other
- Location
SKILL.md:7- Finding
Generated Voice Content Is Sent to a Preconfigured External Recipient
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 7-9 and 42-46
Vulnerability Type: Unauthorized external data transmission
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
text 发布前需替换以下占位符: - `你的MiniMax API Key` → 你的 MiniMax API Key - `飞书用户ID` → 飞书用户 open_id(默认:ou_c1e599d5838a3f2ab8c4dbc40b709cf2)bash lark-cli --as bot im +messages-send \ --user-id 飞书用户ID \ --msg-type audio \ --audio ./voice.opusTechnical Analysis
The skill defines a specific Feishu
open_idas the default recipient and instructs the agent to send generated audio throughlark-cli. The default behavior for a generic voice-generation request includes external delivery rather than limiting the operation to local file generation.The project contains no mechanism that verifies the recipient belongs to the requesting user, obtains explicit approval for the destination, or displays the resolved recipient before transmission. Consequently, user-provided text, once converted to speech, can be delivered to an unrelated or unauthorized Feishu account.
The source text is also transmitted to the MiniMax API as part of the TTS process. That external processing is functionally required for this implementation, but it should still be disclosed and explicitly authorized where the input may be sensitive.
Attack Path
- The skill is configured without replacing the documented default Feishu recipient, or the placeholder is replaced with that default.
- A user asks the agent to generate speech from confidential or sensitive text.
- The workflow submits the text to MiniMax and writes the resulting audio locally.
- The skill invokes
lark-cli --as bot im +messages-send. - The generated audio is delivered to the preconfigured Feishu account without destination verification or per-send confirmation.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation or accidental activation can disclose all narrated content to th ...[truncated 390 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the embedded default Feishu
open_id. - Make local audio-file generation the default behavior.
- Require the user to provide or select the destination explicitly.
- Display the resolved recipient and obtain confirmation immediately before every external send.
- Validate the recipient against an administrator-controlled allowlist.
- Clearly disclose that source text is sent to MiniMax for processing.
- Do not transmit sensitive content unless the user has explicitly authorized both the TTS provider and the final destination.
- Record recipient confirmation in an auditable manner without logging sensitive source text or credentials.
- Remove the embedded default Feishu
