. In this skill context, the tool directly mutates live sales-order data and the grid is the primary order-entry surface, so an operator or downstream agent could unintentionally remove existing order lines by sending an incomplete payload.
This code sends user-supplied tool arguments to a remote MCP endpoint via session.call_tool(...), which is a network operation that may transmit user or system data. While the module docstring describes connectivity and auth, there is no runtime confirmation or explicit user-facing warning near the operation about data being sent to the server.