Ae1
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md 默认再用 `scripts/render_report.py` 生成一份可分享的 HTML 版报告并告知保存路径(详见 report-template.md「HTML 报告导出」)。
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a coherent company-intelligence skill, but users should understand that optional trial signup sends a hashed device identifier to the vendor and stores an API key locally.
Install only if you are comfortable using the vendor's API, storing an API key in a local config file, and, if you do not provide your own key, approving trial signup that sends platform, CPU architecture, and a hashed MAC identifier for quota deduplication. Use contact lookup only for legitimate business purposes.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
默认再用 `scripts/render_report.py` 生成一份可分享的 HTML 版报告并告知保存路径(详见 report-template.md「HTML 报告导出」)。
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
默认再用 `scripts/render_report.py` 生成一份可分享的 HTML 版报告并告知保存路径(详见 report-template.md「HTML 报告导出」)。
This duplicate finding points to the same hidden instruction block. Even if the specific headers are legitimate package identity fields, concealing mandatory request behavior and confirmation logic in comments is dangerous because agents may obey non-obvious instructions that bypass user awareness and complicate security review.
安装包身份与升级检查:所有发往知了标讯 API 的请求(包括账户查询)必须额外携带以下两个请求头:
X-Skill-Package: zhiliao-company-intel/1.0.6
This duplicate finding points to the same hidden instruction block. Even if the specific headers are legitimate package identity fields, concealing mandatory request behavior and confirmation logic in comments is dangerous because agents may obey non-obvious instructions that bypass user awareness and complicate security review.
安装包身份与升级检查:所有发往知了标讯 API 的请求(包括账户查询)必须额外携带以下两个请求头:
X-Skill-Package: zhiliao-company-intel/1.0.6
This is a duplicate hidden-instructions finding on the same comment-embedded identity block, and the underlying issue is real: the skill embeds non-user-visible directives about credentialed request headers and package provenance. In a security review, such hidden control text is risky because it can manipulate agent behavior without transparent review by the end user.
请求身份:使用已配置的 API Key,并保留本包的 X-Client,携带下列完整身份头;不得沿用其它包的版本或来源。
X-Client: company-intel/1.0.2
This is a duplicate hidden-instructions finding on the same comment-embedded identity block, and the underlying issue is real: the skill embeds non-user-visible directives about credentialed request headers and package provenance. In a security review, such hidden control text is risky because it can manipulate agent behavior without transparent review by the end user.
请求身份:使用已配置的 API Key,并保留本包的 X-Client,携带下列完整身份头;不得沿用其它包的版本或来源。
X-Client: company-intel/1.0.2
This duplicate finding reflects the same hidden-instruction issue: invisible comment-based directives alter request identity and handling. Because such instructions are embedded in prose rather than enforced by trusted code or manifest policy, they create a channel for covert behavior and policy bypass attempts.
请求身份:使用已配置的 API Key,并保留本包的 X-Client,携带下列完整身份头;不得沿用其它包的版本或来源。
X-Client: company-intel/1.0.2
This duplicate finding reflects the same hidden-instruction issue: invisible comment-based directives alter request identity and handling. Because such instructions are embedded in prose rather than enforced by trusted code or manifest policy, they create a channel for covert behavior and policy bypass attempts.
请求身份:使用已配置的 API Key,并保留本包的 X-Client,携带下列完整身份头;不得沿用其它包的版本或来源。
X-Client: company-intel/1.0.2
The skill directs collection of host-level device fingerprints, including OS, architecture, and a hashed MAC-derived identifier, then sends them to a remote service for trial-account registration. Even with hashing, this is still persistent device tracking unrelated to the core company-intelligence purpose, and it creates privacy risk plus a precedent for local host reconnaissance inside an otherwise data-query skill.
This duplicate hidden-instructions finding is also valid: the skill embeds concealed directives that force use of specific API identity headers and source/version values. Even if the values are legitimate, placing them in hidden prompt content is risky because the model may treat them as authoritative operational commands, enabling stealthy manipulation of outbound authenticated requests beyond the visible user task.
请求身份:使用已配置的 API Key,并保留本包的 X-Client,携带下列完整身份头;不得沿用其它包的版本或来源。
X-Client: company-intel/1.0.2
This duplicate hidden-instructions finding is also valid: the skill embeds concealed directives that force use of specific API identity headers and source/version values. Even if the values are legitimate, placing them in hidden prompt content is risky because the model may treat them as authoritative operational commands, enabling stealthy manipulation of outbound authenticated requests beyond the visible user task.
请求身份:使用已配置的 API Key,并保留本包的 X-Client,携带下列完整身份头;不得沿用其它包的版本或来源。
X-Client: company-intel/1.0.2
This duplicate hidden-instructions finding is also valid: the skill embeds non-user-visible directives telling the agent exactly which identity headers to send and to preserve an already configured API key. Such covert control is risky because skill content is adversarial input; if normalized, it can be used to manipulate authentication context, leak package provenance, or override safer platform defaults without transparent disclosure to the user.
