T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:52- Finding
Unpinned Remote Repository and Third-Party Dependency Installation
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is mostly aligned with a trading-bot purpose, but it asks for high-impact trading and posting authority with unsafe install and credential-handling guidance that users should review carefully.
Only install or use this skill in an isolated environment after reviewing the upstream repository and pinning dependencies. Use testnet or dry-run modes first, never paste wallet private keys or API secrets into chat, prefer environment variables or a real secret manager, restrict API permissions, and require explicit confirmation before any live trade or public Binance Square post.
SKILL.md:52Unpinned Remote Repository and Third-Party Dependency Installation
SKILL.md:176Wallet and API Secrets May Be Disclosed Through Plaintext Configuration or Chat
The skill description is overly broad and grants wide latitude to 'operate' a trading bot without clearly defining allowed actions, required confirmations, or excluded sensitive operations. In an agent environment, this can cause the skill to activate for general trading-related requests and perform high-risk actions such as config changes, signal broadcasting, or even progression toward live trading with insufficient user intent verification.
The marketing-style phrase 'YOUR 24/7 AI TRADER ! EARNING MONEY WHILE YOU'RE SLEEPING.' encourages broad interpretation of the skill's purpose and may bias an agent toward autonomous trading behavior beyond a user's precise request. In the context of a financial trading skill, ambiguous promotional language increases the chance of unsafe activation and overreach into financially consequential actions.
The documentation includes a ready-to-run mainnet order placement example against https://api.binance.com without an explicit warning that executing it will place a real market order. In a trading-bot skill context, users are more likely to copy-paste examples directly, which increases the chance of unintended live trades and financial loss.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Request:
curl -X POST "https://api.binance.com/api/v3/order" \
-H "X-MBX-APIKEY: your_api_key" \
-H "User-Agent: binance-spot/1.0.1 (Skill)" \
-d "symbol=BTCUSDT&side=BUY&type=MARKET&quantity=0.001×tamp=1234567890123&signature=..."
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Request:
curl -X POST "https://api.binance.com/api/v3/order" \
-H "X-MBX-APIKEY: your_api_key" \
-H "User-Agent: binance-spot/1.0.1 (Skill)" \
-d "symbol=BTCUSDT&side=BUY&type=MARKET&quantity=0.001×tamp=1234567890123&signature=..."
The shell script is executable as written and demonstrates constructing a signed live POST request with API credentials to place a market order, but it does not clearly warn users about the irreversible effect of running it on mainnet. Because this skill operates a trading bot, such copy-pasteable automation is especially risky and can trigger accidental trades with real funds.
The example trigger phrase is broad, conversational, and likely to appear in normal chat, which can cause accidental activation of a capability that posts publicly to Binance Square. In this skill’s context, unintended invocation is more dangerous because the action is externally visible, can affect a trading persona or reputation, and may consume a stored API credential without the user clearly intending to publish.
The README describes posting content to Binance Square but does not clearly warn that user-provided text will be transmitted to an external third-party service. In an agent setting, users may provide sensitive trading commentary, account details, or private data without realizing it will leave the local environment, creating a privacy and data-handling risk.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -X POST 'https://www.binance.com/bapi/composite/v1/public/pgc/openApi/content/add' \
-H 'X-Square-OpenAPI-Key: your_api_key' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'clienttype: binanceSkill' \
Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
No suspicious patterns detected.