T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:84
- Finding
- Unpinned External Dependencies Are Installed Without Integrity Verification## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:84-96`, `SKILL.md:373`, `SKILL-CLAWHUB.md:84-96`, and `SKILL-CLAWHUB.md:373` **Vulnerability Type**: Supply-chain exposure through mutable, unverified external dependencies **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code Snippet ```bash pip install openclaw-public-relations-manager ``` ```bash clawhub install public-relations-manager ``` ```bash git clone https://github.com/ZhenRobotics/openclaw-public-relations-manager cd openclaw-public-relations-manager pip install -e . ``` The final installation instruction is also repeated as: ```bash clawhub install public-relations-manager ``` ### Technical Analysis The audited artifact contains only two duplicate documentation files and does not include the package implementation, dependency lockfile, package hashes, signed release metadata, or a pinned Git commit. The installation instructions therefore cause users to trust mutable content obtained from PyPI, ClawHub, or the repository's current default branch. The `pip install` instruction does not pin an exact package version or verify an artifact hash. The Git installation procedure similarly checks out the mutable default branch rather than a reviewed commit. Moreover, Python package installation can execute attacker-controlled build backend logic or installation hooks. The effective code executed by users may consequently differ from the content available when the skill documentation was audited. This finding establishes a supply-chain weakness, not evidence that the referenced upstream package is currently malicious. The absent implementation also prevents local verification of the claims that the package contains 27 modules and 4,078 lines of code. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the referenced PyPI or ClawHub publisher account, gains control of the upstream repository, or otherwise causes a malicious release to be distributed under the expect ...[truncated 1255 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Include the complete executable source code in the reviewed skill artifact so that installed behavior can be audited together with its documentation. 2. Pin the Python package to an exact reviewed version rather than installing the latest available release. 3. Provide a hash-locked requirements file and require hash verification, for example through `pip install --require-hashes`. 4. Pin Git-based installation instructions to a specific reviewed commit SHA rather than the mutable default branch. 5. Publish signed release artifacts and document signature or provenance verification. 6. Provide a dependency lockfile containing exact transitive dependency versions and integrity hashes. 7. Avoid editable installations in production guidance. Build a reproducible wheel from a verified source revision and install that immutable artifact instead. 8. Recommend installation inside an isolated virtual environment or container using a non-privileged account. 9. Add automated supply-chain controls such as dependency scanning, release provenance generation, protected publisher accounts, and continuous verification that published artifacts match the reviewed source. 10. Apply the corrected instructions consistently to both duplicate documentation files and to the repeated installation command at line 373.