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Security audit

Teamgram Architecture

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only Teamgram architecture reference with no executable behavior, persistence, credential use, or hidden authority.

Install this if you want a Chinese-language reference for Teamgram Server architecture. Users who do not read Chinese may need translation, but the inspected artifact does not request sensitive access or perform actions.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The markdown body presents the skill's instructional content exclusively in Chinese, while the manifest does not indicate that the skill is intentionally region- or language-specific. Under the language/locale policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in or justification is a natural-language policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.