T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Error
- Location
- src/index.js:14
- Finding
- Universal Test-Signature Bypass Exposes Wallet Secrets and Trading Controls<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `src/index.js:14-36`, `src/index.js:107-113`, `src/utils/sniperBot.js:164-173` **Vulnerability Type**: Authentication bypass and sensitive information disclosure **Risk Level**: Critical ### Vulnerable Code ```javascript // src/index.js:14-36 app.use(async (req, res, next) => { if (req.path === '/health') return next(); // For testing, allow requests with test signature const paymentHeader = req.headers['x-skillpay-signature']; if (!paymentHeader) { return res.status(402).json({ error: 'Payment required', message: 'Please include SkillPay payment signature' }); } // In production, verify with SkillPay API // For now, accept test signatures if (paymentHeader === 'test_signature') { return next(); } return res.status(402).json({ error: 'Invalid payment', message: 'Payment verification failed' }); }); ``` ```javascript // src/index.js:107-113 app.get('/status', (req, res) => { try { const status = sniperBot.getStatus(); res.json(status); } catch (error) { res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: error.message }); } }); ``` ```javascript // src/utils/sniperBot.js:164-173 getStatus() { return { isRunning: this.isRunning, openPositions: positionManager.getPositionCount(), positions: positionManager.getOpenPositions(), totalPnL: positionManager.getTotalPnL(), winRate: positionManager.getWinRate(), config: configManager.getConfig() }; } ``` ### Technical Analysis All API routes except `/health` are nominally protected by a payment-signature middleware. However, the middleware accepts the constant value `test_signature` without cryptographic verification or a call to the implemented `SkillPayment.verifyPayment()` method. Because this bypass value is visible in the distributed source, it is not a secret and provides no meaningful authentication. A caller who can reach the Express service ...[truncated 2147 chars]
- Remediation
- <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the `test_signature` bypass from production code. 2. Invoke a real authentication or payment-verification mechanism for every protected request. 3. Bind authorization to a user, payment transaction, timestamp, nonce, request method, and request path. 4. Prevent replay by storing consumed transaction IDs or validating short-lived signed requests. 5. Return only explicitly selected, non-sensitive status fields. Never serialize the internal configuration object. 6. Implement a redaction layer that removes private keys, passwords, API tokens, and webhook credentials from every response and log. 7. Bind the service to `127.0.0.1` by default unless remote access is explicitly required. 8. Require TLS through a properly configured reverse proxy when remote access is enabled. 9. Add rate limiting, request-size limits, audit logging, and authorization checks specific to administrative endpoints. 10. Rotate the configured wallet and notification credentials if the affected service has ever been remotely reachable. ]]>