T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
workflow.json:6- Finding
Unpinned External Skill Dependencies Create a Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
workflow.json:6-10,workflow.json:15,workflow.json:33,workflow.json:54;SKILL.md:13;README.md:140-144
Vulnerability Type: T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
workflow.json:6-10:json "skills": [ "rss-aggregator", "summarize-pro", "feishu-wiki" ],The workflow subsequently invokes these dependencies by unversioned names:
json "skill": "rss-aggregator"json "skill": "summarize-pro"json "skill": "feishu-wiki"SKILL.md:13:json "skills": ["rss-aggregator", "summarize-pro", "feishu-wiki"],README.md:140-144permits any compatible version at or above the stated minimum:markdown | Skill | Version | Purpose | |---|---|---| | `rss-aggregator` | ≥1.0.0 | Multi-source RSS aggregation | | `summarize-pro` | ≥1.0.0 | AI batch summarization and translation | | `feishu-wiki` | ≥1.0.0 | Feishu Wiki knowledge-base writing |Technical Analysis
The workflow identifies three executable third-party Skills only by package name. It does not pin exact versions, provide integrity hashes, identify a trusted registry, or enforce publisher identity. The documented
≥1.0.0ranges further allow future versions that were not included in this audit.These dependencies occupy security-sensitive positions in the data flow:
rss-aggregatorperforms outbound requests to configured feed URLs.summarize-proreceives fetched article data and may transmit it to an AI service.feishu-wikireceives generated content, a Wiki space identifier, and a parent-node token and operates using Feishu credentials available to the runtime.
The network transfers themselves are necessary for the declared aggregation, summarization, and Wiki-publication functionality. No direct transmission of app secrets, private keys, or credentials to an attacker-control ...[truncated 1914 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin each external Skill to an exact, reviewed version rather than a package name or open-ended minimum version.
- Record and verify cryptographic integrity hashes or signed provenance metadata before execution.
- Resolve dependencies only through an explicitly trusted registry and require verified publisher identities.
- Maintain a lock file or equivalent immutable dependency manifest and require review before updating it.
- Audit the source and release artifacts of
rss-aggregator,summarize-pro, andfeishu-wiki. - Run each dependency in a restricted sandbox:
- Allow the RSS component to access only configured feed hosts.
- Allow the summarizer to access only the approved AI endpoint.
- Allow the Feishu component to access only required Feishu API endpoints.
- Deny unnecessary filesystem, shell, process, and environment-variable access.
- Use a Feishu credential restricted to creating pages in the intended Wiki space or parent node. Do not provide tenant-wide administrative permissions.
- Avoid exposing credentials directly to components that do not require them, and redact tokens, page content, and identifiers from logs.
- Add automated dependency provenance, signature, vulnerability, and unexpected-permission checks to the release process.
