T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:11- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Execution Through npx
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 11–14
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and unverifiable third-party dependency execution
Risk Level: Mediumyaml Requires npm install. allowed-tools: - Bash(hotnews *) - Bash(npx hotnews *)Technical Analysis
The skill permits
npx hotnews *execution but does not pin thehotnewspackage to an audited version or provide a lockfile, integrity hash, canonical registry location, or verified publisher identity.When the package is unavailable locally,
npxcan retrieve it from the configured npm registry and execute its code. The effective implementation may therefore change after this skill has been reviewed. Package lifecycle hooks and the CLI entry point can run code with the privileges of the user operating the agent.This creates a software supply-chain risk. A compromised publisher account, malicious package release, dependency confusion condition, registry compromise, or package ownership transfer could cause future skill invocations to execute attacker-controlled code. The repository contains only
SKILL.md, so the behavior of the external package could not be verified within the audited artifact.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the
hotnewspackage, one of its transitive dependencies, or the package publisher account. - The attacker publishes a malicious package version to the registry resolved by npm.
- The agent loads this skill and invokes an allowed command such as
npx hotnews baidu. - Because no exact version or integrity value is specified,
npxresolves and downloads the malicious release. - Package installation hooks or the CLI entry point execute attacker-controlled code locally.
- The payload operates with the agent process's user privileges and can access resources available in that execution environment.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running th ...[truncated 774 chars]
- An attacker compromises the
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the package to an exact, reviewed version rather than resolving the latest release, for example by using an explicitly verified version such as
hotnews@X.Y.Z. - Document and verify the canonical package name, registry URL, publisher, and source repository to reduce typosquatting and dependency-confusion risks.
- Add a lockfile containing package integrity metadata and enforce deterministic installation with
npm ci. - Verify the package tarball and dependency integrity before execution. Consider signature or provenance verification where supported.
- Disable npm lifecycle scripts with
--ignore-scriptswhere the package can operate without them. - Prefer bundling reviewed source code in the skill package so the executed implementation is included in the audit scope.
- Run the tool in a restricted environment with minimal filesystem access, no unnecessary credentials, limited outbound networking, and no elevated privileges.
- Periodically re-audit the pinned package and its transitive dependencies before upgrading them.
- Pin the package to an exact, reviewed version rather than resolving the latest release, for example by using an explicitly verified version such as