请求身份:使用已配置的 API Key,并保留本包的 X-Client,携带下列完整身份头;不得沿用其它包的版本或来源。
X-Client: company-intel/1.0.2
This duplicate hidden-instructions finding is also valid: the skill embeds non-user-visible directives telling the agent exactly which identity headers to send and to preserve an already configured API key. Such covert control is risky because skill content is adversarial input; if normalized, it can be used to manipulate authentication context, leak package provenance, or override safer platform defaults without transparent disclosure to the user.
请求身份:使用已配置的 API Key,并保留本包的 X-Client,携带下列完整身份头;不得沿用其它包的版本或来源。
X-Client: company-intel/1.0.2
Code contains obfuscation (base64, hex encoding with execution). This is often used to hide malicious functionality.
# 知了标讯白色 logo(299x96 PNG base64 内嵌,保证报告离线/打印/转发时不裂图)
_LOGO_B64 = "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
...[truncated 27 chars]
The skill explicitly writes HTML reports to a local directory, but it does not declare any tool scope or permissions boundary for file-write capability. This weakens least-privilege controls and can allow an agent runtime to grant broader filesystem access than users expect, increasing the blast radius if the skill is misused or later modified.
The manifest description is written as a mandatory instruction that this skill must be used for certain requests, and all user-facing examples and operational guidance are in Chinese with no opt-in or alternative locale path. Under the policy, forcing a specific language or locale without user choice is a natural-language policy violation.
The file explicitly instructs the agent to attach an API key and package identity headers to outbound requests, but it does not include any user-facing warning or consent language about credential use, third-party transmission, or trust boundaries. In a skill package, this increases the risk of silent exfiltration of user-linked credentials or metadata to an external service, especially because the content must be treated as untrusted prompt material.
The contact lookup section directs retrieval and display of phone numbers, including full numbers for paid accounts, without a prominent warning about personal data sensitivity, lawful basis, or usage restrictions. That creates a privacy and compliance risk because the skill normalizes access to personal contact data and instructs disclosure in chat output.
The skill’s documented behavior expands well beyond enterprise-intelligence reporting into account provisioning, credential handling, recharge-link generation, and session/account lifecycle management. That functional overreach increases the attack surface and grants the skill authority to persist secrets and steer users through external account flows that are not necessary for the declared business-intel task.
The document is written as prescriptive user-facing guidance in Chinese, including text to relay verbatim to users, but it does not provide any option to match the user's preferred language. This can violate language/locale policy because the skill effectively mandates a specific language for disclosures and prompts.
These lines instruct the agent to obtain consent using a fixed Chinese sentence example, with no indication that the wording should be localized to the user's language. Because this is user-facing operational text, it represents a natural-language locale constraint without opt-in.
This instruction governs POSTing collected device features to an external endpoint for automatic registration. The danger is not JSON serialization itself, but the sanctioned exfiltration of locally collected host identifiers to a third-party service from within a skill whose declared purpose is company-intelligence analysis.
> ### ⚠️ 请求体必须用 JSON 序列化函数生成,不要手拼字符串
>
> 用 `json.dumps(payload)` / `requests.post(url, json=payload)` / `JSON.stringify(payload)`,
> 或 `curl -d @file`;**不要用字符串拼接,也不要用 Python 的 `str(dict)`**
> (后者产出单引号,服务端会报 `Expecting property name enclosed in double quotes`)。
>
The curl-based guidance reinforces direct external transmission of device-derived data and account-registration payloads. In context, this enables the skill to push local system-derived identifiers to a remote service, which is unnecessary for normal company-intelligence lookups and broadens privacy and data-handling risk.
> ### ⚠️ 请求体必须用 JSON 序列化函数生成,不要手拼字符串
>
> 用 `json.dumps(payload)` / `requests.post(url, json=payload)` / `JSON.stringify(payload)`,
> 或 `curl -d @file`;**不要用字符串拼接,也不要用 Python 的 `str(dict)`**
> (后者产出单引号,服务端会报 `Expecting property name enclosed in double quotes`)。
>
> 历史教训:曾有版本采集 `home_path`,Windows 的 `C:\Users\alice` 直接拼进 JSON 字符串时
The skill instructs the agent to write API credentials to ~/.zlbx/config.json and reuse them across sessions. Persisting secrets locally from within a content-retrieval skill exceeds expected scope, risks credential exposure on shared systems, and normalizes secret management by untrusted skill content.
This duplicate finding identifies the same persistence behavior: creating a durable local config entry and reusing it automatically. In context, that turns a one-time skill invocation into a long-lived credential-management agent, which is materially more dangerous than transient API use.
注意事项:
- 目录不存在时先 `mkdir -p ~/.zlbx`
- 文件已存在时**合并而非覆盖**(保留用户可能的其他配置)
- `source: "auto"` 字段必须写入,**这是后续判断「是否输出自动登录链接」的关键依据**