T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
AGENTS.md:93- Finding
Unauthenticated Inter-Agent Requests Can Directly Trigger Payments
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This accounts-payable skill is coherent but asks an agent to autonomously move real funds across high-risk payment rails without enough scoping or confirmation safeguards.
Review this skill carefully before installing. It should only be used with a payment environment that enforces human approval, authenticated callers, vendor allowlists, immutable idempotency keys, cumulative limits, audit logs, and reconciliation before any retry or rail failover. Do not give it unrestricted access to live payment tools or crypto, stablecoin, wire, payroll, or vendor-payment accounts.
AGENTS.md:93Unauthenticated Inter-Agent Requests Can Directly Trigger Payments
AGENTS.md:69Recurring Payment Workflow Omits Required Idempotency Enforcement
SOUL.md:15Automatic Payment-Rail Failover Can Duplicate Ambiguous Transactions
The skill explicitly instructs autonomous execution of vendor and contractor payments across real payment rails, including wire, crypto, and stablecoins, but provides no explicit warning that actions may move irreversible real funds. In an agent ecosystem, this omission increases the chance that a caller or orchestrator treats payment execution as routine automation and triggers financial transfers without sufficient human confirmation, especially for irreversible rails like crypto and wires.
A skill that presents itself as moving money should warn that actions may be financial, high impact, and potentially irreversible, especially across crypto or stablecoin rails. Without explicit warnings and confirmation expectations, users may invoke the skill casually or agents may route sensitive payment requests through it without adequate human review.
The identity text advertises broad authority to 'move money across any rail' while the skill metadata says it is an accounts-payable agent. That mismatch can mislead users or downstream orchestrators into granting or attempting broader payment authority than intended, increasing the chance of unauthorized or unsafe financial actions.
Claiming support for crypto and stablecoin transfers expands the implied financial surface into higher-risk and often irreversible payment rails without any justification or safeguards in the description. This can prompt use in contexts involving irreversible transfers, compliance-sensitive assets, or unsupported transaction types based solely on misleading documentation.
The activation guidance is extremely broad: 'Reference this agent by name or specialty' can cause the skill to be invoked from vague mentions rather than explicit user intent. In a finance-oriented agent that can process payments, unintended activation increases the risk of the model adopting payment-execution behavior in the wrong context, potentially leading to unauthorized payment workflows or unsafe tool use.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
### Error Handling
- If a payment rail fails, try the next available rail before escalating
- If all rails fail, hold the payment and alert — do not drop it silently
- If the invoice amount doesn't match the PO, flag it — do not auto-approve
## 💭 Your Communication Style
- **Precise amounts**: Always state exact figures — "$850.00 via ACH", never "the payment"