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Security audit

socialpeta-zingclaw

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent ZingAPI ad-creative search helper, with the main caution being careful handling of its API credentials.

Install only if you intend to use ZingAPI creative-list with your own account. Store the ZINGAPI credentials in protected environment variables or a secret manager, avoid passing secrets on the command line, avoid sharing dry-run output, and review raw request JSON before sending it.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
scripts/creative_list.py:689
Finding

Credential Exposure Through Command-Line Arguments and Dry-Run Output

Content
View full analysis
" print(_json_dumps({ "url": f"{BASE_URL}{canonical_uri}", "headers": safe_headers, "body": payload, })) return 0 ``` ### Technical Analysis The script supports passing both the access-key ID and access-key secret as command-line arguments. Command-line secrets can be exposed through shell history, process inspection facilities, process-monitoring software, CI job metadata, diagnostic reports, or command logging. Although the documented usage recommends environment variables, the command-line options remain available and create an avoidable credential-exposure path. This exceeds the minimum privilege and disclosure requirements of the declared functionality because the secret only needs to be available internally for HMAC signing and does not need to appear in process arguments. Dry-run mode also performs incomplete redaction of the `Authorization` header. It replaces only the signature while retaining the `Credential=` component. This conflicts with the Skill documentation's instruction n ...[truncated 2073 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
" ``` 5. Consider redacting or omitting the customer name and access-key ID from all diagnostic output unless explicitly required for troubleshooting. 6. Add automated tests that verify neither the access-key ID nor the access-key secret appears in dry-run output, standard output, error messages, or exception text. 7. Rotate any credentials that may previously have been supplied through command-line arguments or retained in shared terminal and CI logs. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (12)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

md
所有接口请求均通过 `scripts/creative_list.py` 执行。常规查询优先使用脚本参数;需要完整控制入参时,可使用 JSON 请求体。

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

md
所有接口请求均通过 `scripts/creative_list.py` 执行。常规查询优先使用脚本参数;需要完整控制入参时,可使用 JSON 请求体。

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 48)May include surrounding context.

md
所有接口请求均通过 `scripts/creative_list.py` 执行。常规查询优先使用脚本参数;需要完整控制入参时,可使用 JSON 请求体。

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 54)May include surrounding context.

md
所有接口请求均通过 `scripts/creative_list.py` 执行。常规查询优先使用脚本参数;需要完整控制入参时,可使用 JSON 请求体。

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

md
所有接口请求均通过 `scripts/creative_list.py` 执行。常规查询优先使用脚本参数;需要完整控制入参时,可使用 JSON 请求体。

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 75)May include surrounding context.

md
所有接口请求均通过 `scripts/creative_list.py` 执行。常规查询优先使用脚本参数;需要完整控制入参时,可使用 JSON 请求体。

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill clearly expects access to environment variables, local files, and outbound network requests, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or allowed-tools policy. This creates an over-permissioning and review gap: a host may grant broader capabilities than intended, and users or auditors cannot verify the minimum required privileges before execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The document title and operating instructions are entirely in Chinese, and there is no indication that users may choose another language or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking context. Under the policy, a forced language or locale without opt-in or justification is a natural-language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The file’s natural-language instructions and examples are all presented in Chinese, and there is no indication that users may choose another language or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-only audience. Per the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

All user-facing instructions and examples in the file are presented only in Chinese, which can constitute a language policy violation when no user opt-in or explicit locale justification is provided. There is no indication that the skill is intentionally restricted to a Chinese-speaking audience or region-specific workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This markdown file includes direct instructions to set access key ID and secret environment variables, which is a sensitive credential-handling operation. The document does not warn users about protecting shell history, avoiding committing secrets, or using secure secret storage, so the credential exposure risk is undisclosed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The document instructs users to configure long-lived access key environment variables but does not warn that these credentials are sensitive, should not be committed to source control, and should never be printed in logs or shared in examples. In an agent skill context, this omission increases the chance that operators or downstream tooling will expose secrets through debugging, dry-run output capture, CI logs, or documentation copy/paste.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.