Back to skill

Security audit

Database Credential Security (Zero‑Exposure Edition)

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This documentation-only skill is mostly coherent, but it gives agents a pattern for running arbitrary SQL against production databases without clear confirmation or safety boundaries.

Review this skill before installing if agents may access production databases. Use it only with narrowly scoped database accounts, explicit user approval for migrations or destructive SQL, and careful handling of result files and sealed scripts.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Low
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding
The trigger "Run database migrations safely" is generic and does not reference the skill's actual scope, which is credential handling through MGC blackbox patterns rather than migrations themselves. This ambiguity could cause the skill to activate for broad migration requests that are not specifically about secure credential management.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
url = f"{MGC_BASE_URL}/api/mgc/sensitive/get"
    headers = {"X-MGC-Token": token, "Content-Type": "application/json"}
    data = {"info_type": info_type, "info_owner": info_owner, "action": "run"}
    resp = requests.post(url, json=data, headers=headers, timeout=10)
    resp.raise_for_status()
    result = resp.json()
    if isinstance(result, str):
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
token = f.read().strip()
    url = f"{MGC_BASE_URL}/api/mgc/sensitive/get"
    headers = {"X-MGC-Token": token, "Content-Type": "application/json"}
    resp = requests.post(
        url,
        json={"info_type": info_type, "info_owner": info_owner, "action": "run"},
        headers=headers,
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
- ✅ Reference scripts by `info_owner`/`diff_1` only; never include credentials in prompts
- ❌ **Never call `mgc_get`** — returns plaintext
- ❌ **Never embed credentials** in SKILL.md, prompts, or AI context
- ❌ **Never ask the user** to paste the password in chat

---
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
SKILL.md:461