T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
skill.json:15- Finding
Hard-Coded SkillPay API Credential Distributed with the Project
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a coherent discovery-and-notification service, but it ships a live-looking payment API key and exposes subscription/payment operations without adequate access control.
Review carefully before installing or deploying. Rotate the exposed SkillPay key, replace it with an operator-provided secret, add authentication and signed payment callback verification, avoid exposing this server publicly until subscription endpoints are protected, and document how contact and payment data are stored and used.
skill.json:15Hard-Coded SkillPay API Credential Distributed with the Project
src/index.js:203Unsigned Payment Callback Allows Unpaid Subscription Activation
src/index.js:177Subscription Records Can Be Read or Deleted Without Authentication
src/notifiers/email.js:98External Registry Metadata Is Embedded into HTML, Markdown, and Mermaid Without Escaping
The README appears to expose a concrete SkillPay API key value in the example .env configuration rather than a clearly fake placeholder. Publishing what looks like a real secret can enable unauthorized use of the payment integration, billing abuse, account compromise, or downstream fraud if the credential is valid.
The lockfile pins undici 6.21.3, and the supplied advisories include request/response smuggling, response queue poisoning, and CRLF injection issues. In a skill that appears to make outbound HTTP requests and interact with external services, a vulnerable HTTP client can enable SSRF-adjacent abuse, request confusion, or header injection if untrusted inputs ever influence requests.
axios 1.13.6 is reported with multiple high-severity advisories, including SSRF-related proxy bypass and prototype-pollution-linked attack chains. Because this skill-discovery monitor likely fetches remote content, a vulnerable HTTP library is especially relevant and could expose internal services, credentials, or response integrity if attacker-controlled URLs or proxy settings are involved.
brace-expansion 5.0.4 is associated with multiple DoS issues involving pathological expansion inputs. It appears only as a development dependency path here, so exploitation is less likely in production, but it can still affect development tooling or CI if untrusted patterns are processed.
form-data 4.0.5 is flagged for CRLF injection via multipart field names and filenames. If the application constructs multipart requests from untrusted values, an attacker may be able to manipulate downstream HTTP message structure or inject unintended headers/content.
lodash 4.17.23 is associated with prototype pollution and template-related code injection advisories. The actual exploitability depends on whether vulnerable lodash APIs such as _.unset or _.template are used with attacker-controlled data, which cannot be confirmed from the lockfile alone, but the dependency is genuinely vulnerable.
lodash-es 4.17.23 carries the same pollution and template-related risks as lodash. As a transitive library used by mermaid-related packages, the impact depends on reachable code paths, but the presence of a known-vulnerable version is still a valid dependency risk.
nodemailer 6.10.1 is flagged for multiple high-severity issues including CRLF/header injection. In a monitoring skill that may send alert emails, this is operationally relevant because attacker-influenced email fields could permit header injection, spoofing, or message manipulation.
path-to-regexp 0.1.12 is a genuinely outdated vulnerable dependency in the express routing stack. If exposed routes rely on attacker-controlled paths, vulnerable path parsing can contribute to denial of service or route-matching issues, making it relevant for any internet-facing express service.
picomatch 2.3.1 is reported with high-severity advisories and is present via development tooling. Because it is likely only used by nodemon/chokidar in development, this is less dangerous for deployed runtime but can still affect developer machines or CI if fed malicious glob patterns.
qs 6.14.2 is flagged with multiple high-severity advisories and is used by express/body-parser for query/body parsing. In a service exposing HTTP endpoints, parser bugs can enable prototype pollution, denial of service, or unexpected object-shape manipulation from crafted requests.
undici 7.22.0 is also present and reported with numerous advisories. Since this package underpins network operations for cheerio and possibly other consumers, multiple vulnerable HTTP client versions in one project expand the attack surface for malicious remote content, redirect abuse, smuggling, or header manipulation.
The manifest contains a hard-coded API key directly in skill.json, which exposes a secret to anyone who can access the package or repository. This is especially suspicious because the skill is described as a discovery/monitoring tool, and embedding a live credential in static metadata is unnecessary and enables credential theft, unauthorized API usage, billing abuse, or pivoting into connected services.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Get top AI skills
curl "http://localhost:3000/discover?category=ai&limit=5"
# Get all trending skills
curl "http://localhost:3000/discover?limit=20"
The markdown shows a subscription API that sends a user ID, Telegram chat ID, and preference data, but it does not include any warning about privacy, data handling, or notification side effects. For markdown files, user-facing descriptions should warn when behavior could affect user data or privacy.
The skill exposes notification and subscription flows that collect contact identifiers such as Telegram chat IDs and email addresses, but the documentation provides no privacy notice, retention policy, consent language, or description of how that data is stored and used. This creates privacy and compliance risk because operators may collect personally identifiable information and trigger outbound messaging without clear user disclosure or safeguards.
The configuration section lists sensitive secrets including API keys, bot tokens, webhook URLs, and SMTP credentials without any warning about secure storage, rotation, least-privilege use, or avoiding disclosure in source control and logs. In practice, this omission can lead to secret leakage, unauthorized messaging, account compromise, or abuse of integrated services if users handle the credentials insecurely.
Line L013 states "Full English documentation," and later L089 reinforces "All code in English - Comments, docs, everything!" This is a natural-language locale policy constraint presented as a requirement or project property, with no opt-in or justification for restricting language usage.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
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# Discover AI skills
curl "http://localhost:3000/discover?category=ai&limit=5"
# Get Clawhub skills only
curl "http://localhost:3000/platform/clawhub"
The manifest describes broad discovery, monitoring, and notification capabilities across multiple platforms without clear activation boundaries, scope limitations, or exclusions. Overly generic scope increases the chance the skill is invoked in unintended contexts, potentially leading to excessive data collection, spammy outbound notifications, or actions that users did not explicitly authorize.
The /notify route takes user-supplied channel details and then transmits discovered skill data to Telegram, Discord, and email. While the code performs the action intentionally, this file does not provide a confirmation prompt or explicit user-facing disclosure at the point where external notifications are sent, which is relevant for network transmissions affecting user data and privacy.
The subscription endpoint persists user channel configuration and preferences, and the scheduled task later uses those settings to send reports to external services. Although the behavior appears functional, this file lacks an explicit warning or disclosure that user-provided contact endpoints and report contents will be stored and used for recurring outbound notifications.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
class SkillPayment {
constructor(apiKey) {
this.apiKey = apiKey;
this.baseURL = 'https://api.skillpay.me/v1';
this.pricePerCall = 0.001; // USDT
}
The code transmits userId, transactionId, payment amount, and currency to an external payment service without any visible consent flow, notice, or data-minimization controls in this module. In a skill context, silent transmission of user-linked payment data to a third party can create privacy and compliance risks, especially if users are unaware their identifiers are being shared externally.
This payment creation flow sends userId and payment metadata to an external processor with no visible user-facing notice or consent mechanism in the code. Because this initiates third-party billing-related processing, the lack of transparency is more dangerous in a skill environment where users may not expect their identifiers to be shared off-platform.